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Abstract
Gaze during situated language production and comprehension is tightly coupled with
the unfolding speech stream – speakers look at entities before mentioning them (Griffin,
2001; Meyer et al., 1998), while listeners look at objects as they are mentioned (Tanen-
haus et al., 1995). Thus, a speaker’s gaze to mentioned objects in a shared environment
provides the listener with a cue to the speaker’s focus of visual attention and poten-
tially to an intended referent. The coordination of interlocutor’s visual attention, in
order to learn about the partner’s goals and intentions, has been called joint attention
(Moore and Dunham, 1995; Emery, 2000). By revealing the speakers communicative in-
tentions, such attentional cues thus complement spoken language, facilitating ground-
ing and sometimes disambiguating references (Hanna and Brennan, 2007).
Previous research has shown that people readily attribute intentional states to non-
humans as well, like animals, computers, or robots (Nass and Moon, 2000). Assuming
that people indeed ascribe intentional states to a robot, joint attention may be a relevant
component of human-robot interaction as well. It was the objective of this thesis to in-
vestigate the hypothesis that people jointly attend to objects looked at by a speaking
robot and that human listeners use this visual information to infer the robot’s commu-
nicative intentions.
Five eye-tracking experiments in a spoken human-robot interaction setting were con-
ducted and provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis. In these experiments, par-
ticipants’ eye movements and responses were recorded while they viewed videos of a
robot that described and looked at objects in a scene. The congruency and alignment
of robot gaze and the spoken references were manipulated in order to establish the
relevance of such gaze cues for utterance comprehension in participants.
Results suggest that people follow robot gaze to objects and infer referential inten-
tions from it, causing both facilitation and disruption of reference resolution, depending
on the match or mismatch between inferred intentions and the actual utterance. Specif-
ically, we have shown in Experiments 1-3 that people assign attentional and intentional
states to a robot, interpreting its gaze as cue to intended referents. This interpretation
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determined how people grounded spoken references in the scene, thus, influencing
overall utterance comprehension as well as the production of verbal corrections in re-
sponse to false robot utterances. In Experiments 4 and 5, we further manipulated tem-
poral synchronization and linear alignment of robot gaze and speech and found that
substantial temporal shifts of gaze relative to speech did not affect utterance compre-
hension while the order of visual and spoken referential cues did. These results show
that people interpret gaze cues in the order they occur in and expect the retrieved ref-
erential intentions to be realized accordingly. Thus, our findings converge to the result
that people establish joint attention with a robot.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Blickrichtung des Menschen ist eng mit Sprachproduktion und Sprachverstehen
verknüpft: So schaut ein Sprecher in der Regel auf ein Objekt kurz bevor er es nennt,
während der Blick des Hörers sich beim Verstehen des Objektnamens darauf richtet
(Griffin, 2001; Meyer et al., 1998; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Die Blickrichtung des Sprech-
ers gibt dem Hörer also Aufschluss darüber, wohin die Aufmerksamkeit des Sprechers
gerade gerichtet ist und worüber möglicherweise als nächstes gesprochen wird. Wenn
jemand dem Blick seines Gegenübers folgt, um herauszufinden was dieser für Ziele
oder Absichten hat, spricht man von gemeinsamer Aufmerksamkeit (Joint Attention,
bzw. Shared Attention, wenn beide Gesprächspartner ihre Aufmerksamkeit bewusst
koordinieren, Moore and Dunham, 1995; Emery, 2000). Der Blickrichtung des Sprech-
ers zu folgen kann demnach nützlich sein, da sie häufig seine Absichten verrät. Sie
kann sogar das Sprachverstehen erleichtern, indem zum Beispiel referenzierende Aus-
drücke mit Hilfe solcher visuellen Informationen disambiguiert werden (Hanna and
Brennan, 2007).
Darüber hinaus wurde in der Vergangenheit gezeigt, dass Menschen häufig nicht
nur Menschen, sondern auch Tieren und Maschinen, wie zum Bespiel Robotern, Ab-
sichten oder Charakterzüge zuschreiben (Nass and Moon, 2000). Wenn Robotern tat-
sächlich die eigentlich menschliche Fähigkeit, Ziele oder Absichten zu haben, zugeord-
net wird, dann ist davon auszugehen, dass gemeinsame Aufmerksamkeit auch einen
wichtigen Bestandteil der Kommunikation zwischen Mensch und Roboter darstellt.
Ziel dieser Dissertation war es, die Hypothese zu untersuchen, dass Menschen ver-
suchen Aufmerksamkeit mit Robotern zu teilen, um zu erkennen was ein Roboter be-
absichtigt zu sagen oder zu tun.
Wir stellen insgesamt fünf Experimente vor, die diese Hypothese unter-
stützen. In diesen Experimenten wurden die Augenbewegungen und Antworten,
beziehungsweise Reaktionszeiten, von Versuchspersonen aufgezeichnet, während let-
ztere sich Videos anschauten. Die Videos zeigten einen Roboter, welcher eine Anord-
nung von Objekten beschrieb, während er seine Kamera auf das ein oder andere Objekt
v
richtete um Blickrichtung zu simulieren. Manipuliert wurde die Kongruenz der Ver-
weise auf Objekte durch Blickrichtung und Objektnamen, sowie die Abfolge solcher
Verweise. Folglich konnten der Informationsgehalt und die relative Gewichtung von
Blickrichtung für das Sprachverstehen bestimmt werden.
Unsere Ergebnisse belegen, dass Menschen tatsächlich dem Roboterblick folgen und
ihn ähnlich interpretieren wie die Blickrichtung anderer Menschen, d.h. Versuchsper-
sonen leiteten aus der Blickrichtung des Roboters ab, was dessen vermeintliche (sprach-
liche) Absichten waren.
Insbesondere zeigen die Experimente 1-3, dass Versuchspersonen die Blickrichtung
des Roboters als Hinweis auf nachfolgende referenzierende Ausdrücke verstehen und
dementsprechend die Äußerung des Roboter speziell auf jene angeschauten Objekte
beziehen. Dies führt zu verkürzten Reaktionszeiten wenn die Verweise auf Objekte
durch Blickrichtung und Objektnamen übereinstimmen, während widersprüchliche
Verweise zu verlängerten Reaktionszeiten führen. Dass Roboterblick als Ausdruck
einer (sprachlichen) Absicht interpretiert wird, zeigt sich auch in den Antworten, mit
denen Versuchspersonen falsche Aussagen des Roboters korrigierten. In den Experi-
menten 4-5 wurde außerdem die Anordnung der Verweise durch Blick und Sprache
manipuliert. Während die genaue zeitliche Abstimmung der Verweise den Einfluss
von Roboterblick nicht mindert, so scheint die Reihenfolge der Verweise entscheidend
zu sein. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Menschen Absichten aus den Ver-
weisen durch Blickrichtung ableiten und erwarten, dass diese Absichten in dersel-
ben Anordnung umgesetzt werden. Insgesamt lassen unsere Ergebnisse also darauf
schließen, dass Menschen versuchen, ihre Aufmerksamkeit gemeinsam mit Robotern
zu koordinieren, um das Sprachverstehen zu erleichtern.
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1. Introduction
According to an old and widespread proverb, the eyes are windows to the soul. The
validity of this statement has, at least to some extent, been supported by a large body of
previous psychological and psycholinguistic research. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997a) state,
for instance, that
"we showed that a small number of other mental states can also be read
from direction of gaze. These include desire, refer, and goal (Baron-Cohen,
Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995). That is, our natural
reading of gaze directed at a specific object is in terms of a person’s voli-
tional states. This should come as no surprise, since we tend to look at what
we want, and to what we are referring, and at what we are about to act
upon." (p.312)
The primary function of directing gaze is certainly related to the act of seeing. To fixate
something or somebody lets us inspect it or her in greater detail. Additionally, gaze in
communication reflects numerous different processes and responds to many cues. It
conveys, for instance, information about emotions, goals or desires: The eyes of the
partner may express a certain emotion and where they are directed during talking may
express a certain attitude (Argyle and Dean, 1965; Dovidio and Ellyson, 1982; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997b). Depending on the occurrence and duration, direct eye contact (also
called mutual gaze) with a partner may appear threatening or dominant, while averted
gaze may appear submissive or arrogant (Dovidio and Ellyson, 1982). Moreover, gaze
may help organizing communication. Mutual gaze, for example, can be a useful cue for
a listener to signal that she will take a speaking turn (Kendon, 1967). In addition to these
meta-linguistic functions of gaze, it can also reflect information that is directly linked
to the content of a spoken utterance. A deictic expression accompanied by a glance
towards a certain object may be a valid and comprehensible reference for a listener
in face-to-face communication (Clark and Krych, 2004). Thus, a listener seems to be
able to link the spoken reference to the object which is in focus of the speaker’s visual
attention.
1
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The emphasis of this thesis is precisely on this linguistically relevant role of gaze,
potentially communicating attentional states and referential intentions which may in-
fluence both production as well as comprehension of an utterance.
Previously, gaze has been widely studied as an indicator for overt visual attention
during language processing and it was shown that where we look is closely related to
what we say and understand. Studies have revealed, for instance, that speakers look
at entities roughly 800msec - 1sec. before mentioning them (Griffin, 2001; Meyer et al.,
1998), while listeners inspect objects as soon as 200-400msec after the onset of the cor-
responding referential noun (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Allopenna et al., 1998). This shows
that eye gaze during situated language production and comprehension is tightly cou-
pled with the unfolding speech stream. In face-to-face communication, the speaker’s
gaze to mentioned objects in a shared environment also provides the listener with a vi-
sual cue as to the speaker’s focus of (visual) attention (Flom et al., 2007). Following this
cue in order to attend to the same object as the partner has been dubbed joint attention
(by Emery, 2000, and others as reviewed in Section 2.4). By revealing a speaker’s focus
of visual attention, such gaze cues potentially offer the listener valuable information to
ground and sometimes disambiguate referring expressions, to hypothesize about the
speaker’s communicative intentions and goals and, thus, to facilitate comprehension
(e.g., Clark and Krych, 2004; Hanna and Brennan, 2007).
It is an interesting question whether such gaze behavior is unique to human-human
interaction – possibly hinging on common biological and cognitive mechanisms – or
whether such gaze cues play a similar role in human-machine interaction. Previous
research has shown that people readily attribute intentional states and personality traits
to non-humans as well, like animals or artificial agents such as robots (see e.g. Nass
and Moon, 2000, or Kiesler et al., 2008, for overviews). Assuming that people indeed
ascribe intentional states (or at least goal-directedness) to robots, joint attention may be
an important component of human-robot interaction as well.
Before addressing this issue, we will briefly review the most relevant findings on
gaze and its coupling to language as well the role of gaze for joint attention. We then
explain to what extent the insights on human gaze have been used to enrich human-
computer interaction and which important questions remain to be investigated. Finally,
we discuss whether robot gaze can in principle fulfill similar functions as human gaze
and how we have examined this issue, before giving an overview of the theoretical and
experimental work presented in this thesis.
2
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1.1. Use of Gaze during Language Processing
Since language is often vague and ambiguous, additional non-verbal cues supporting
and augmenting the conveyed message or the retrieval of information are potentially
useful in face-to-face communication. While cues like pointing generally complement
spoken language and are potentially useful to ground and disambiguate an utterance in
the scene (Hanna and Brennan, 2007), gaze seems to be a special one among such non-
verbal cues: Gaze is permanently available since people constantly use and move their
eyes even when their gaze is not related to language production or comprehension.
Further, gaze is extremely diverse in its expressiveness conveying various emotions
and other mental states as suggested by a large body of research (see, e.g., Adams and
Kleck, 2003; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b; Dovidio and Ellyson, 1982).
The close coupling of language and gaze has been established in a number of studies
(Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Allopenna et al., 1998; Meyer et al., 1998; Altmann and Kamide,
1999; Griffin and Bock, 2000; Altmann and Kamide, 2004; Knoeferle et al., 2005). On one
hand, where people look is driven by what they hear or say (linguistic processing), and
on the other hand, it is driven by what they see (visual processing, Henderson, 2003)
which includes speakers’ gaze as a visual cue. Possibly because of this systematic and
automatic coupling listeners can interpret speakers’ eye-movements on-line as visual
references.
Whether, and how, the close alignment of visuo-linguistic processes helps listeners to
comprehend utterance content, is subject to ongoing research (Crocker et al., in press).
Previous studies on joint attention suggest that people do indeed monitor and use each
others gaze and speech in face-to-face communication to rapidly ground and resolve
spoken utterances with respect to a common environment (Moore and Dunham, 1995;
Clark and Krych, 2004; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007). That is, where a speaker looks
may constraint the domain of interpretation for the listener (Hanna and Brennan, 2007)
and where a listener looks may tell the speaker that she has misunderstood such that
the speaker may decide to repeat or to further specify a referring expression (Clark and
Krych, 2004).
Thus, referential gaze is closely aligned to speech – and the question arises what
happens when this alignment is disrupted. That is, how do people deal with gaze cues
that are incongruent or miss-aligned with the spoken utterance? Such situations occur,
for instance, when misunderstandings lead to the use of inappropriate objects names in
both human-human or human-computer interaction. In the latter, incongruent multi-
3
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modal references (i.e., combined linguistic and visual cues) could easily be caused by an
agent’s "mis-programmed" gaze movements or errors in its object recognition. Insights
on how inappropriate co-occurrences of gaze and speech cues are resolved offer the
potential to illuminate the nature of gaze influence as well as the integration process of
information provided through different modalities such as language and vision.
1.2. Mechanisms behind the Use of Gaze as a Cue
Listeners may use speaker gaze as a timely cue to utterance content, possibly because
of the tight coupling of gaze and speech mentioned above. In order to understand why
and how people use each others gaze as referential cues, the notion of visual atten-
tion is essential. It helps to establish and understand the connection between eye gaze
and its referents in the external world. Allocation of visual attention allows more de-
tailed inspection of one aspect in the environment (selectivity) while limiting processing
of other (visual) information (capacity limitation) (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone and Dun-
can, 1995). That is, an entity that is being looked at is typically in the focus of visual
attention, allowing investigation of the entity’s visual features in greater detail. How-
ever, visual focus and visual attention can be dissociated such that a person may direct
her visual focus (gaze, also called overt attention) towards an object while she already
shifts (covert) attention to another entity (Posner, 1980). While covert visual attention
can be shifted without shifting eye-gaze, the opposite is not necessarily the case (Hoff-
man and Subramaniam, 1995; Posner, 1980). That is, gaze shifts are preceded by covert
visual attention shifts. Consequently, following the interlocutors’ overt gaze shifts typ-
ically reveals information about what she is or has been visually attending to and may
result in joint attention to the entity in focus.
Following Emery (2000), we consider joint attention to occur when a subject follows
another subject’s gaze to mutually attend to an entity, while possibly inferring her refer-
ential intentions. Joint attention presupposes that the gazer has attentional states such
that the follower has reason to consider the looked-at entity as relevant. Further, the
term shared attention is used to refer to a similar phenomenon which additionally in-
volves intention sharing: One person intentionally directs another person’s gaze to an
object by looking at this object, in order to communicate goals for cooperating in task
completion or just to share the experience (Emery, 2000).
It was previously investigated what kind of attention shift gaze cues may elicit (po-
tentially resulting in joint attention) and to which extent eye gaze influences the as-
4
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signment of attentional and intentional states to the gazer. Results suggest that people
follow gaze, and infer mental states from it, since they learned that other human beings
are similar to themselves and that seeing something with one’s eyes means attending to
it (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Meltzoff and Brooks, 2007). This attribution of perceptual
(seeing) mental states as well as volitional mental states (desires, goals) to oneself and
to others is a prerequisite for building a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995). To have
a theory of mind means to use knowledge about mental states in general, and about
epistemic mental states (believing, knowing, pretending) in particular, in a "theory-
like" way to reason about and predict actions of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p.51ff).
Therefore, having a theory of mind of others implies the capacity to interpret other’s
behavior in terms of mental states (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Frith and Frith, 2005).
In other words, an individual can draw inferences about why another person behaves
likes she does because she can imagine what goals and intentions have elicited this be-
havior. Thus, it seems that the development of a theory of mind is a crucial component
underling the use of gaze as a cue to (referential) intentions. It follows that the role
of gaze in language production and comprehension is similarly closely related to our
understanding of the partner as an intentional being since the interpretation of gaze as
a cue to intended referents requires the assignment of perceptual and volitional states
to the gazer.
1.3. Robot Gaze in Interaction with a Person
Despite the generally growing interest in human-computer/human-robot interaction
(HCI/HRI) to incorporate natural gaze mechanisms, the psycholinguistic findings con-
cerning referential gaze described above have not been systematically investigated.
Rather, previous work on gaze in in HCI/HRI has concentrated largely on the general
appearance of the agent and what competences and characteristics people intuitively
ascribe to agents featuring certain gaze behaviors. Kanda and colleagues (2001), for in-
stance, equipped their robot with very basic gaze movements and observed that people
generally found the interaction more enjoyable than when the robot showed no gaze
movements. Thus, robot gaze can, on one hand, improve agreeableness of HRI. On
the other hand, robot gaze can be dysfunctional and disturb smooth interaction. In the
same study, Kanda et al. (2001) found that the robot’s crude gaze movements resulted
in a lower performance judgement revealed by a post-experiment questionnaire. Simi-
larly, Sidner and colleagues (2005) found that participants judged the robot they had to
5
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interact with to be less ’reliable’ when it showed gaze (or head) movement. It was also
found, however, that participants became more non-verbally engaged in the conversa-
tion with a robot when it showed gaze behavior (see also Wang et al., 2006). That is,
participants produced more head nods and gaze cues in response to a robot that also
produced such cues.
Another study conducted by Cassell et al. (1999c) revealed that the usage of mu-
tual gaze is a function of turn-coordination and discourse information structure. This
finding was partially used to implement and test a model for gaze production on a vir-
tual agent (Cassell et al., 1999a; Cassell and Thórisson, 1999) and a robot (Mutlu et al.,
2006). Results showed that such gaze behavior elicited positive impressions (agent was
perceived as helpful and lifelike) and improved people’s ability to later recall facts men-
tioned in this interaction.
The above mentioned studies on HCI suggest that gaze in one way or the other affects
the impression a person or agent makes. Since appropriate and inappropriate robot be-
havior positively and negatively influences HCI, respectively, improvement of agent
gaze behavior requires more information on human gaze production and processing.
Psycholinguistic evidence reported in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, for instance, show that gaze
can provide additional information that helps to quickly link the accompanying utter-
ance to the world and guide attention accordingly. There has been limited research in
HCI, however, that makes use of gaze as a visual modality which augments speech and
elicits joint attention with an artificial agent and which may be used to ground and dis-
ambiguate references. Breazeal and colleagues (2005), for instance, provided empirical
results using their robot Leonardo which showed that people generally use non-verbal
behavior such as object-directed gaze to detect errors in the robot’s knowledge and to
correct these errors. However, the role of intentional states for the occurrence of joint
attention in HRI needs to be addressed first in order to establish a link between the
utility of gaze in HHI and HCI/HRI.
1.4. A Theory of Robot Gaze and (Joint) Attention
The findings on gaze in HCI/HRI reported above are largely subjective measures taken
off-line and, in many cases, an observed improvement of the interaction may simply
be due to agent/robot gaze behavior engaging the user at a very general level. Psy-
cholinguistic findings (as in Sections 1.1 and 1.2) show, however, that gaze is useful
beyond general engagement. Since speaker gaze, for instance, is tightly coupled with
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her utterance, a listener may use this visual cue to infer the speaker’s focus of visual
attention and, thus, her referential intentions (Hanna and Brennan, 2007). Therefore,
closely observing the partner’s gaze during interaction offers benefits for (listener’s) ut-
terance comprehension and may also facilitate (speaker’s) utterance production (Clark
and Krych, 2004). In this thesis, we aim to explore whether utterance-mediated robot
gaze can be similarly beneficial for HRI by applying the psycholinguistic findings on
speech and gaze production to our robot and observing people’s responses to the robot
utterances.
As noted above, the use of such language-mediated gaze for joint and shared atten-
tion may well be unique to human-human interaction (HHI), possibly relying on (a) a
shared biological apparatus and its functions (e.g., eyes that see), (b) certain shared
cognitive mechanisms (a person knows from experience that she looks at objects her-
self, e.g., when mentioning them or when mentioned by others), (c) a theory of mind
about our interaction partner (i.e., the ability to reason about why someone looks at
something) and/or (d) the fact that human gaze is typically informative in some way
or another (people almost always look at something or somebody, for some reason). In
order to improve robot behavior for HRI, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to
find out to what extent robots are a useful and suitable tool to study human percep-
tion and integration of multimodal referential cues, it is essential to examine whether
people behave similarly in an HRI setting as in HHI and whether they apply similar
expectations and mechanisms in the first place. We provide supporting evidence from
five eye-tracking experiments in an HRI scenario, suggesting that people do exactly
that.
In these experiments, participants were shown videos of a robot (Figure 1.1) describ-
ing objects in a scene while looking at objects. Participants were eye-tracked while
observing these videos. They were additionally asked to quickly determine the cor-
rectness of the robot’s statement with respect to the scene by pressing a button (Exper-
iments 1, 2, 4 and 5), or to correct the robot’s false statements orally (Experiment 3).
Thus, we consider listeners’ eye-movements in the scene, in response to robot gaze and
speech, and task responses. Crucially, the tasks that participants were asked to per-
form in these experiments neither required people to pay attention to robot gaze nor
did robot gaze significantly facilitate task completion.
We identify four levels of possible responses when people need to comprehend the
robot’s spoken statements – accompanied by robot gaze – about the shared environ-
ment. Response levels reflect the extent to which people ascribe human-like attentional
7
1. Introduction
Figure 1.1.: Robot interaction partner. Its head and gaze direction is realized by the stereo-
camera mounted on a pan-tilt-unit.
mechanisms and intentions to the robot.
1. People ignore robot gaze if they do not consider the robot to share biological and
cognitive mechanism and do not recognize a robot’s head/eyes movement as a
gaze movement or as a useful cue in general.
2. People may follow robot gaze, possibly reflexively as observed in response to
stylized gaze cues (and other symbolic cues such as arrows) in previous studies
(Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999). It
is an interesting question whether the visual information obtained after such a
reflexive attention shift would affect further (visual and linguistic) processing.
3. If people treat the robot’s camera movement as a type of eye gaze – that is, they
accept it as a similar way of seeing which fulfills similar functions – we predict that
people use robot gaze as an attentional cue. Thus, people not only follow robot
gaze, they rather seek to find out what the robot attends to and may establish joint
attention with it. The obtained visual information may be linked (via the robot’s
attentional state) to the robot’s utterance, helping to ground and predict utterance
content. Utterance comprehension will, thus, be affected by robot gaze in terms
of comprehension speed and/or reference resolution.
4. If people consider the robot to have intentional states, they may further try to
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reason about why the robot looks at an object and draw inferences about inten-
tions, i.e. they will try to establish shared attention with the robot. Considering that
shared attention requires both individuals to consciously and intentionally coor-
dinate mutual attention, it remains an open question whether this can ever be
fully established between a human and a robot, in particular when using video-
based presentation. However, reasoning about the robot’s perceptual and belief
states would clearly affect utterance interpretation and inferences people make
about the robot’s intentions.
The implications for points 3 and 4 are certainly similar and hard to distinguish by
purely behavioral observations. Essentially, in level 3 people are assumed to ascribe
attentional states to the robot which links gazed at and mentioned objects to infer com-
municative intentions, while level 4 implies the intentional sharing of perceptual states
and goals. That is, people may reason about why the robot did something and what it
intended to say or do.
Previous studies that were concerned with the assignment of human traits and char-
acteristics to computers (anthropomorphism) and the mindless application of social rules
in human-computer interaction (Nass and Moon, 2000) mostly considered certain types
of language use (e.g., dominant, assertive language versus submissive, equivocal lan-
guage), outer appearance of the agent or general information about the robot eliciting
stereotypical knowledge. While the results of these studies generally encourage the
hypothesis that people indeed ascribe intentional states to a robot, our manipulations
apply to a visual cue consisting of a simple movement only. Such a cue potentially
reveals attentional states, rather than implementing and eliciting social conventions or
personality traits, as mentioned above and, yet, may similarly affect utterance compre-
hension.
1.5. Overview of the Thesis
In this thesis we investigate the on-line influence of language-mediated robot gaze on
human visual attention, utterance comprehension and intention recognition. We re-
port evidence from five eye-tracking experiments on people’s interaction with a robot,
exploring whether people use robot gaze to establish joint attention and to draw infer-
ences about the referent intended by the robot. Results from these experiments provide
insights on the issue whether people apply similar mechanisms and behaviors when
interacting with a robot as they do in HHI. Thus, results from our studies reveal to
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what extent robots are a useful and suitable tool to further study human perception of
gaze. Once it is established that this is a valid paradigm, experiments in such a setting
may provide insights on the integration of (possibly conflicting) multimodal referential
cues and their interaction. Thus, on one hand, the results from human-robot interaction
studies reported in this thesis potentially contribute to the extension of existing theo-
ries on the general perception of gaze cues and their effects for interlocutors’ attention
coordination as well as language processing. On the other hand, implications of the
reported work may affect the future development and design of robots, enabling more
natural and effective face-to-face communication.
In an extensive review of relevant literature from psychology, psycholinguistics, and
human-machine interaction provided in Chapter 2, we present current theories on
gaze-processing in human-human interaction and motivate our attempt to replicate
and extend some of these findings within a human-robot interaction setting. Further-
more, we consider previous work on the utility of gaze in general human-computer
interaction and point out some short-comings that we have tried to overcome in our
studies. We additionally motivate our initial experimental design and present results
of a pilot study which influenced the design of subsequent experiments. Results from
this pilot study were previously published in a workshop paper presented at HRI’08
(Staudte and Crocker, 2008).
In Chapter 3, we introduce the revised experimental design and report findings from
Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically, Experiment 1 examined whether human gaze is gen-
erally influenced by both robot speech (revealed by the listener’s looks towards a men-
tioned object) and gaze (looks towards an object fixated by the robot) and Experiment
2 determined whether robot gaze is indeed beneficial to the comprehension of robot
speech. We manipulated congruency and validity of the produced robot gaze behavior
to separate the effects of robot gaze and speech. Results of these experiments relate
to response levels 1 (ignoring gaze) and 2 (reflexive gaze-following) identified above.
These results have been presented at the Conference on Human-Robot Interaction and
were published in the corresponding proceedings (Staudte and Crocker, 2009c).
Experiment 3 is presented in Chapter 4 and served to distinguish between two pos-
sible explanations for the results from Experiment 2. Specifically, it was investigated
whether people drew inferences about intended referents as a function of robot gaze.
Results from this experiment relate to response levels 2 and 3 (joint attention), sup-
porting the hypothesis that people assign intentional states to the robot. These findings
have been published in the proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
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Society (Staudte and Crocker, 2009a,b).
In Chapter 5, Experiments 4 and 5 provide insights on the flexibility of gaze and
speech synchronization. Experiment 4 focused on exploring temporal and sequential
alignment of robot gaze and speech. While results suggested that temporal synchro-
nization is not essential for robot gaze to facilitate utterance comprehension, a sequen-
tially incoherent order of gaze and speech cues seemed to disrupt people. In Experi-
ment 5, we contrasted this type of coherent and incoherent behavior with neutral robot
gaze to study the issue of synchronization in more detail. Results from this chapter
provided further evidence in favor of response level 3.
A general discussion of the findings from all experiments and their contribution to
current research are provided in Chapter 6. We further discuss ideas for future work
before concluding this thesis.
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2. The Utility of Gaze in Situated
Communication
In this chapter, we consider the following kinds and uses of gaze in greater detail.
Section 2.1 reviews social functions of eye gaze which are manifold and comprise,
for instance, the expression of emotions, desires and other mental states (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1995, 1997b; Adams and Kleck, 2003). The specific production patterns of such
gaze cues as well as their interpretation is influenced by social conventions and may
therefore vary across cultures, sex or social status (e.g., LaFrance and Mayo, 1976; Do-
vidio and Ellyson, 1982; Greenbaum, 1985; Yuki et al., 2007; Schofield et al., 2008). The
frequency and duration of mutual gaze as a non-verbal cue to help coordinating speak-
ing turns in a conversation may similarly vary with the conventional and personal use
of mutual gaze in general (Dovidio and Ellyson, 1982). While a certain pattern for the
use of direct gaze cues has been established as relatively reliable (Kendon, 1967), a turn-
taking signal can be realized by several cues (Duncan, 1972; Sacks et al., 1974) such that
gaze occurrence can vary without immediate function loss (Section 2.2).
In addition to mutual and averted gaze, object-directed gaze also plays a role in social
interaction and conveys different kinds of information (see Section 2.3). Object-directed
gaze occurs in a pattern that suggests close coupling with the production and compre-
hension of linguistic content (Allopenna et al., 1998; Meyer et al., 1998; Altmann and
Kamide, 1999; Griffin and Bock, 2000). It seems that this type of object-directed or refer-
ential gaze is indeed produced (and maybe therefore interpreted) in a more automatic
manner, probably largely independent of social conventions.
A large body of research reviewed in Section 2.4 supports the view that the way
people generally follow gaze (and use it to establish joint attention) is potentially a
universal behavior which develops at a very early age (D’Entremont et al., 1997; Moll
et al., 2006; Meltzoff and Brooks, 2007) and becomes a reliable source of information
in face-to-face communication (e.g., Clark and Krych, 2004; Hanna and Brennan, 2007;
Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007). This section further presents evidence indicating what
13
2. The Utility of Gaze in Situated Communication
it means to establish joint and shared attention and what processes are involved in
these phenomena. Furthermore, gaze-following seems to be such a reliable behavior
that previous studies could show that gaze cues elicit reflexive attention shifts (Friesen
and Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999).
In Section 2.5 we explain how referential speaker gaze is used to establish joint atten-
tion between speaker and listener and, thus, to facilitate language comprehension for
the listener. People follow each other’s gaze to jointly attend to an aspect of the envi-
ronment, possibly because people know that, on one hand, gaze reflects visual inquiry
(i.e., seeing, Baron-Cohen et al., 1995, 1997b). On the other hand, people have experi-
enced that object-directed gaze is typically closely related to linguistic content so that
they use the visual information obtained through gaze-following to infer communica-
tive intentions of their partners. This way, referential gaze and the attentional state it
reflects influence further utterance production and comprehension (Clark and Krych,
2004; Hanna and Brennan, 2007).
We present results and insights from previous research on each of the functions of
gaze mentioned above and explain how partial results have been applied within the
general field of human-computer interaction (HCI) in order to improve communica-
tion between robots or virtual agents and human users (Section 2.6). Most implementa-
tions of gaze behavior focused on the use of mutual gaze to increasingly convey general
engagement of an agent (Kanda et al., 2001; Sidner et al., 2005) or to support the coordi-
nation of speaking turns (Cassell et al., 1999a,c; Cassell and Thórisson, 1999). The type
of referential gaze that has been observed in spoken human-human interaction and
which leads to joint visual attention between interlocutors (see Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5)
has to our knowledge not been implemented or empirically investigated within HCI.
In Section 2.7 we explain how we have addressed this issue and argue for the validity
of our approach.
2.1. Social Gaze
The eyes give away reliable information about the emotional and mental state of a per-
son and, thus, play an important role for taking someone’s measure. Adams and Kleck
(2003) have shown, for instance, that the direction of eye gaze influences what emotion
and how quickly this emotion is identified from a depicted face. Participants in this
study were given pictures of faces expressing approach or avoidance related emotions
(anger versus fear and joy versus sadness, respectively) while showing direct gaze, i.e.
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towards the opponent, or averted gaze, that is, away from the opponent. Participants
had to indicate which emotions they saw by clicking a mouse button as fast as possi-
ble. A second set of stimuli further contained faces with a blend of an emotion pair
(anger/fear), again combined with both direct and averted gaze. Response times sug-
gest that gaze direction facilitates the recognition of approach related emotions while
averted gaze facilitates avoidance related emotions. Gaze direction further modulated
which emotion was recognized in the blended pictures.
While this study suggests that gaze direction and facial expression are not indepen-
dent of each other, others have shown that eye gaze alone can be a reliable indicator
to a person’s mental state. Baron-Cohen and colleagues showed that people not only
recognize basic emotions but also complex mental states from seeing only the eyes of a
person (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b). In one study, an actress displayed various mental
states and emotions and participants were given pictures of either the whole face, only
the eyes or only the mouth of the posing actress. A forced choice test where partici-
pants had to choose between two words to best describe the picture resulted in very
high accuracy for face and eyes display for complex mental states. Accuracy was also
very high for recognizing emotions from faces and reasonably high when only the eyes
were displayed.
However, the reported results on the interpretation of eye gaze with respect to dis-
played emotions, attitudes or desires, do not necessarily reveal universally valid gaze
patterns. It may be biologically plausible that direct and averted gaze is essentially
related to approach and avoidance behavior (Emery, 2000). However, when and how
often people directly look at each other, i.e., establish mutual gaze, and how emotions are
read from eye-gaze can vary considerably. Cross-cultural studies have investigated the
frequency and the occasion at which people establish mutual gaze. Yuki et al. (2007),
for instance, conducted a study showing that Americans used people’s eyes for inter-
preting displayed emotions to a lesser extent than did Japanese participants. While the
former concentrated on the mouth, the latter used mostly the eyes to recognize emo-
tions from both illustrated faces and photographs. One possible explanation according
to the authors is that most East Asian cultures like the Japanese require that emotions
be frequently subdued. Western cultures, in contrast, appreciate and often demand the
overt expression of feelings. This cultural distinction is suggested to promote the eyes
for Japanese as an indicator for emotions since eye-movement and the eyes’ expres-
sion are assumed to be harder to control than muscles around the mouth. Similarly,
the mouth is considered more important for people who typically display emotions
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overtly and rely on the interpretation of those (Yuki et al., 2007). A different aspect of
eye-gaze which similarly seems to vary across ethnic and cultural groups concern the
use of mutual gaze for interaction regulation (LaFrance and Mayo, 1976; Greenbaum,
1985; Schofield et al., 2008). LaFrance and Mayo (1976) found, for instance, that the
frequency of listeners’ looks at the speaker varied across race as well as sex. More evi-
dence for differences in (mutual) gaze behavior in gender has been provided by numer-
ous studies, sometimes unexpectedly as shown in an HRI study by Mutlu et al. (2006),
or more systematically, reported by Argyle and Dean (1965). The latter further found
supporting evidence that the amount of mutual gaze is related to the relationship inter-
locutors have with each other. Specifically, they showed that the amount of eye-contact
is modulated by the physical proximity of interlocutors which is considered to reflect
the level of intimacy: The closer two people were placed, the less eye-contact was estab-
lished – which seems to establish and reflect a certain level of intimacy by itself. It has
been shown that the amount of time spent looking at the interlocutor during speaking
and listening modulates the impression a person makes with respect to conveyed dom-
inance and social power: Dovidio and Ellyson (1982) varied the proportion of time a
confederate spent looking at her interlocutor while speaking conpared to looking while
listening. These dyads were recorded and viewed by subjects who rated the perceived
social power of the confederate. Results suggested that the more time a person spent
looking while speaking (and the less time she spent looking while listening), the more
social power was attributed to her. This further shows that social conventions and rules
underly certain gaze patterns and how these are encoded and decoded via eye gaze.
2.2. Meta-Linguistic Organization of Conversation
Mutual gaze is a cue that people use in face-to-face conversation also to signal and ac-
knowledge whose speaking turn it is (Kendon, 1967; Duncan, 1972). Kendon (1967),
for instance, found that a speaker averts her gaze when she begins a long utterance
(> 5s duration) and gazes at the listener when she approaches the end of a long utter-
ance. This pattern was established in a study in which Kendon (1967) recorded dyadic
face-to-face conversations between participants who had the simple task to get to know
each other. Kendon hypothesized that the speaker averts gaze at the beginning of long
utterance since planning and execution of the utterance requires concentration and by
looking away from the listener the speaker shuts out an additional information source.
In contrast, when approaching the end of an utterance, the speaker signals this to the
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listener and thereby offers her the next speaking turn. This interpretation was further
supported by the finding that listeners indeed seem to resume speaking instantly when
being looked at and more often fail to do so when not being looked at. While duration
and amount of mutual gaze varied considerably between subjects, the use of averted
and direct gaze before and after turn boundaries seemed stable. Duncan (1972) further
reported and analyzed the use of many more cues for turn-taking such as intonation,
body motion and gestures, or pitch and similarly included head turns (considered iden-
tical to Kendon’s gaze cue). Duncan (1972) showed that when the speaker displayed
one or more such turn-yielding cues towards the end of her utterance, the chance of
simultaneous turns (when speaker and listener attempt to both talk) decreased dramat-
ically. These results show that meta-linguistic organization is achieved by following
rules for verbal and non-verbal signal exchange including mutual and averted gaze.
Similarly, efficiency strategies for cognitive processing may influence the usage of such
gaze cues.
2.3. Gaze in Relation to Linguistic Content
The studies mentioned above have investigated mostly how direct or mutual versus
averted gaze reflects and evokes certain mental states. Most of these gaze behaviors
play a role in establishing and maintaining a social relationship between interlocutors.
Part of this social relationship is the way people coordinate speaking turns (which may,
for instance, signal social power or the lack of it) and which can be supported by non-
verbal cues such as direct and averted gaze. Another aspect of gaze is related to under-
standing that eyes capture information about the environment, i.e., that they are used
for seeing – seeing not only the partner but also objects, other persons, events etc. While
mutual gaze potentially provides insights in the interlocutors’ social relation or each
others intentions and emotions, gaze towards entities in the environment provides the
gazer with more visual information about certain aspects of a shared scene. Similarly,
a person’s gaze towards an object or person also provides the interlocutor with infor-
mation about what the gazer currently attends to, at least visually. Psycholinguistic
research has previously exploited the fact that a person’s eye movement typically re-
flects a shift in visual attention. Observation of such attention shifts provides on-line
information about ongoing cognitive processes, for instance, during language produc-
tion or comprehension (e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann and Kamide, 2004). Con-
sequently, in the following sections we review relevant findings on the production of
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gaze during speaking and listening and on its effect on linguistic processing.
2.3.1. (Speaker) Gaze during Language Production
Eye gaze promotes a subtle but powerful non-verbal cue that continuously provides
on-line visual information about the speaker’s visual attention (essentially, gaze is al-
ways present, whether produced intentionally or not). The information about where
an individual looks complements spoken language and often simultaneously reveals
information about an individual’s intentions and goals as well as her belief states. In-
tuitively, gaze cues seem unique among non-verbal cues both in its consistency with
internal states of the gazer – a smile may be false, but the eyes often give it away –
and its temporal synchronization with the gazer’s spoken utterance. This close syn-
chronization of speaker gaze with language production has been established in several
studies. It has been shown, for instance, that referential gaze in speech production is
associated with the planning process for an intended utterance and typically precedes
the onset of the corresponding linguistic reference by approximately 800msec - 1sec.
(Meyer et al., 1998; Griffin and Bock, 2000; Griffin, 2001).
Meyer et al. (1998) have conducted two experiments which show that gaze durations
are affected by word frequency during a naming task and that this effect is absent when
objects have to be categorized. Their participants viewed pairs of line-drawings which
they were asked to name. The displayed objects were manipulated with respect to the
their contour (complete, contour-deleted) and the frequency of the object names (high,
low). Objects with full contours were named faster than those with deleted contours,
and objects with high frequency names were named faster than those with low fre-
quency names. Similarly, mean viewing time was shorter for full contour objects and
for high frequency objects than for deleted contours and low frequency objects. In a
second experiment, Meyer et al. (1998) ruled out that the difference in naming latencies
and viewing time was elicited by difficulties during object recognition. Instead of nam-
ing objects, participants were asked to categorize objects into existing or non-existing
objects by pressing a button accordingly. Object name frequency did not affect decision
latencies or viewing times in this second experiment. This indicates that the longer
viewing times for low frequency objects arose during lexical retrieval, along with the
longer naming latencies, and not during object recognition. Meyer et al. (1998), thus,
suggest that people look at an object not only until they have identified it, but further
until they have retrieved its phonological form.
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Griffin and Bock (2000) further examined the conceptual and linguistic processing
involved in apprehending and describing a displayed event. They conducted a study
in which participants viewed actions scenes containing line drawings of an event in-
volving two characters, an agent, who is performing an action, and a patient, who is
undergoing an action. While one group of participants was asked to describe the scenes
during viewing time, a second group first viewed a scene – and prepared their verbal
description – before describing it in absence of the picture. A third group had to detect
which character was the patient which required comprehension of the causal structure
of depicted events, while a fourth group did not have to complete any task at all. Grif-
fin and Bock (2000) manipulated the depicted events such that in one condition scenes
elicited predominantly active descriptions. In the second condition, a human character
was used as grammatical subject and elicited passive sentences when the human was
the patient, and active sentences when she was the agent. In both the speaking-while-
viewing and the patient-detection groups, fixations towards patient and agent diverged
at approximately 300ms after picture onset. Overt response times, marking patient de-
tection or the beginning of a describing sentence, were also similar in both groups. Both
results suggest rapid and complete comprehension of events for both conditions (event
comprehension and sentence preparation). Moreover, eye movements of the speaking-
while-viewing group revealed that participants inspected a character that they were
going to mention approximately 915ms prior to noun onset, regardless of whether the
character was subject or object. The manipulation with regard to agent/patient in sub-
ject and object position revealed that people generally spent more time fixating the
agent before subject onset and less time afterwards. The reverse pattern was observed
for the patient, i.e., the patient was looked at longer after the sentences had been started.
Griffin (2001) extended these results by investigating exactly when difficulties in lex-
ical retrieval arise during a spoken sentence, providing insights about the precise time
course of word selection during sentence production. An experiment was conducted
in which Griffin (2001) asked participants to describe a scene containing three objects
using a sentence like "The A and the B are above the C". Griffin found that speakers gazed
longer at an object that they were going to name if its name was of low frequency or
low codability. A name was considered less codable when it had several similarly dom-
inant names instead of one obvious name. Thus, the duration of referential gaze prior
to naming the referent seems to accommodate difficulties of both word selection and
phonological encoding. Interestingly, it was also found that the onset of the sentences
(as well as viewing time on A) varied only according to the frequency and codability of
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A, i.e., regardless of difficulties related to B or C. That is, participants started speaking
once they had prepared to mention A and only later dealt with naming difficulties of B
and C. This result suggests that speakers select their words incrementally.
Taken these results together, they indicate how visual scene information and sentence
planning and execution interact. Specifically, the mentioned results indicate that speak-
ers look towards an object before mentioning it as part of a planning process involved
in speaking about this object.
2.3.2. (Listener) Gaze during Language Comprehension
It has further been shown that listeners’ visual attention is driven by the utterances they
hear (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Chambers et al.,
2004; Knoeferle et al., 2005; Knoeferle and Crocker, 2006). Tanenhaus et al. (1995) found
that people "made informative sequences of eye movements that were closely time-locked to
words in the instruction that were relevant to establishing reference" (p.1632). In one study
it was shown, for instance, that people began identifying (visual) referents of a spoken
noun already before the offset of the noun. People heard a sentence such as "Pick up
the candy" while viewing a visual scene containing a piece of candy and sometimes a
competing object called a cohort which has a name that shares its onset with the target
(e.g., candle). Analysis of first fixations showed that people initiated eye movements
to the candy before noun offset when the candle was not present. If the candle was
present, initiation of eye movements to the target was delayed until or beyond noun
offset. Moreover, the findings presented in Tanenhaus et al. (1995) not only show that
listeners rapidly fixate mentioned objects, but that the visual context also influences
resolution of temporary structural ambiguity in the utterance. Tanenhaus et al. (1995)
further reported a study in which participants heard either a (temporarily) structurally
ambiguous ("Put the apple on the towel in the box") or an unambiguous sentence ("Put
the apple that’s on the towel in the box") and saw one of two visual scenes. The one-
referent scene contained one possible referent (apple on a towel) and two possible des-
tinations (empty towel, box). The two-referent scene contained an apple on a towel
and an apple on a napkin as well as both possible destinations (a towel and a box).
Eye movements revealed that in the one-referent visual context people initially inter-
preted the ambiguous phrase "on the towel" incorrectly as destination whereas in the
two-referent visual context the towel was correctly identified as modifier. That is, the
phrase "on the towel" was correctly interpreted as modifier since there were two apples
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in the scene such that the reference would have been ambiguous without the modi-
fier. This result shows that people rapidly integrate visual and linguistic information to
comprehend and disambiguate an utterance.
Allopenna et al. (1998) have further established the precise time course with which
people look at mentioned referents. In an eye-tracking study, four line-drawings of
objects as well as a selection of other shapes were presented on a computer screen to
participants. While fixating a central cross, participants were instructed to select one of
the objects and move it to a specified location. Besides the target (beaker), there was a
cohort (beetle), a rhyme (speaker) and an unrelated object (carriage) on the display. Fix-
ations were analyzed from the onset of the target word in the experimenter’s instruc-
tion. Results showed that people began fixating target and cohort as soon as 200ms
after target onset and continued until 400ms after onset. At 300ms after onset, even
the rhyme showed an increased probability (though lower then target and cohort) of
being fixated. After 400ms, the target then gradually became more likely fixated than
the cohort. Considering that programming and launching a saccade takes in itself at
least 150-200ms (Matin et al., 1993), these results are indeed evidence for temporally
very closely aligned language comprehension and gaze.
Moreover, it has been shown that people not only look at mentioned referents but
that they use other disambiguating information from the speech stream which is avail-
able prior to the referring noun such as prenominal adjectives (Eberhard et al., 1995;
Sedivy et al., 1999) or even verb selectional restrictions (Altmann and Kamide, 1999).
Eberhard et al. (1995) reported studies in which participants heard sentences such as
"Touch the plain red square". While listening to these sentences, participants saw a vi-
sual scene which contained various shapes. In the first condition, there were no other
plain shapes such that the adjective "plain" already disambiguated the referring expres-
sion. In the second condition, the scene contained a couple of plain shapes of different
colors such that the referent could be identified only after the second adjective red. In
the third condition, the scene contained competing objects that were plain and red but
not squares. Thus, the linguistic point of disambiguation was manipulated by the vi-
sual context and varied between first and second adjective and the referring noun. Eye
movements showed that participants looked at the target before noun onset when the
prenominal adjectives already disambiguated the target. Specifically, they looked at a
target within 250ms after offset of the disambiguating word. In another study, Sedivy
et al. (1999) showed that people similarly process scalar adjectives (as in "the tall glass")
and incrementally establish possible referent groups by either contrasting between ob-
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jects in the visual context (other tall versus short objects) or between an object and a
typical representation of that object (a tall glass compared to a typically sized glass).
Altmann and Kamide (1999) further found strong evidence for the rapid use of verb-
selectional restrictions during sentence comprehension in the presence of visual scenes.
Information provided by the verb elicited anticipatory eye movements to potential ref-
erents (’anticipatory’ looks to an object occur before it is mentioned explicitly). In two
experiments, people listened to spoken utterances while inspecting a visual scene. Par-
ticipants were first asked to judge whether sentences were valid descriptions of the
depicted scenes and, in the second experiment, were not given any particular task. Vi-
sual scenes contained several object drawings, e.g., a boy, a cake, a toy train, a car, and
a ball. Sentences where the verb indicated only one object as an appropriate referent
were contrasted with sentences where verb selectional restrictions allowed all available
objects as referents. For restrictive verbs as in the sentence "The boy will eat", anticipa-
tory eye movements to the only edible object in the scene (the cake) were found before
noun onset. No such anticipatory eye movements to the cake were found when the
verb was unrestrictive and selected several objects (cake, ball, toy train, car) as was the
case for sentences like "The boy will move". These findings reveal that, on one hand,
linguistic content may be used to rapidly restrict the domain of reference. On the other
hand, people’s fixations indicate what they consider as potential (visual) referents of
the utterance.
Results of a number of studies further showed that visual contexts influence thematic
role assignment during sentence comprehension (Knoeferle et al., 2005; Knoeferle and
Crocker, 2006). In three experiments, Knoeferle et al. (2005) investigated the compre-
hension of (preferred) subject-verb-object (SVO) sentences and (less preferred) object-
verb-subject (OVS) sentences in the context of depicted events. The sentences described
depicted events which contained a role-ambiguous character (e.g. a princess), acting
and being acted upon, as well as an agent character (e.g., a fencer) and a patient char-
acter (e.g., a pirate), such that the fencer paints the princess and the princess washes
the pirate. Sentences were temporarily role-ambiguous since the first noun phrase re-
ferred to the role-ambiguous character (princess) – and there were no case-marking
cues to determine the correct syntactic and thematic relations (nominal and accusative
feminine articles are identical in German). The second noun phrase, which was un-
ambiguously case-marked as subject or object, disambiguated the sentence structure
and role assignment. For early disambiguation, listeners had to rely on depicted event
scenes that showed fencer, princess and pirate. Thus, as soon as the verb identified,
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for instance, the washing action, eye movements indicated that participants had estab-
lished the princess as agent of the event (SVO) and not patient (OVS). That is, fixations
on the character involved in the depicted event (pirate as patient of the washing ac-
tion) increased which reveals rapid integration of depicted and linguistic information
to assign sentence structure, thematic roles and to anticipate the next referent.
Summarizing the mentioned results, it seems that gaze is not only driven by what is
heard, it also serves to continuously gather visual information which is integrated into
the comprehension process and which may clearly affect interpretation of the unfolding
utterance.
2.4. Joint and Shared Attention
In the previous section we have presented findings on gaze production during speaking
and listening and what this gaze reveals about language processing. These findings are
limited to utterance-mediated gaze, i.e., gaze that is mainly driven by what is said or
heard. In face-to-face communication, interlocutors not only speak to each other, they
can further see and use each other’s gaze. Essentially, people use another person’s gaze
because they understand that eye gaze towards an entity in the external world reflects
visual perception of that entity, and because they understand that there may be reason
for this other person’s gaze, e.g., interest, danger or food (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Emery,
2000; Flom et al., 2007). Thus, it can be useful for person A to know what person B
(visually) attends to since the object in question may be interesting or dangerous or in
some other way relevant to person A as well. Following B’s gaze to an object reveals
potentially interesting information for A and results in joint attention, a state where both
individuals end up attending to the same object, or even shared attention, a state where
partners are aware of each others attentive state and draw inferences about each others
intentions from this.
We follow Emery (2000) in considering joint attention to occur when a subject follows
another subject’s gaze to mutually attend to an entity. Joint attention presupposes that
the gazer has attentional states such that the follower has reason to consider the looked-
at entity as relevant. The term shared attention is used to refer to a similar phenomenon
which additionally involves intention sharing: One person intentionally directs another
person’s gaze to an object by looking at this object, in order to communicate goals for
cooperating in task completion or just to share the experience (Emery, 2000). Notably,
what we call shared attention has been named joint attention previously (Kaplan and
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Hafner, 2006; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007). Similarly, it has been described as a
state that requires that the "goal of each agent is to attend to the same aspect of the
environment" (Kaplan and Hafner, 2006, p.144) and that "both agents are aware of this
coordination of ’perspectives’ towards the world" (Kaplan and Hafner, 2006, p.145).
However, we decided to adopt a more fine-grained categorization and distinguish joint
and shared attention.
The ability to follow gaze, indicating the perception of others as beings with atten-
tional states, develops already in infants. Previous research on infant perception of eyes
and head direction has shown that children learn to perceive gaze as meaningful and
potentially revealing something new, at a very early stage in development. The age at
which infants first follow gaze is controversial due to different methodologies (e.g., ex-
perimenter versus infant’s mother as gazer/interlocutor, angle of produced gaze move-
ments) or different definitions of gaze (e.g., including head turns or not). However,
D’Entremont et al. (1997) have shown that infants, even as young as three months old,
already follow a person’s head turns towards a puppet.
Support for a conceptual distinction of joint and shared attention may be further
drawn from the developmental stages of infants. Meltzoff and Brooks (2007) suggest,
for instance, that infants at the age of 10 to 12 months are at a transitional age, capable
of gaze-following but not of intentionally sharing experience. They showed that at this
particular age infants follow a person with open eyes and refrain from doing so when
the person’s eyes are closed. While they realize that closed eyes do not signal visual
attention, they do not understand that blindfolds similarly obstruct vision. And yet,
the infant must have understood that the gazer has a seeing organ – just like herself –
that indicates what the gazer (visually) attends to and towards which the infant then
follows. It seems that children at this stage establish joint attention but not shared
attention, i.e., they do not fully grasp that they can direct and share the gazer’s view
intentionally. Thus, the authors suggest that only between 12 and 18 months of age
infants learn to share their interlocutor’s view and interpret it as an indicator to her
goals and intentions. This is in line with findings from Moll et al. (2006) who showed
that 14-month-olds are able to reason about what an adult most likely attends to given
the adult’s gaze direction and her past experience.
The presented studies suggest that children typically learn to establish first joint and
later shared attention at an early developmental stage. Many autistic children also be-
gin to follow gaze and head turns towards objects (Leekam et al., 1998; Kylliäinen and
Hietanen, 2004). Even though with a certain delay (Leekam et al., 1998, 2000), they also
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learn to follow gaze. However, autistic children seem to learn to establish only limited
joint attention and no shared attention. That is, they do not infer intentions from the
perceived gaze direction nor do they infer goals, desire or even interest in the object
in focus. Results from a number of studies involving perception of gaze in normal and
autistic children suggest that the observed inability to read mental states such as desire,
intention or interest from a person’s gaze is indicative of an inability to form a theory
of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995, 1997a,b). This is further evidence suggesting that
people normally follow gaze and interpret it with respect to mental states because they
ascribe attentional and intentional states to the gazer and because they seek to establish
joint and shared attention with the gazer. Consequently, gaze is an essential cue in the
context of studying phenomena such as joint and shared attention, both in HHI and
HRI.
Summarizing this section, the insights from developmental studies on the role of
gaze, also for autistic children, further support the distinction of joint and shared atten-
tion. This suggests that basic joint attention requires the general ability to follow and
understand object-directed gaze (i.e., to interpret it as an attentional state which may
reveal communicative intentions) which children learn very early. The ability to reason
about the goals behind a gaze cue seems to require that the interlocutor assigns inten-
tional states to her communication partner, i.e., that she has a theory of mind for her
partner. Shared attention further requires the understanding that the partner’s atten-
tion can be manipulated by one’s own gaze, thus, also manipulating what the partner
believes about oneself.
2.4.1. Reflexive Gaze-Following
Related research has further suggested that gaze-following is a behavior that is indeed
applied so reliably that it may be considered automatic. Specifically, previous stud-
ies have shown that people reflexively follow gaze cues and also other direction-giving
cues such as arrows (Langton et al., 2000; Ristic et al., 2002). It is an ongoing debate
whether attending and reacting to eyes and gaze is "hard-wired" (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997b, p.328) in the sense that it is a unique attentional process with a dedicated neu-
ral basis (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a; Emery, 2000) or whether the immediate, low-level
and reflexive attention shift that gaze cues elicit (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Driver
et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999; Vecera and Rizzo, 2006) similarly applies to other
attention directing cues such as arrows (Bayliss and Tipper, 2005; Tipples, 2008). While
25
2. The Utility of Gaze in Situated Communication
reflexive attention shift (especially in the context of peripheral cueing) is considered to
be exogeneous, voluntary orienting towards a symbolic cue is called endogenous (Posner,
1980). Studies suggesting that gaze cues reflexively trigger (exogenous) attention shifts
have typically presented stylized faces or eyes (or arrows) to their participants who then
had to detect or identify a target stimulus that appeared either in the cued or uncued di-
rection. Findings revealed that response times where significantly shorter for the cued
location when the target stimulus appeared within a certain time window (stimulus-
onset asynchrony, SOA) after the cue: 1005ms in Friesen and Kingstone (1998), 1000ms
in Langton and Bruce (1999) and 700ms in Driver et al. (1999). Crucially, these cueing ef-
fects were observed even though cues were not predicting the target location, i.e., were
uninformative. In addition to these early cueing effects ascribed to reflexive orienting,
it has been shown that these cues can also trigger voluntary attention shifts when they
predicted the target location (Friesen et al., 2004; Tipples, 2008). In their study, Friesen
et al. (2004) used counterpredictive cues which predicted the target location in the lo-
cation opposite to the cued location. It was found that people initially attended to the
cued location (cueing effect for short SOAs, up to 600ms) but then also attended to the
opposite location in which they predicted the target to occur (cueing effect for longer
SOAs, from 600ms to at least 1800ms). This seems to suggest that involuntary and vol-
untary use of cues are separable processes. However, recent studies which correlate
voluntary and involuntary attention shifts have questioned this assumption. Tipples
(2008) presented evidence showing that what appears as involuntary or reflexive ori-
enting is at least influenced by voluntary attentional control. People that scored high
in an attentional control questionnaire (i.e., who reported "good" attentional control)
also showed larger involuntary orienting effects. Moreover, Vecera and Rizzo (2006)
presented a study on neural impairment and attention from which they conclude that
gaze triggers the type of voluntary attention shift that is also observed for words, for
instance. Thus, it seems that reflexive and voluntary attention shifts cannot be entirely
decoupled and rather both determine when and where an individual shifts her visual
attention.
Notably, all above mentioned studies relied on the presentation of static cues even
though gaze is typically a dynamic cue. Additionally, these studies typically did not
involve recording people’s overt visual attention shifts (eye movements) and restricted
themselves to reaction time for measuring detection or identification time. Importantly,
experiments within this paradigm looked mostly at visual orienting in response to a
simple visual stimuli and did not consider the interaction of language – or, more gen-
26
2.5. Joint Attention and Language Comprehension
erally, intentions potentially involved when considering "real" gaze – with these gaze
cues. As a study by Hietanen et al. (2008) suggests, pictures of faces do not necessar-
ily have the same effect on an observer as a real face does. The observer may lack the
feeling of being looked at since she does not attribute any intentional, social meaning
to the gaze cue.
The described studies do suggest that gaze can elicit both levels of response, reflexive
as well as voluntary orienting, which raises the question about how these may co-occur
and possibly interact. Moreover, it is unclear whether it is also voluntary orienting
when children, for instance, follow their mothers’ gaze to establish joint and shared
attention. Previously, attention shifts have been called voluntary or volitional in the
context of (covert) orienting when such an attention shift was elicited by a central sym-
bolic cue that predicted a target in an uncued location (e.g. Friesen et al., 2004). There
may be a qualitative difference between using such a symbolic cue (after being told that
it is useful and having trained to interpret it accordingly) compared to following some-
one’s gaze to an object or person and inferring mental states of the gazer (because as a
child one has learned that gaze-following potentially reveals interesting information).
2.5. Joint Attention and Language Comprehension
In the previous sections, we have explained that an important aspect of gaze is related
to understanding that eyes capture information about the environment. Knowing that
an individual’s gaze is often directed to entities in the vicinity and that this provides
the individual with (visual) information about this entity makes gaze-following a use-
ful strategy for learning (what does an unknown word refer to), survival (is there a
source of danger) and smooth communication (what is my partner going to say, want
or do). Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1995; 1997a; 1997b) showed in a number of stud-
ies, for instance, that a speakers’ gaze direction can normally be a significant cue to
the intended referent of the speaker. In one study, children were shown two nonsense
shapes and were asked to indicate which of them was beb, a nonsense word. While first
they had to guess and deliberately pointed at one shape, the second time a cartoon face
named Charlie was placed between the shapes and looked at one of the shapes. Asking
the children what Charlie thought was the beb, most of them pointed to the one that the
face was looking at. Children with autism, in contrast, mostly stayed with their initial
decision and failed to interpret the face’s gaze cue as an indicator for attention and de-
sire with respect to a certain shape. These studies by Baron-Cohen and colleagues seem
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to suggest that autistic children typically do not read mental states from the eyes at all
and even tend to prefer artificial cues such as arrows over reading eye direction. These
results also suggest that gaze is an important cue to an individuals intentions and that
not being able to interpret it as such indicates a deficiency in theory of mind formation
which further disrupts social interaction ("it is the lack of mental state concepts that causes
the failure to understand that eye-direction signifies this range of mental states", Baron-Cohen
et al. 1995, p.394).
In addition to this general notion of visual attention and intention ascribed to gaze,
a close coupling has been established between produced gaze and language compre-
hension and production (reviewed in Section 2.3). Whether, and precisely how, the
close alignment of gaze with spoken language production, for instance, helps listen-
ers to identify and anticipate utterance content, is subject to ongoing research. The
mentioned studies on joint and shared attention, however, clearly suggest that people
do monitor and use each others gaze in face-to-face communication. In spoken com-
munication, information obtained through gaze-following helps to rapidly ground and
resolve spoken utterances with respect to a common environment (Moore and Dun-
ham, 1995; Clark and Krych, 2004; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007). Speakers’ gaze to
an object can, thus, function as a visual reference to an object, augmenting linguistic
references. Consequently, face-to-face communication produces not only utterance-
mediated gaze, but also gaze-mediated gaze which potentially reflects states of joint
visual attention.
Studies investigating the utility of such referential gaze cues in face-to-face commu-
nication have provided evidence that listeners use speakers’ gaze to identify a referent
in the scene before the utterance unambiguously identifies that referent (Hanna and
Brennan, 2007). In a first experiment, Hanna and Brennan (2007) found that listen-
ers follow and use speaker gaze to constrain their domain of interpretation such that
(a) temporary ambiguity is disambiguated, and (b) reference resolution is enhanced
since this information is available early during language processing. The experiment
was conducted with a director and a matcher facing each other. Both had their own
displays hidden behind a low barrier but were shown the other’s display at the begin-
ning of the experiment. Displays contained either a mirrored object constellation, i.e.,
were congruent with each other as shown in Figure 2.1, or contained different spatial
object arrangements (non-congruent) such that the director’s gaze was uninformative.
The director instructed the matcher to move one of the displayed objects to a specific
location. Such an instruction contained a referring expression of the form "the [color]
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Figure 2.1.: Sketch of experimental setting with reversed displays containing a target ("orange
circle with three dots on it") and a far competitor, as described in Hanna and Bren-
nan (2007). Original pictures and a more precise description can be found in the
respective paper.
[shape] with [number of dots]". The display either contained a competitor object of the
same shape and color next to the target (’near competitor’) or further away (’far com-
petitor’) such that the referring expression was temporarily ambiguous, or it contained
no competitor. In the ’near competitor’ condition the director’s gaze towards the tar-
get was not clearly disambiguating while in condition ’far competitor’ director’s gaze
more clearly distinguished between target and competitor. Results from matchers’ tar-
get looks showed that the matcher identified the target before the linguistic point of
disambiguation if displays were congruent. Moreover, in the ’far competitor’ condition
participants seemed to identify the target as early as when there was no competitor at
all, suggesting that director’s gaze was clearly disambiguating.
In a second experiment, Hanna and Brennan (2007) changed the display arrange-
ments such that displays were either congruent (mirrored) or reversed. In the reverse
condition, objects on the director’s right were to the matcher’s right such that director’s
gaze needed to be re-mapped in order to be informative from the matcher’s perspec-
tive. Matchers’ target fixations indicated that matchers used directors’ early target fix-
ations (visual point of disambiguation) to initially orient towards the same (mirrored)
side of their display. 1000ms after the visual point of disambiguation, matchers ap-
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parently remembered the display condition and began to adjust to that, i.e., oriented
towards the opposite, "target" side when displays were reversed. The congruent condi-
tion replicated previous results showing that director’s (i.e., speaker’s) gaze is an early
disambiguating cue. Though matchers did not immediately follow directors’ gaze cue
to the target they seemed to use this information about 1500ms later, between the color
onset and the linguistic point of disambiguation, to identify the target. Interestingly,
matchers’ target fixations in the reverse condition showed a considerably smaller but
nonetheless significant benefit of director gaze for target identification. This suggests
that speaker gaze helped to identify referents even when this gaze cue was initially
misleading. Listeners seemed to establish a mapping of the speaker’s gaze to their own
visual scene and, still, made use of the speaker’s gaze early during comprehension.
The results from Hanna and Brennan in addition to other previous results (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b), suggest that people infer intended referents from the
speaker’s gaze after the initial, reflexive response to gaze (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998;
Driver et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999). That is, beyond the possibly reflexive at-
tention shift in response to gaze, people seem to be able to impose the communicative
context onto the visual stimulus and, thus, may still interpret the gaze cue as a visual
reference which reflects communicative intentions.
The above mentioned findings show that gaze during spoken communication is sys-
tematically and automatically coupled to situated speech. This close coupling in ad-
dition to the general notion of seeing and visual attention ascribed to gaze may be the
reason that listeners interpret speakers’ eye movements on-line as visual references to
help rapidly identify, and disambiguate among, intended referents.
2.6. Social Robot Gaze
In previous sections, we have reviewed in detail the role of gaze in human-human in-
teraction (HHI). The reported results have highlighted the utility of gaze for rich and
smooth interaction between individuals. It was shown that gaze is closely coupled
to speech and how the partner’s gaze reveals what she understands and plans to say.
Further, it was explained that gaze is a cue that guides visual attention reflexively and
voluntarily and that already infants learn to use gaze cues for further information pro-
cessing. Considering that gaze is such a frequent, reliable and useful cue, it is con-
ceivable that it also plays a role when humans interact with virtual agents or robots.
To investigate to what extent the findings on human gaze are also valid for human-
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computer/human-robot-interaction (HCI/HRI), previous research in this area has con-
sidered human gaze patterns and their application to agents. User studies from HCI,
thus, involve various functions of gaze as, for instance, non-verbally engaging the user,
turn coordination, or simply making the interaction more pleasant (Sidner et al., 2005;
Cassell et al., 1999a; Cassell and Thórisson, 1999; Kanda et al., 2001).
While agent gaze has been shown to enrich HCI in terms of "enjoyment" (Kanda
et al., 2001), it has further been shown to negatively influence people’s judgement of
the robot’s competence and reliability (Sidner et al., 2005). Sidner et al. (2005) con-
ducted a study investigating how robot gaze affects people’s impression of the robot as
well as their own non-verbal engagement in a conversation. Participants were asked
to interact with the robot Mel and then rate, for instance, their liking of the robot, their
sense of involvement, and their impression of reliability. Participants in the first group
interacted with Mel when it produced both verbal and non-verbal behavior (mover con-
dition) while a second group had to communicate with Mel when it produced speech
only (talker condition). In the mover condition, Mel was capable of looking and point-
ing at objects when the task explicitly required it to draw the user’s attention to an
object. That is, Mel turned towards the table top between the interlocutor and itself
after it had explicitly referred to an object on the table top and needed to make sure
the partner had seen it as well. Furthermore, it looked towards its partner whenever
it finished a speaking turn. User ratings revealed that neither participants’ liking of
the robot nor their factual knowledge gained during the interaction were affected by
the conditions. In contrast, people’s judgement of the robot’s reliability was strongly
affected by Mel’s non-verbal behavior. That is, when Mel performed no movements it
was rated to be more reliable than when it used head/gaze movements and pointing ges-
tures. One explanation for this result may be that the produced head/gaze movements
were simply not appropriate and instead enforced the perception of incompetence of
the robot. However, Sidner also found that participants in the mover condition felt
more involved in the conversation than participants in the talker condition. These par-
ticipants also showed more non-verbal behavior themselves in this condition (e.g. more
mutual gazes).
A point of criticism that this study has in common with similar HCI experiments
(see also Kanda et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2006) is that they lack an appropriate baseline
condition. To assess the friendliness and enjoyability of a more or less plausible gaze
pattern, the robot shows such a pattern in one condition while in the baseline condition
the robot shows no gaze movement at all. It is difficult though to evaluate the actual
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contribution of the implemented gaze pattern when compared to a system without any
command of the gaze modality, especially considering that gaze possibly comes at a
cost such as decreasing the impression of competence and reliability (Kanda et al., 2001;
Sidner et al., 2005).
Moreover, it has been attempted to employ gaze cues for implementing social behav-
iors mentioned in section 2.1. Specifically, Kipp and Gebhard (2008) have shown in a
study with a virtual character that direct gaze can be used to manipulate the impres-
sion of social dominance (of the virtual character as perceived by participants). While
continuously direct gaze (which has been dubbed the Mona Lisa strategy) conveys dom-
inance, direct gaze during speaking combined with averted gaze during listening also
conveys dominance but is perceived as more negative and close to arrogant. These re-
sults have essentially replicated the effects of direct gaze during speaking and listening
reported for HHI by Dovidio and Ellyson (1982).
Cassell et al. (1999c) took a different approach to implementing natural gaze behavior.
As the literature suggests, mutual gaze is a signal that is used to coordinate turn-taking
in a conversation (Kendon, 1967; Duncan, 1972; Sacks et al., 1974). The authors hypoth-
esized that gaze also correlates with information structure of the discourse, that is, the
theme (what is known; links the utterance to previous discourse) and the rheme (new
information) of an utterance. Initial experiments confirmed the correlation of speaker
gaze towards and away from the hearer with both turn-taking and information struc-
ture (Cassell et al., 1999c). In this study, participants who were strangers to one another
were told to sustain a conversation on any topic for at least 20 minutes. Three such
dyads were video-taped and transcribed in terms of speech, speaker gaze towards and
away from the listener, and head nods. Speech was annotated using the units turn,
rheme and theme. A beginning turn was defined as the first word of a new turn, and
the end of turn was defined as the last and second last word of a turn. Theme and
rheme boundaries were similarly defined. The analysis revealed co-occurrences of be-
ginning direct and averted gazes with turn beginnings and endings as well as rheme
and theme beginnings. It was confirmed that speakers often (but not always, 44% of
all turn beginnings) look away from the listener upon turn beginning. Interestingly, all
turn beginnings that also began a theme co-occurred with a look away. Similarly, it was
found that speakers look towards the listener at the end of a turn, but only in 15% of
the turn endings. However, they looked towards the listener at all turn endings that
co-occurred with a beginning rheme.
Cassell and her colleagues used these results and implemented a heuristic for gaze
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production. Original implementations included the realization of turn-taking cues,
only, and were tested on embodied conversational agents (e.g. Rea and Gandalf ) in
interaction with users (Cassell et al., 1999a; Cassell and Thórisson, 1999; Cassell et al.,
1999b). In such a user study, participants were asked to interact with three different
characters within the Ymir environment (Thórisson, 1999). These characters differed
with respect to the non-verbal feedback they gave: No non-verbal feedback, emotional
feedback containing of smiles and confused expressions, and envelope feedback com-
prising turn-relevant gazes (Cassell and Thórisson, 1999). Analysis of users’ verbal
contributions to the interactions revealed that people made fewer contributions in the
third condition. This result was considered to show that conversation was more effi-
cient when the character used gaze behavior to indicate turn endings and beginnings.
Subject ratings further showed that participants judged a character’s language abili-
ties as well as ’interaction smoothness’ to be higher when it used turn-relevant gaze
behavior than when it did not. It is unclear, however, what ratings for ’smoothness of
interaction compared to interacting with a dog’ are meant to reveal.
More recently, Mutlu and colleagues implemented the initial probabilistic algorithm
suggested by Cassell et al. drawing on both turn-taking and information structure ef-
fects on gaze production. This implementation was used and evaluated on a story-
telling humanoid robot (Mutlu et al., 2006). The authors manipulated the probabilities
in the algorithm such that the robot produced two versions of gaze behavior differ-
ing in the overall amount of looks towards each of two listeners. The generated robot
behavior was evaluated by measuring participants’ performance at recall of the heard
story and by giving out pre- and post-experiment questionnaires. The results showed
that participants who were looked at by the robot more often (at appropriate occasions)
performed better on the recall task. While impressions of the robot with frequent mu-
tual gaze behavior were again not all positive, the effect on recall performance suggests
that people attend closer to the robot when being looked at more often.
Similarly, Yamazaki et al. (2008) have shown that robot gaze towards the listener
at turn endings could be useful in interaction with a human. Specifically, it has been
shown that direct robot gaze at turn end elicits more head turns and nods from the
subject than direct robot gaze at the beginning or in the middle of a turn. This result
indicates that participant’s non-verbal engagement depends not only on the robot’s
production of non-verbal behavior in general (compared to no production thereof) but
also on when the robot issues head/gaze turns.
Notably, the reported studies have failed to directly investigate whether robot gaze,
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similar to human gaze, conveys attentional states such that it elicits joint attention be-
tween robot and user – and whether this helps the user to resolve ambiguous refer-
ences by means of visually constraining the domain of reference. There have been few
attempts in HCI to employ robot gaze as a modality that expresses attentional states of
the robot and potentially elicits joint attention with the user such that ambiguous ref-
erences, for instance, can be resolved. The work conducted by Breazeal and colleagues
with the robot Leonardo (Breazeal et al., 2005) has made relevant contributions to this
field of research. It was shown that implicit robot behavior like gaze shifts, head nods
and other gestures was used by human interlocutors to faster solve a collaboration task.
Specifically, participants were asked to interact with Leonardo and make it switch on
buttons that were located in front of it. There were two conditions, an implicit and an
explicit one. In the explicit condition, Leonardo looked at buttons right before it was
going to press it or point to the button itself. In the implicit condition, it additionally
looked at buttons when the interlocutor pointed at them, and it produced general gaze
shifts and eye-blinks to convey liveliness and shrugging gestures to convey confusion.
A post-experiment questionnaire revealed that participants in the implicit condition
thought they had a better mental model of the robot (they could tell when the robot
was confused or had understood what was referred to) than participants in the explicit
condition. Furthermore, some behavioral data was analyzed such as number of er-
rors and repairs in a conversation or time needed to complete the task (make Leonardo
turn all buttons on). Results revealed that the implicit, non-verbal information helped
people to detect errors in the robot’s performance and, consequently, to repair them.
Not surprisingly, task completion time was considerably shorter in the implicit condi-
tion than in the explicit condition, in particular, when errors occurred throughout the
conversation since their detection was facilitated. Breazeal et al. (2005) concluded that
Leonardo’s gaze constituted a "window to its visual awareness" and that people per-
ceive the robot’s gaze-following as signaling "shared attention" (Breazeal et al., 2005,
p.714).
While the described studies have suggested that non-verbal behavior in general, and
gaze in particular, influences the way people perceive and interact with an agent or
robot, they do not reveal precisely how referential gaze influences utterance compre-
hension, for instance, and whether people infer intentional states from the robot’s gaze.
Nevertheless, the presented findings are promising and suggest that people might in-
deed interpret gaze cues with respect to attentional and ’mental’ states and that appro-
priate robot gaze can facilitate interaction.
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2.6.1. Appearance and Motion of Inanimate Entities
When working with robots and other agents, naturally the question arises at some
point to what extent (only) the appearance of the agent influences people’s percep-
tion thereof. Previous studies, partly described in the previous section, have hinted at
an important role of the agent/robot form suggesting that people expect a humanoid
form to also reflect human-like behavior (Kiesler and Goetz, 2002; Hegel et al., 2008;
Groom et al., 2009). Previous studies have shown, however, that also motion patterns
can reliably convey goal-directness and intentional states of things which otherwise do
not look human-like or in any other way intelligent (Heider and Simmel, 1944). We,
thus, argue that the appearance of the robot’s head/eyes is not crucial to participants’
responses: Firstly, robot head and gaze do not necessarily have to be distinct modal-
ities as head direction is a cue similar to gaze, often used when eyes are obstructed
or when visual attention needs to be directed to other issues (Emery, 2000; Imai et al.,
2002; Hanna and Brennan, 2007). Secondly, people merely need to understand that the
robot’s camera is their ’organ’ for seeing in order to assign meaning to its gaze (see e.g.
Meltzoff and Brooks, 2007; Baron-Cohen et al., 1995). It seems that this understanding
does not rely on the human-like appearance of the seeing-organ (the eyes) but that this
rather results from a plausible movement pattern and the conveyed functionality of the
camera. How powerful motion can be in conveying intentional, or at least goal-directed
behavior has been impressively illustrated by an animated film (Heider and Simmel,
1944), also used for further experimental research by, for instance, Berry et al. (1992).
Heider and Simmel (1944) produced a simple animation showing moving geometrical
figures: a small and a large triangle, a disc or circle, and a large rectangle with a section
that opened and closed like a door. The animation showed movement of various types:
(a) Successive movements with momentary contact of two shapes, (b) simultaneous
movements with prolonged contact, (c) simultaneous movement without contact, and
(d) successive movements without contact. Participants were asked to describe what
they saw and typically interpreted movements as actions of animate beings, in fact
mostly as those of persons. Heider and Simmel (1944) found that movements of type
(a) were often interpreted as one object hitting the other, (b)-movements were consid-
ered as pushing or pulling actions, (c) often as leading or chasing events, and (d) as chasing
or evading. The interpretation of the events (e.g., chase versus lead or flee) depended
on and reflected what people considered to be the origin of the movement. Besides the
origin of movement, people seem to further interpret motives for movement. Instead
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of using the term "entering", for instance, when a small triangle moves into the large
square, it has been called "hiding" or "being-forced-in", suggesting that they ascribed
intentions and motivations to the moving objects.
2.7. Studying Robot Gaze as an Attentional Cue
In this section, we draw on the findings in the various research areas reported above
to motivate our own investigation of the role of referential speaker gaze in situated
interaction with a robot. Considering the findings described in Sections 2.3 and 2.5, we
envisage the following scenario: Two people (A and B) are talking about an object (e.g.
a mug) that is visible to both of them. According to human gaze production patterns, A
says "Pass me the mug, please." and looks at the mug 800-1000ms before saying "mug".
As part of understanding A’s utterances, listener B then looks at the mug around 200-
300ms after A started saying "mug". This would result in a 1000-1300ms time span
between the speaker’s gaze towards the mug and the listener’s gaze to that same object.
If additionally A and B can see each other, joint attention can be established throughout
this communication. Listener B can follow A’s gaze towards the mug right away and
anticipate A’s mentioning of the mug. The time span between A’s and B’s gaze towards
the mug is shortened dramatically and B can rapidly ground A’s reference to the mug
in their shared environment. Also B’s looks to the mug, rapidly inform A that the
utterance has been understood. Furthermore, in a situation where there are several
mugs, gaze may provide a crucial means of referential disambiguation.
A human-robot interaction scenario offers a controlled setting for the manipulation
of gaze parameters, such as temporal alignment of gaze and speech, as well as the ob-
servation of people’s responsive behavior. Thus, the scenario described above can be
conceived also as an experimental HRI setting with a robot as speaker A, for instance.
Despite a general and large interest in using gaze cues also in HCI/HRI, the psycholin-
guistic findings on gaze as referential cue described above have not yet been examined
empirically. Thus, we investigate whether referential robot gaze is a useful cue for
people to disambiguate the robot utterance, to infer the robot’s referential "intentions"
and whether this can be evaluated by means of on-line, quantitative measures. Such
measures are crucial when investigating issues in information processing that people
may not be aware of and, thus, cannot report accurately in questionnaires, for instance.
Moreover, we argue that the insights gained in such a scenario can be compared to HHI
behavior such that these results potentially contribute more broadly to the investigation
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of human gaze processing and joint attention.
That is, we propose an experimental setting in this thesis, involving a robot speaker
and a human listener. We apply previous results from psycholinguistics in order to
produce cognitively motivated robot behavior. Specifically, the robot’s gaze is timed
such that the robot fixates an object it is going to mention around one second before
the corresponding noun onset (Meyer et al., 1998; Griffin and Bock, 2000; Griffin, 2001).
This behavior is then video-taped and played back to participants. If such human-like
gaze behavior elicits natural responsive behavior from human interlocutors, we expect
to observe ’speech-following’ (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Se-
divy et al., 1999; Knoeferle et al., 2005) as well as gaze-following behavior (Hanna and
Brennan, 2007; Meltzoff and Brooks, 2007) that is typical for HHI.
Although it might be argued that video-based presentation of the robot does not al-
low true interaction, it has been shown that a video-based scenario without true inter-
action yields similar results to a live-scenario and can be considered to provide (almost)
equally valuable insights into the subject’s perception and opinion (Woods et al., 2006).
Further, the subjective perception of remote versus collocated agents (for both robots
and virtual agents) has been studied by Kiesler et al. (2008) and similar results were
presented. One might further argue that using a virtual agent instead of a robot could
solve this problem of video presentation. However, even though there exists a grow-
ing body of research on gaze for both virtual agents and robots simultaneously, there
is one main difference between the two types of agents that potentially affects the us-
age of gaze. While an agent "lives" in its own world and is assumed to have complete
knowledge of its environment, a robot shares the environment with a human inter-
locutor and is not expected to have full knowledge of the world. This leads to different
expectations and impressions of an agent versus a robot. Mistakes and errors are poten-
tially more acceptable and less irritating when communicating with a robot. Moreover,
robots seem to elicit more anthropomorphic interaction and attributions than agents
(Kiesler et al., 2008). Kiesler and colleagues also investigated whether a robot and an
agent in co-present and remote conditions are perceived differently. The results of their
questionnaire, which participants had to fill out after a 10-15min discussion with the
robot/agent, indicate that the robot was perceived as more life-like, having more pos-
itive personality traits and being liked better. However, whether the robot/agent was
co-present or remote (i.e. recorded and projected onto a screen) did not seem to greatly
influence participants’ impressions. This study, thus, supports our decision to employ a
robot for studying the benefits of cognitively-motivated, referential gaze behavior and
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suggests that remote, video-based presentation should not substantially affect percep-
tion or interaction.
Further, if the participant behavior observed within our HRI setting is indeed similar
to people’s behavior in HHI, we argue that such an experimental design may be useful
to shed light not only on the role of robot gaze but on how humans process gaze in gen-
eral. We intend to approach questions like: Can we measure the utility of referential
gaze, i.e., its information content and benefit for utterance comprehension? How are
potentially mismatching linguistic and gaze cues integrated? As Hanna and Brennan
(2007) already showed, listeners can map and use speaker gaze for disambiguation.
That is, listeners infer the intended referent from the speaker’s gaze in order to antici-
pate and quickly resolve the upcoming referring expression – even when listeners have
to take into account that their own and the speaker’s visual scene differ.
In the experiments presented in subsequent chapters, we examine whether listeners
similarly use information obtained from robot gaze in order to infer referential inten-
tions and facilitate comprehension. The general setting of these experiments was as
follows: We recorded videos of a robot that looked at objects presented on a table in
front of it while it produced statements about this scene. For the production of robot
gaze behavior, we made use of the psycholinguistic findings summarized in Section
2.7. That is, for producing referential and cognitively plausible robot gaze, the camera
moved towards an object approximately one second prior to its mention, which is con-
sistent with the observed co-occurrence of referential gaze and referring expressions in
human speech production. Participants were typically instructed to attend to and de-
termine the ’correctness’ of robot utterances with respect to the scene. We consider two
dependent measures: People’s eye movements were monitored as an on-line measure
of visual attention, and people’s responses to different tasks were used as off-line mea-
sures, e.g., of the effort that comprehension requires. We chose such a video-based pre-
sentation of the robot in order to better control experimental conditions and to obtain
statistically relevant data. Although it might be argued that this is not true interaction,
it has been shown that a tele-present robot has similar effects on the subjects’ perception
and opinion as a physically present robot Kiesler et al. (2008); Woods et al. (2006).
Using the outlined setting, we investigated in Experiment 1 whether people attend
to robot gaze as they typically attend to human gaze. That is, participants are shown
videos of a robot that looks at an object and subsequently mentions a referring expres-
sion. Since participants are asked to validate the robot utterance, they need to resolve
the referring expressions with respect to the scene. Participant’s eye movements are
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expected to reveal whether people follow robot gaze to an object and, further, whether
they use this visual cue to resolve the referring expression with respect to the looked at
object, even when there are other possible referents in the scene. Results from this ex-
periment relate to response levels 1 and 2 described in Section 1.4 and indicate whether
people (can) ignore robot gaze or whether it generally directs people’s visual attention.
Experiment 2 sought to study the influence of robot gaze on utterance comprehension
in greater detail. We manipulated robot gaze congruency to explore whether robot
gaze is interpreted as a visual reference revealing the robot’s attentional states such that
congruent gaze would facilitate comprehension while incongruent gaze might mislead
people and, thus, disrupt comprehension. Findings from this experiment provided
further evidence for the hypothesis that people follow robot gaze (supporting response
level 2) and suggest that robot gaze may be interpreted as a cue to its attentional state
and infer referential intentions from this (supporting level 3).
Experiment 3 served to decide whether the effect of robot gaze on utterance com-
prehension is due to reflexive gaze-following inducing a purely "bottom-up" visual
attention shift (level 2), or whether this is rather caused by the expectation that robot
gaze reflects referential intentions such that people indeed establish joint attention with
the robot (level 3, offering support for level 4 potentially observable in a different sce-
nario). To shed light on these underlying processes, participants were asked to perform
a correction task rather than simply validating utterances. A verbal correction of an
utterance involving (especially incongruent) multimodal references implicitly requires
participants to decide which referent they think the robot intended. Results indeed
suggest that people not only reflexively follow this cue but consider the robot to indeed
see and process visual information such that listeners assign an attentional and even
intentional state to the robot, providing support for the application of response level 3.
Finally, the importance of human-like robot gaze and speech alignment is explored in
Experiments 4 and 5. While Experiments 1-3 suggest that robot gaze affects utterance
comprehension when it is aligned to robot speech in a manner that is typical for human
gaze and speech production, it is an open question whether such alignment is necessary
for people to interpret (robot) gaze as a an attentional/intentional cue. Thus, alignment
was manipulated with respect to temporal synchronization and linear order of refer-
ential cues, investigating how gaze is interpreted and integrated into the incremental
process of understanding an utterance. Results from these experiments illuminate the
nature of robot gaze influence and, additionally, provide evidence supporting response
level 3.
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Comprehension
In situated face-to-face communication human listeners are known to direct their visual
attention based on both the speaker’s utterance (Griffin and Bock, 2000) and speaker’s
gaze (Hanna and Brennan, 2007). In this chapter we examine, firstly, whether such
behavior applies in HRI as well and, secondly, how robot speaker gaze influences ut-
terance comprehension. That is, two experiments are presented that explore whether
people respond to a robot showing referential gaze on level 1 (ignoring robot gaze), 2
(following robot gaze, possibly reflexively) and 3 (interpreting robot gaze as an atten-
tional cue that may be used to establish joint attention) as described in Section 1.4.
Specifically, Experiment 1 examines whether people follow robot gaze and look to-
wards an object fixated by the robot and, further, investigates whether robot gaze can
help people to identify the referent of a referentially ambiguous utterance. Such a be-
havior could suggest that people interpret robot gaze similar to human gaze which, in
turn, hints at an assignment of attentional and intentional states to the robot. Experi-
ment 2 examines whether such referential robot gaze is in fact beneficial for the com-
prehension of referentially unambiguous robot utterances. The benefits of gaze were
examined through manipulation of gaze congruency with respect to speech, simulta-
neously exploring consequences of a conflict between these referential cues.
Experiments 1 and 2 were run as a combined study, in order to simultaneously in-
vestigate very simple effects of robot gaze in Experiment 1 and more general effects
of robot gaze in Experiment 2. For balancing conditions in items and fillers, we con-
sider items of one study as additional fillers for the other study. Therefore we recorded
data for both experiments from each participant in Experiment 1 and 2 and analyzed
them separately as explained below. In both experiments, participants were generally
required to pay close attention to the robot’s utterance as well as the scene in order to
quickly complete their task.
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3.1. Experiment 1
One reason listeners may pay attention to speaker gaze is to identify the intended refer-
ent. Gaze may be particularly important when the utterance fails to uniquely identify
an object in the shared environment. Consider this sample scenario: Person A and B
are facing each other. A has her hands in cookie dough and needs B to pass her the next
ingredient. There are two bowls, one to A’s right and one to her left. The right one is
filled with dark chocolate chips, the left bowl is filled with white chocolate chips. Thus,
A says: "B, could you pass me this bowl please?" and briefly looks at the bowl to her
right. Even though B might favor white chocolate chips, it is very likely that she will
(rightly so) pass A the dark chocolate chips.
Obviously, people follow both the speaker’s utterance as well as her gaze in order to
understand the speaker’s intention. The processes involved in understanding a spoken
sentence have been studied extensively, as reported in Chapter 2. Previous findings
suggest that people process a sentence incrementally with each new information further
constraining the domain for interpretation: Listeners’ eye movements indicated when
and what people considered as potential referents of the sentence (Tanenhaus et al.,
1995; Allopenna et al., 1998; Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Sedivy et al., 1999; Knoeferle
et al., 2005). Moreover, people typically follow their partner’s gaze and seek to establish
shared attention in order to infer intentions and emotional states (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997a,b). Since speaker gaze is closely coupled to the utterance, it reveals what the
speaker plans to mention (Meyer et al., 1998; Griffin and Bock, 2000). Thus, paying
attention to these gaze cues and their referents can be beneficial for the listener – in
particular, when the spoken utterance contains referential ambiguity, as illustrated in
the example above.
All these findings together suggest that listeners’ visual attention is influenced by
both the spoken utterance and the speaker’s gaze. Experiment 1 examines whether
robot gaze is a similarly powerful cue which interlocutors follow and use in order
to ground and possibly disambiguate robot utterances. Beyond the purely behavioral
findings, linking robot gaze to the robot’s utterance would indicate that people implic-
itly assign attentional states to the robot which connect the robot’s visual perception
with its spoken utterance. To begin investigating this hypothesis and, specifically to ex-
plore to what extent people retrieve referential information from robot gaze, we exam-
ined whether listeners followed robot gaze, both in cases when the utterance uniquely
identifies the referent and, more interestingly, when there are several possible referents.
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Thus, participants in this study faced a videotaped robot and were asked to judge its
utterances for validity with respect to the shared scene.
Participants saw the robot while it produced a statement about several objects in its
view and were asked to indicate whether or not the statement was valid. A description
such as "The sphere is next to a cube." was accompanied by robot gaze movements –
first to the sphere and then to the cube – each occurring shortly before the robot utters
the corresponding noun phrases (Figure 3.1). To determine whether listeners followed
robot gaze to a mentioned referent, we manipulated the referential ambiguity of the
second noun phrase with respect to a given scene. That is, in one condition, the video
showed among other shapes one sphere, one cube and one pyramid. In the second
"two-referent" condition, there were two pyramids in the scene, both matching the ref-
erentially ambiguous utterance "The sphere is next to a pyramid". Consequently, we
manipulated the single factor (Ambiguity) with two levels (one-referent, two-referent)
within subjects.
Since participants were required to verify the statement against the scene, we as-
sumed that their gaze behavior would be influenced by the robot’s utterance. It was
unclear, however, what impact robot gaze would have on participants’ visual attention
and their comprehension. In the one-referent condition, both robot gaze and speech
identified a unique target object (a single cube). In the two-referent condition, the
robot’s utterance identified two potential referents (a target and a competitor pyramid)
while robot gaze is directed only towards one pyramid (target). We observed and com-
pared participants’ looks towards the target and competitor objects in both conditions
to establish whether people follow robot gaze. In the one-referent condition, we ex-
pected people to fixate the target at latest upon hearing it mentioned (Allopenna et al.,
1998) and possibly earlier when people follow robot gaze. Crucially, in both conditions
robot gaze was not required to determine the statement’s validity since for either ref-
erent (target or competitor) the utterance was valid. In the two-referent condition, we
expected people to fixate the target object upon mentioning if they generally follow
gaze, or else that people would inspect both the target and competitor equally often.
Moreover, if people considered the looked at pyramid as uniquely identified, response
times for both conditions should be similar, suggesting that the linguistic ambiguity
does not affect comprehension.
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(a) One-referent condition.
(b) Two-referent condition.
(a)
Original sentence: ”Die Kugel ist neben einem Würfel.”
(Translation: ”The sphere is next to a cube.”)
(b)
Original sentence: ”Die Kugel ist neben einer Pyramide.”
(Translation: ”The sphere is next to a pyramide.”)
Figure 3.1.: Sample scenes from Experiment 1.
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3.1.1. Method
Participants
Forty-eight native speakers of German, mainly students enrolled at Saarland Univer-
sity, took part in this study (34 females, 14 males). All participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. Most of them had no experience with robots.
Materials
A set of 16 items was used in two conditions. In the one-referent condition, only one
object in the scene matched the second noun phrase of the sentence. That is, all men-
tioned objects were uniquely identified by the uttered sentence. In the two-referent
condition, two objects in the scene had the named shape. Thus, the ambiguity in the
two-referent condition resulted from two potential referents in the scene as shown in
Figure 3.1. There were equally many objects in each visual scene and the videos showed
among other objects one sphere, one cube and one pyramid (in the one-referent condi-
tion). In the second, two-referent condition, there were two pyramids in the scene, both
matching the utterance "The sphere is next to a pyramid." The result is a single factor
with two levels that is manipulated within subjects. Crucially, the big brown pyramid
(competitor object) was identical in both conditions such that looks to this object could
be compared between conditions: When it was not a competitor for the referring noun
"cube" in the one-referent condition compared to when it was a competitor object for
the ambiguous referring noun "pyramid" in the two-referent condition. Since sentences
were constructed to be valid for each potential referent (target, and competitor in the
two-referent condition), items contained only true utterances. The task, however, was a
decision task and we therefore created fillers that contained false statements (in total, 32
fillers were true and 24 were false) such that participants were required to pay attention
to the utterances (57% true versus 43% false fillers).
We created 32 1920x1080 resolution video-clips showing the PeopleBot (Mobile
Robots Inc., Amherst, NH, United States) robot onto which a pan-tilt unit was mounted,
carrying the stereo camera. Note, that head orientation and eye-gaze of the robot are
identical for this robot. The robot was positioned behind a table with a set of colored
objects in front of it.
The objects are plain geometrical shapes of different colors and sizes. We used pa-
per and styrofoam objects and colored them such that each object pair (of same shape)
roughly had equally attractive colors in terms of saturation, e.g. red and orange, light
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green and grey or blue and green. In the one-referent condition (Figure 3.1a), each
shape occurred only once on the table and the uttered sentence had a unique interpre-
tation with respect to the scene. In the two-referent condition (Figure 3.1b), two objects
of the same shape (but of different colors and sizes) were target and competitor refer-
ents in a corresponding sentence. The video-clips each showed a sequence of camera-
movements (that are called saccades for the human eye) consecutively towards the object
mentioned first and the target object mentioned second. Simultaneously, a synthesized
sentence of the form given in Figure 3.1 was played back. Sentences were in German
and synthesized using the Mary TTS system (Schroeder and Trouvain, 2001). Note, that
the English determiner "a" has a unique interpretation while the original German deter-
miner "ein(e)" may be understood as existential quantifier ("a") or as numeral ("one").
Thus, it is possible that incorrect, or rather undesired, responses in the two-referent con-
dition would be elicited by a misinterpretation of the German determiner as numeral.
However, we explicitly made participants aware of this issue and the accuracy rate for
button presses suggests that participants did not use the numeral interpretation.
To align the synthesized sentences with the recorded scene, we first had to speed up
the original video sequences by 140% so that the camera movements of the robot oc-
curred at the appropriate point in the utterance. We subsequently overlaid the videos
with the spoken stimulus sentences such that a robot fixation towards an object oc-
curred one second prior to the onset of the referring noun, being consistent with cor-
responding findings on alignment of referential human gaze and speech production
(Griffin and Bock, 2000; Van der Meulen et al., 2001). This also enabled us to observe
two types of reactive human gaze: One being elicited by robot gaze (potentially in-
dicating joint attention), the other being utterance-mediated shifts of visual attention
(to inspect mentioned objects). In both conditions, participants had to give a positive
answer since the statements were always true. Furthermore, across all 16 items, we bal-
anced the stimuli with respect to target size (eight target objects are big and have small
competitors and vice versa) and target location. For eight items, the target was placed
to the left of the central object mentioned in the first noun phrase and in the other eight
items it was placed to the right of the central object. Moreover, we have twelve differ-
ent colors for twelve different object shapes that are employed as targets within our 16
items. Since a pilot study Staudte and Crocker (2008) suggested that participants ini-
tially inspected mainly the left area of the scene, we provided people with two seconds
preview time which allowed them to inspect the entire scene before the robot started to
move or speak.
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In addition to the 16 items described above, we constructed 56 filler videos (of which
24 videos were experimental items for Experiment 2). Fillers contained between five
and six objects and the location of the target object varied. Moreover, comparisons
made in the robot’s statements varied: In addition to location, color and size compar-
isons were used (e.g. "The heart is darker than the sphere", "The cone is shorter than
the pyramid"). A complete list of item stimuli is provided in Appendix A (containing
sentences) and B (containing still frames of each scene). We created two lists of stimuli,
each containing 72 videos. Each participant saw only one version of an item and, in
total, eight two-referent and eight one-referent items. The order of the filler videos was
randomized for each participant individually such that an effect of trial sequence can
be ruled out as explanation for the dependent variables’ variance.
Procedure
An EyeLink II head-mounted eye-tracker monitored participants’ eye movements on a
24-inch monitor at a a temporal resolution of 500 Hz and a spatial resolution of 0.1 ◦.
Participants were seated approximately 80 centimeters from the screen. Viewing was
binocular, although only the dominant eye was tracked. The eye-tracker was adjusted,
calibrated and validated manually for each participant using a nine-point fixation stim-
ulus. Before the experiment, participants received written instructions about the experi-
ment procedure and task: They were asked to attend to the presented videos and judge
whether or not the robot’s statement in each was valid with respect to the scene. In
order to provide a cover story for this task, participants were told that the robot sys-
tem would be evaluated. It still made many mistakes and participants’ feedback was
to be used as feedback in a machine learning procedure to improve the robot system.
Crucially, gaze was typically not required nor did it change the assessment of sentence
validity with respect to the scene (with an exception of only two fillers where sentence
ambiguity affected validity). Each trial started with a fixation dot that appeared at the
centre of the screen. Participants were instructed to always focus on that dot so as to
allow the system to perform drift correction when necessary. Then a video was played
until the participant pressed a button or until an overall duration of 12 seconds was
reached. The entire experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes.
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Figure 3.2.: Marked IAs in sample scene.
Analysis
The presented videos were segmented into Interest Areas (IAs), i.e., each video con-
tained regions that were labelled "anchor", "target" and "competitor" (Figure 3.2). The
output of the eye-tracker was mapped onto these interest areas to compute the number
of participant fixations on an object. The spoken utterance was a sentence as shown in
Figure 3.1, describing the relation between a couple of objects. The noun "sphere" was
encoded as the linguistic reference to the anchor object and the noun "cube"/"pyramid"
was encoded as the linguistic target reference. In the one-referent condition, the refer-
ring noun "cube" uniquely identified one referent, namely the target object. The scene
contained another competitor object also located next to the sphere. Since this object
had a different shape (pyramid), however, it was not a possible referent for the second
noun ("cube"). In the two-referent condition, in contrast, "pyramid" ambiguously iden-
tified the target and the competitor object since there were two pyramids in the scene.
The speech stream was segmented into two Interest Periods (IPs) based on the onsets
and offsets of the encoded linguistic events. The IPs identify the time regions when
the robot head fixated the target object and when it referred linguistically to the target
object (see Figure 3.3). IP1 was defined as the 1000ms period preceding the onset of the
target phrase, and contained the robot’s fixation on the target object as well as some ver-
bal content preceding the target noun phrase ("next to"). IP2 stretched from the target
noun onset to offset and had a mean duration of 471ms (min=288ms, max=772ms). For
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(English)          “The     sphere         is next to a       pyramid.”
SPEECH:
       <partner>   <sphere>                    <small pyramid> <partner>GAZE:
TIME:
       (sec)        1     2     3         4     5           6            7
Interest
Period:
      IP1    IP2
(German)         “Die     Kugel       ist neben einer  Pyramide.”
Figure 3.3.: The approximate timing of utterance-driven robot gaze for the given sentence.
the analysis of participants’ fixations, all consecutive fixations within one IA and IP (i.e.,
before a saccade to another IA or the background occurred) were pooled and counted
as one inspection. Trials that contained at least one beginning inspection towards an IA
within an IP (coded as "1") are contrasted with trials that did not contain an inspection
in the same slot ("0"). As a result, mean values represent inspection probabilities for a
given IA/IP.
For the analysis of such un-accumulated, binary inspection data, in general, we used
logistic regression (mixed-effects models with a logit link function from the lme4 pack-
age in R Bates, 2005). Participants and items were included as random factors. To asses
the contribution of a fixed factor or an interaction of two factors to explaining the vari-
ance of the dependent variable, we performed model reduction/simplification. That
is, we used a χ2 comparison between the model including and excluding the factor as
predictor and compare the log-likelihoods and AIC/BIC (Baayen et al., 2008; Jaeger,
2008).1 For the comparison between levels of a factor we reported coefficients, stan-
dard errors (SE) and Wald’s Z. For post-hoc comparisons among individual conditions
in case of more than one predictor, we also used subsets of the data for each level of one
predictor and fitted models with only the second predictor. P-Values, although shown
in the tables, are potentially anti-conservative (Baayen et al., 2008) so we rather refer to
coefficients being larger than two SEs for indicating significance or, additionally, gen-
erate p-Values using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling when possible (see
e.g. Kliegl et al. (2007, in press) or Knoeferle and Crocker (2009) for previous use of this
1For model reduction, models were fitted by ML whereas final models are fitted using REML (see Crawley, 2007,
p.634ff)
49
3. Gaze Following and Utterance Comprehension
method). Unfortunately, this sampling method is currently available only for linear
mixed-effects models, and not for logistic (generalized linear) models which are used
to fit binary data such as eye-movement data.
The response time was calculated as time elapsed from the offset of IP2, which marks
the end of the sentence, until the moment of the button press. Inferential statistics for
response times are conducted using linear mixed-effects models.
Predictions
If robot gaze is not followed, we expect participants to solely rely on the robot’s utter-
ance and, thus, to fixate the competitor object more often in the two-referent condition
than in the one-referent condition. That is, inspections on the referent (target in one-
referent condition) would not be expected before IP2, i.e., when the referring noun is
uttered. This behavior would support the hypothesis that people ignore robot gaze
(response level 1 identified in Section 1.4) and, as a consequence, suggest that people
do not consider this robot to share biological and cognitive mechanisms and do not
recognize its "gaze" movements as an expression of directing visual attention. Not fol-
lowing and, crucially, not using the robot’s gaze would also predict longer response
times for the two-referent condition since the ambiguous referring expression has to be
dealt with.
If, in contrast, participants follow gaze, we expect to observe looks towards the tar-
get even before it is being mentioned (that is, in IP1) since the robot’s gaze preceded
the target mention. Observing gaze-following would imply at least response level 2 de-
scribed in Section 1.4. That is, either robot gaze is followed reflexively as is the case with
other direction-inducing cues (level 2), or it is (further) assumed to reflect attentional
states in which case the robot’s gaze direction would also affect reference resolution
(level 3). Specifically, if people interpret robot gaze as reflecting visual attention and,
consequently, try to establish joint attention, they should further continue to attend to
the target rather than the competitor when the referring noun is mentioned (IP2), even
in the two-referent condition. This would indicate that participants jointly attended to
the target object and inferred the communicative intention of the robot to mention this
target object. Thus, response times would be expected to be equally long for both con-
ditions since people could use robot gaze effectively to quickly resolve the referentially
ambiguous phrase.
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Figure 3.4.: Inspection proportions in both conditions per IA – for IP1 in the left graph and for
IP2 in the right graph. IP2 shows a main effect of Condition as well as an interaction
of Ambiguity and IA.
3.1.2. Results and Discussion
Eye movements
We observed that participants looked significantly more often at the target than at the
competitor in both conditions and in both IPs. That is, Model1 reveals a main effect
of factor IA2 in IP1 (χ2(1) = 152.24, p < 0.001) as reported in Table 3.1. Separate
analyses for each IA with respect to the factor Ambiguity were conducted by fitting
Model2 to each IA and are also given in Table 3.1. The main effect of IA in IP1 indicates
that participants did follow the robot’s gaze towards the target object before it was
even mentioned. Moreover, participants looked equally often at the target object in the
two-referent and the one-referent condition (Figure 3.4), suggesting that participants
followed robot gaze to the target even when there was another potential referent in the
scene.
2It could be argued that IAs are not independent (more looks to one IA typically mean less looks to the other
IA). However, in our counterbalanced design, looks to one object are considered target looks in some trials and
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Table 3.1.: Fitted models on inspection data, Model1 includes IA as predictor, Model2 is fitted
to separate data sets (IA=target/competitor), for both IP1 and IP2.
IP1 Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
(Model1) (Intercept) −1.3731 0.1374 −9.994 <0.001
Ambig-one-referent 0.0989 0.1183 0.836 0.40
IA-target 1.4387 0.1195 12.033 <0.001
IA = target: (Intercept) 0.0374 0.2025 0.184 0.85
(Model2) one-referent 0.1705 0.1613 1.057 0.29
IA = competitor: (Intercept) −1.4223 0.2065 −6.888 <0.001
(Model2) one-referent 0.0246 0.1867 0.132 0.89
IP2
(Model1) (Intercept) -1.5108 0.1788 -8.447 <0.001
Ambig-one-referent -0.5625 0.2526 -2.227 <0.05
IA-target 0.7403 0.2021 3.662 <0.001
one-referent:target 0.9281 0.3116 2.978 <0.01
IA = target: (Intercept) −0.7609 0.1767 −4.307 <0.001
(Model2) one-referent 0.3640 0.1865 1.952 0.051
IA = competitor: (Intercept) −1.8074 0.2678 −6.738 <0.001
(Model2) one-referent −0.6809 0.2702 −2.520 <0.05
Model1 : Inspected ∼ IA ∗ / + Ambiguity + (1|subject) + (1|item),
f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
Model2 : IA ∼ Ambiguity + (1|subject) + (1|item), f amily =
binomial(link = ”logit”)
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There was no main effect of Ambiguity in IP2. However, we found an interaction
of Ambiguity and IA so we kept both predictors. The interaction can be interpreted
such that, upon hearing the referring noun mentioned, participants looked more of-
ten towards the competitor object in the two-referent condition than in the one-referent
condition. This increase in looks towards the competitor suggests that participants did
notice the referential ambiguity. Nevertheless, there is a strong preference for fixat-
ing the target object in both conditions which indicates that participants identified the
target by means of robot gaze despite the referential ambiguity.
Response Times
Trials were removed when participants had pressed the wrong button (2%). We fur-
ther excluded trials as outliers when the response time was ±2.5× SE above or below
a subject’s mean (2.79 %). As predicted, we observed no significant difference in the
response times (1438.4ms in the one-referent versus 1467.9ms in the two-referent con-
dition). Fitting a mixed-effects model with Ambiguity as predictor (RT ∼ Ambiguity +
(1|subject)+ (1|item)) shows that Ambiguity does not contribute to explaining the vari-
ance in the dependent variable Response Time (χ2(1) = 0.0066, p = 0.935).
The findings on both response time and the recorded eye movement data consistently
suggest that people (a) follow robot gaze, and (b) use robot gaze to constrain the do-
main of interpretation, effectively resolving referential ambiguity. There are, however,
several limitations to this study. Firstly, sentences in this experiment were referentially
ambiguous which possibly emphasized the role of robot gaze even though the task
did not require the use of gaze. That is, in the absence of sufficient linguistic informa-
tion, any additional cue inducing a preference for interpretation (such as gaze, but also
simple visual highlighting) may have similarly been used. Secondly, the absence of a
response time effect is weak and indirect evidence for the facilitation of reference res-
olution. Thus, this initial study has provided convincing evidence for gaze-following
behavior in HRI but the actual benefit of robot gaze cues for utterance comprehension
requires further investigation.
Experiment 2 sought to examine the influence or robot gaze when accompanying
unambiguous (one-referent) sentences compared against a baseline with neutral gaze,
and compared to gaze that is directed at an irrelevant object.
competitor looks in other trials. Therefore target and competitor looks are to some extent independent. At this
stage, we include analyses including and excluding IA as a factor although emphasis is put on separate analyses
for each IA in the remainder of this thesis.
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3.2. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that people follow robot gaze to an object prior to its men-
tion and continue to fixate the object even when multiple objects are compatible with
the spoken reference. However, the referential ambiguity of the statements may have
enhanced the utility of an additional cue like gaze for reference resolution. Experiment
2 sought to confirm this result in the context of globally unambiguous sentences. That
is, we examine whether referential robot gaze is followed and used for reference reso-
lution even though utterances can be validated without paying any attention to robot
gaze. Specifically, we investigate the actual benefit of robot gaze when accompany-
ing sentences that contain only temporary referential ambiguity. The benefit will be
assessed by comparison of response times for such a sentence when accompanied by
referential robot gaze and when accompanied by neutral robot gaze. Observing such a
beneficial effect of referential robot gaze would further suggest that people indeed es-
tablish a link between gazed at and mentioned objects via the assignment of attentional
states to the robot.
When considering referential gaze and its utility for reference resolution, the question
naturally arises whether referential gaze can also disrupt reference resolution if, for
instance, it identifies an entity other than the one referenced in the utterance. Consider
another example scenario: Person A is preparing cup-cake dough and needs person B
to pass her yet another ingredient. There are two more bowls on the table, one filled
with raspberries to her right and another one filled with blueberries to her left. Since A’s
hands are covered with dough, she says: "B, could you please pass me the raspberries?"
If she looks at the raspberries already before mentioning them, B can use this early
indicator to quickly identify A’s referential intention, as shown by Hanna and Brennan
(2007). If A looked at the blueberries instead of the raspberries, B is most likely confused
about what she should do. Did A intend to say "blueberries" but was thoughtless and
mentioned the wrong kind of berries? Or did A say what she meant but looked at
the wrong bowl – maybe because she incorrectly remembered where she had put the
raspberry bowl?
If people assign attentional states to the robot such that people would similarly as-
sume that an object looked at by the robot is probably the one it intended to mention,
then incongruent referential gaze may be an irritating cue that somehow disrupts ut-
terance comprehension.
Thus, to further investigate the benefit of robot gaze, we manipulated the congruency
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(a) Congruent multi-modal reference to one ob-
ject. A was apparently intended by the
speaker.
(b) Incongruent multi-modal reference to two
different objects. Was A or B intended by
the speaker?
Figure 3.5.: Multimodal references.
of our robot’s gaze as a potential cue for intended meaning as well as the validity of
the statements. Statements were either true or false, that is, the stated relationship
between objects held or not, and the visual reference (established by robot gaze) was
either congruent, incongruent or neutral with respect to the linguistic reference. We
consider gaze to be congruent (and helpful) when it is directed towards the same object
that is going to be mentioned shortly afterwards (reference match, see also Figure 3.5a)
while it is considered as incongruent when gaze is directed to an object different from
the mentioned referent (mismatch, Figure 3.5b). In a third congruency level robot, gaze
was neutral. The robot briefly looked down at the scene and back towards the listener
before beginning to utter a scene description. The neutral gaze behavior provided a
baseline condition in which participants’ visual attention was purely a response to the
produced robot utterance and comprehension was uninformed by any joint attention
mechanisms.
Robot statements were of the form given in the example sentence below. The second
noun phrase was temporarily referentially ambiguous, providing time for participants
to integrate the gaze cue with the ambiguous noun before the mentioned color disam-
biguated the referent.
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Figure 3.6.: Sample scene from Experiment 2.
Example:
”Der Zylinder ist größer als die Pyramide, die pink ist.”
(”The cylinder is taller than the pyramid that is pink.”)
The scene provided two potential referents (e.g., two pyramids of different sizes and
colors) one of which the robot mentioned. One pyramid matched the description of the
scene (is shorter than the cylinder) while the other did not (it is actually taller than the
cylinder). Thus, which pyramid was finally mentioned depended on the color adjective
and determined whether the statement was valid or not. The manipulation of both
factors, Statement Validity and Gaze Congruency, resulted in six conditions per item.
In Table 3.2, we provide an example for all conditions that the example sentence could
appear in (given a corresponding scene depicted in Figure 3.6).
3.2.1. Method
Participants & Procedure
The same group of participants as in Experiment 1 was tested in an identical procedure.
Materials
A set of 24 items was used. Each item consisted of three different videos and two dif-
ferent sentences, i.e., appears in six conditions as shown in Table 3.2. Additionally we
counterbalanced each item by reversing the comparative adjective, for instance, from
56
3.2. Experiment 2
Table 3.2.: Given the scene in Figure 3.6, manipulation of sentence validity and robot gaze re-
sults in these six conditions.
True Sentence: False Sentence:
"The cylinder is taller than the "The cylinder is taller than the
Robot Gaze pyramid that is pink." pyramid that is brown."
Congruent looks to small pink pyramid looks to big brown pyramid
Incongruent looks to big brown pyramid looks to small pink pyramid
Neutral – –
”taller” to ”shorter”, such that the target becomes the competitor and vice versa. We
obtained a total of twelve videos per item while ensuring that target size, location and
color were balanced. All versions showed the same scene and only differed with re-
spect to where the robot looks and whether it verbally refers to the correct (target)
object. Twelve different object shapes appeared twice each as target-competitor pairs
to produce 24 items. For each shape, we created three different sizes (small, medium,
large) and used each small-large pair as target-competitor pairs and the medium sized
shape as anchor for another target-competitor pair. Moreover, each scene contained
three additional distractors, two were large and small and positioned to either side of
the anchor. They served as potential competitors for partial utterances up to the com-
parative (e.g. "The pyramid is taller than"). The third distractor was typically small and
positioned to the far left or far right of the scene.
Prior to the experiment, target-competitor pairs were pre-tested in order to make sure
that their size and color differences were easily recognizable. We used a questionnaire
that showed photographs of the original scenes excluding the robot. Twenty partici-
pants judged whether a given item sentence accurately described what was visible in
the scene. For each scene, three sentences were given and only one of those contained
a comparison between item objects (anchor and target/competitor). Overall, 50 % of
the sentences were true and 50 % were false in order to avoid an acquiescence bias. A
7-level Likert scale from 1 (incorrect) to 7 (correct) allowed for a graded judgement of
the sentences’ validity. The results exhibit a mean deviation of 0.26 points from the op-
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(a) Robot looks at partner, (b) ...at ANCHOR object,
(c) ...at TARGET object, (d) ...and back up. (with marked regions of in-
terest)
Figure 3.7.: Sequence of gaze movements in sample scene from Experiment 2.
timal answer (1 and 7) and no outlier items which clearly shows that the comparisons
between the distinct objects and their sizes are clear and easily assessable.
We created 24 items each in 12 versions (6 conditions, each counterbalanced), obtain-
ing a total of 288 item videos of the same type that we did for Experiment 1. The robot
fixations and the spoken sentence were again aligned such that a fixation towards an
object occurred one second prior to the onset of the referring noun.
Moreover, we constructed 48 filler videos (16 videos that were item trials for Exper-
iment 1 and an additional set of 32 filler videos) such that we obtained twice as many
fillers as we had items. Half of the experimental items were correct, i.e., in a true condi-
tion, and one third was true and showed congruent or neutral gaze. To compensate for
the relatively high proportion of anomalous items, a large number of fillers contained
a correct statement and congruent robot gaze behavior. That is, 36 of 48 filler videos in
total contained true statements (75%) and 24 were both true and congruent (50%). This
results in an overall distribution of 66% true trials in the experiment. This bias towards
true statements was intended to maintain the participant’s trust in the competence of
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the robot. However, robot gaze can be considered relatively unpredictive since there
were only 40 congruent trials overall (55.5%) showing robot gaze to an object that was
subsequently mentioned. This reduces the likelihood of gaze-following emerging for
purely strategic reasons.
Twelve lists of stimuli each containing 72 videos were created. Each participant saw
only one condition of an item and, in total, four videos in each condition. The order
of the item trials was randomized for each participant individually with the constraint
that between items at least one filler was shown.
Analysis
The Interest Areas (IAs) in this experiment consisted of the anchor, the target and the
competitor objects, the robot head and the two distractors next to the anchor (see Figure
3.7d). The temporarily ambiguous target noun "pyramid" from the example sentence
above was the spoken reference to two potential objects (referents) in the scene: the small
pink target pyramid or the large brown competitor pyramid, and referential robot gaze
provided a visual reference to one of these objects. The small pink pyramid was con-
sidered as target object because the partial description "The cylinder is taller than the
pyramid" applied to the small pink pyramid. That is, the sentence-final mention of the
adjective "pink" resulted in a correct statement whereas mentioning the brown pyramid
resulted in an incorrect comparison.
We segmented the speech stream into three Interest Periods (IP) as depicted in Figure
3.8. IP1 was defined as the 1000ms period ending at the onset of the target noun "pyra-
mid". It contained the robot’s fixation towards the target object as well as some verbal
content preceding the target noun. IP2 stretched from target noun onset to offset. It
had the same mean duration of 471ms as in Experiment 1 which was constant for all
conditions of an item. IP3 was defined as the 700ms period beginning at the onset of
the disambiguating color adjective.
This adjective denoting the color of the referent completed the linguistic reference
and unambiguously identified the actual referent (IP3). Only at that point in time was
it possible to judge the statement validity, which is why it is called the linguistic point
of disambiguation (LPoD).3 The elapsed time between this adjective onset and the mo-
ment of the button press was therefore considered as the response time.
3A similar design, also featuring late linguistic disambiguation with early visual disambiguation by means of gaze-
following, was presented in an HHI scenario by Hanna and Brennan (2007) .
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  (English)    “ The      cylinder      is taller    than the     pyramid     that's pink.”
SPEECH:
    <partner><cylinder>     <small pyramid> <partner>GAZE:
TIME:
       (sec)            2 3   4     5       6       7 8
Interest
Periods:
         IP1 IP2               IP3
  (German)   “ Der      Zylinder     ist größer   als die     Pyramide   ,die pink ist.”
Figure 3.8.: The approximate timing of utterance-driven robot gaze, in a true-congruent condi-
tion.
Mixed-effects models (lmer) were used to fit both eye-movement and response time
data. Participants and items were included as random factors, and Gaze Congruency
(as well as Sentence Validity in IP3) were included as fixed factors.
Predictions
Since participants had to validate the utterance with respect to a given scene, we ex-
pected participants’ gaze to be mediated by robot speech. That is, we predicted that
during sentence processing people would look at entities according to the incremen-
tally constrained set of possible referents (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Sedivy et al., 1999).
Since the second referent was not uniquely identified until the end of a sentence (LPoD),
participants could keep several hypotheses about potential referents until then. We ex-
pected listeners’ gaze throughout a trial to indicate which hypotheses about referent(s)
the listener currently maintained.
Based on the findings of Experiment 1, we hypothesized that people may follow not
only robot speech but also robot gaze (as explained in Section 1.4). In this experiment,
we therefore expected in those conditions showing referential gaze (congruent and in-
congruent) to similarly observe gaze-following. In particular in IP1, when robot gaze
was directed towards either the target or the competitor while none of them was yet lin-
guistically identified, fixations are expected to reveal whether gaze-following occurred
or not.
In Section 1.4, we further differentiated between different mechanisms involved in
gaze-following: People might reflexively orient towards the cued direction (response
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level 2) and/or people might follow robot gaze because they consider the robot’s gaze
movements to reveal information about the robot’s visual attention states (response
level 3). Cueing effects resulting from reflexive gaze-following are relatively short-lived
(Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999) and should
have disappeared by the end of the sentence. However, it is conceivable that informa-
tion obtained through an involuntary attention shift affects further processing. Yet, we
would expect integration of such information during utterance comprehension only if
people consider it relevant and, thus, use it voluntarily – but this remains an open issue
at this stage. In contrast, if people follow robot gaze in order to attend to the same object
as the robot, that is, to establish joint attention with it as is the case in human-human
interaction (Hanna and Brennan, 2007), we would clearly expect robot gaze to affect
both people’s fixation behavior, even beyond IP1, as well as response times.
In IP2 we, thus, expected a continued preference to inspect the object previously iden-
tified by robot gaze. In the neutral gaze condition, inspections might reveal whether
people use the partial utterance to constraint the domain of interpretation. That is, the
target would be inspected more frequently than the competitor since only the target is
consistent with the utterance so far ("The cylinder is taller than the pyramid").
Since IP3 revealed the match (congruent condition) or mismatch (incongruent condi-
tion) of visual and linguistic references, we predicted that a match would cause people
to continue to inspect the object they were already looking at (presumable the object
identified by robot gaze, if listeners followed robot gaze). A mismatch in referential
cues would, thus, lead to an attention shift from the visual referent – the target in con-
dition false-incongruent and the competitor in condition true-incongruent – to the ob-
ject identified by the color adjective – the competitor in condition false-incongruent, or
target in condition true-incongruent. Thus, in the congruent condition, we predicted
inspections mainly on the consistently identified referent whereas inspections on both
the visual and the linguistic referent were expected in the incongruent condition.
Furthermore, we would also expect a main effect of Gaze Congruency for response
times: If participants exploit robot gaze and assume that it indicates the robot’s focus
of visual attention, they will correctly anticipate the validity of statements when gaze
is congruent. In contrast, when gaze is incongruent with the statement, we would
predict that participants anticipate a proposition that eventually does not match with
the actual robot statement. Hence, slower response time for incongruent robot gaze
would be expected. Since neutral gaze neither facilitated nor disrupted the judgement
of the statement validity, we predicted intermediate response time for this condition.
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Crucially, if people followed and used robot gaze for purely strategic reasons, their
behavior should change after a few trials when people realize that robot gaze is almost
equally often misleading as it is helping to anticipate the correct referent. Furthermore,
as true statements are more frequent and expected to elicit faster response times than
false statements, a main effect of statement validity was expected for response times.
3.2.2. Results and Discussion
Eye movements
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show plots of the eye-movement data for the whole duration of a
trial and for each condition individually. The initial two seconds of a trial were preview
time, the robot head started moving approximately 2,000ms after trial start. Plotting
begins after preview time and ends at 10,000ms, just after the end of the robot utter-
ance. This 8,000ms-window is divided into 250ms-bins and fixation proportions are
computed for each IA (anchor, target, competitor and robot head) within each bin. Fix-
ations that did not fall within an IA were counted towards background fixations and
are not included in the graph. The average onset of IP1 is at 5,913ms after plot begin-
ning, the average onset of IP2 is consequently at 6,913ms with an average duration of
471ms. The average onset of IP3 is at 7,949ms and lasts, by definition, 700ms.
Each plot in the time graphs shows that people initially looked mainly at the robot
head. When the robot head moved towards the anchor and, more clearly, when the
robot started speaking, people directed visual attention away from the robot’s head
and towards the anchor. Throughout the course of a trial people rarely looked back at
the robot head. The plots, however, clearly indicate gaze-following which suggests that
people used robot gaze peripherally. Gaze-following is indicated by people’s looks in
IP1 towards either the target (in true-congruent and false-incongruent conditions) or to
the competitor (true-incongruent, false-congruent), following the robot’s gaze towards
these objects. Consequently, in conditions true-neutral and false-neutral, neither target
nor competitor were being closely attended in IP1. Notably, in the presence of robot
gaze people started fixating either target or competitor even before IP1 began. This is
most likely due to the long time window that a robot ’saccade’ spans. Since IP1 began
with the end of the camera movement towards an object such that the robot fixated
this object approximately one second prior to noun onset, the actual movement (or sac-
cade) towards the object preceded IP1. Plots of congruent conditions show that people
more frequently fixated the looked at and mentioned object until the end of the trial
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Table 3.3.: Models fitted to separate inspection data sets (IA=target/competitor), in IP1 and IP2.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
IP1
IA = target (Intercept) -2.1457 0.1901 -11.290 <0.001
competitorgaze -0.6764 0.2797 -2.418 <0.05
targetgaze 1.6323 0.2032 8.032 <0.001
IA = competitor (Intercept) -2.4090 0.1994 -12.081 <0.001
competitorgaze 1.6547 0.2222 7.448 <0.001
targetgaze -0.5496 0.3070 -1.790 0.073
IP2
IA = target (Intercept) -1.0967 0.1825 -6.009 <0.001
competitorgaze -1.2799 0.2366 -5.409 <0.001
targetgaze 0.4785 0.1857 2.577 <0.01
IA = competitor (Intercept) -2.1023 0.2012 -10.450 <0.001
competitorgaze 1.5116 0.2145 7.048 <0.001
targetgaze -0.3726 0.2847 -1.309 0.191
Model : IA ∼ Gaze + (1|subject) + (1|item),
f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
while paying little attention to the other, potentially competing object. In incongruent
conditions, people mostly fixated the looked at object in IP1 and IP2 (where the refer-
ring expression is still ambiguous) and then fixated the object identified by the color
adjective in IP3.
Since sentence truth did not play a role in IP1 and IP2 (because the LPoD only oc-
curs in IP3), we collapsed each two conditions where trials were identical up to IP2 for
further inspection analyses. That is, conditions true-congruent and false-incongruent
were collapsed into the condition "gaze to target", true-incongruent and false-congruent
were collapsed into the condition "gaze to competitor" and the two neutral conditions
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Figure 3.9.: Average Fixation proportions calculated using 250ms bins, for true sentences.
IP1 ends on noun onset and contains robot’s gaze towards target/competitor, IP2
stretches from the (ambiguous) noun onset to offset, and IP3 comprises the disam-
biguating color adjective.
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Figure 3.10.: Average Fixation proportions calculated using 250ms bins, for false sentences.
IP1 ends on noun onset and contains robot’s gaze towards target/competitor, IP2
stretches from the (ambiguous) noun onset to offset, and IP3 comprises the disam-
biguating color adjective.
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Figure 3.11.: Mean inspection probabilities in three gaze conditions for IP1 (left graph) and IP2
(right graph). IP1 is the 1,000ms time window preceding the target noun onset.
IP2 stretches from target noun onset to offset.
were merged to one "neutral"-condition.
Results from inferential statistics for IP1 and IP2 are given in Table 3.3. Summarizing
these numbers, we observed the following:
IP1("The cylinder is TALLER THAN THE"): During IP1, robot gaze is the only po-
tential cue to the intended target (e.g. big brown or small pink pyramid). In this IP,
robot gaze had a main effect on people’s inspection behavior (visible on the target IA:
χ2(2) = 138.97; p < 0.001 and also the competitor IA: χ2(2) = 118.17; p < 0.001). The
graph in Figure 3.11 depicts people’s inspections on the target and competitor IAs and
shows that people inspected the target IA with a significantly higher probability when
the robot also looked at the target than when it looked at the competitor or showed neu-
tral gaze. Similarly, when the robot looked at the competitor, we observed significantly
more inspections on the competitor than in the other conditions. In contrast, when
robot gaze was neutral, inspections to both IAs were equally unlikely at this point. Ac-
cording to previous work on sentence processing (Eberhard et al., 1995; Sedivy et al.,
1999), the mentioned comparative could in fact constrain the domain of interpretation
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already at this point such that the target becomes a more likely referent than the com-
petitor. However, this preference was not yet visible in fixations patterns (but will be
in IP2). One reason for this may be that target and competitor are on the far sides of
the table and not so salient at this point, another reason might be that there are other
objects in the scene which also match the utterance so far (at least one of the distractor
as discussed below).
IP2("The cylinder is taller than the PYRAMID"): The inspection pattern observed
in IP1 persisted in IP2 for both conditions showing referential robot gaze (target IA:
χ2(2) = 64.8; p < 0.001 and competitor IA: χ2(2) = 87.53; p < 0.001). For neutral robot
gaze, participants were now more likely to inspect the target IA (small, pink pyramid)
than the competitor which was consistent with the incomplete utterance so far. Pairwise
comparisons between target and competitor inspections for neutral gaze in IP2 showed
that people inspected the target rather than the competitor (p < 0.001). Based on the
comparative in the sentence (taller/shorter), the target was the more probable referent.
However, referential robot gaze introduced additional (and potentially conflicting) in-
formation since it drew attention to either target or competitor prior to IP2. Thus, when
referential robot gaze was available, the preference for the object that met the linguistic
constraints of the utterance (target) was no longer observable. Interestingly, partici-
pants simply followed the robot’s gaze to either the target or the competitor instead.
For IP1, we conducted a similar analysis (as for target and competitor) for both dis-
tractor objects next to the anchor (see Figure 3.6). Since there was always one tall and
one short distractor, one distractor always matched the linguistic constraints in IP1 (was
shorter/taller that the cylinder) while the other did not. Moreover, a short distractor
was between the anchor and the tall target/competitor while a tall distractor was lo-
cated between anchor and short target/competitor object. Thus, when the robot uttered
the correct sentence "The cylinder is taller than the (pyramid that is pink)" and gazed
incongruently at the tall, brown pyramid, its continuous gaze movement would pass
the short distractor. This implies that, in addition to the linguistic constraints (the com-
parative), robot gaze potentially also constrained or biased interpretation.
Since the size of the distractor did not affect whether the sentence comparative in-
duced a preference for it or not (the same main effect was observed for both distrac-
tor objects, short and tall, separately), we collapsed the two IAs for this analysis and
obtained the following factors: Sentence Comparative Match (distractor size either
matched or mismatched the comparative in the sentence) and Gaze Direction Match.
That is, gaze was either neutral, or the distractor was in the general direction of robot
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Table 3.4.: Model fitted to inspection data on distractor IAs, for IP1.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
(Intercept) 0.3858 0.1022 3.777 <0.001
Sentence- mismatch -0.6168 0.0949 -6.499 <0.001
Gaze - mismatch -1.6094 0.1236 -13.016 <0.001
Gaze - none -0.3237 0.1083 -2.989 <0.005
Model : Inspected ∼ SentenceMatch + GazeDirection
+(1|subject) + (1|item), f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
gaze (i.e., when the robot looked at the target/competitor located further away its gaze
passed this distractor), or the distractor was in the opposite direction to robot gaze.
The results shown in Figure 3.12 suggest that the direction of the robot’s gaze was in-
deed a very dominant cue that mainly determined where people looked. Nevertheless,
we found main effects for both robot Gaze Direction Match (χ2(2) = 201.94; p < 0.001)
and the Sentence Comparative Match (χ2(1) = 42.44; p < 0.001, see also Table 3.4). That
is, even though people’s visual attention was primarily influenced by robot gaze, subtle
linguistic information (such as the comparative) was also picked up and incrementally
constrained the domain of interpretation, as reflected by inspection probabilities. This
shows that people pay close attention to both modalities, speech and gaze.
IP3("The cylinder is taller than the pyramid that is PINK/BROWN."): IP3 contains the
linguistic point of disambiguation (LPoD) specifying which pyramid is indeed being
mentioned. This IP was considered separately from IP1 and IP2 since both factors, Sen-
tence Validity and Gaze Congruency, now affected participant behavior. Fitting and
comparing various linear mixed-effects models (for both IAs separately) showed that
both predictors and, more importantly, their interaction significantly contribute to a
model of the respective data set. That is, model reduction (and model parameters in
Table 3.5) reveals a robust main effect of Statement Validity (χ2(1) = 24.47; p < 0.001),
that is for both IAs, the validity level "true" is significantly different from the intercept
level ("false"). The positive coefficient of the predictor level (’true’) indicates a higher
inspection probability for the given IA compared to the intercept level (’false’). This
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Figure 3.12.: Inspection proportions on distractor object in two gaze conditions (towards/away
from distractor) for both comparatives (match/mismatch with distractor size).
Figure 3.13.: Looks to target/competitor during adjective-mentioning (IP3), in each condition.
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Table 3.5.: Models fitted to separate inspection data sets (IA=target/competitor), in IP3.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
IA = target (Intercept) -1.7067 0.2177 -7.840 <0.001
Validity - true 1.5996 0.2611 6.128 <0.001
Congr - incongruent 0.9209 0.2679 3.437 <0.001
Congr - neutral 1.0457 0.2630 3.977 <0.001
true:incongruent -1.4702 0.3488 -4.215 <0.001
true:neutral -1.1999 0.3414 -3.514 <0.001
IA = competitor (Intercept) -0.5410 0.1665 -3.248 <0.005
Validity - true -1.6345 0.2983 -5.480 <0.001
Congr - incongruent -0.2048 0.2293 -0.893 0.371
Congr - neutral -0.0803 0.2237 -0.359 0.719
true:incongruent 1.4373 0.3804 3.778 <0.001
true:neutral 0.4847 0.3980 1.218 0.223
Model : IA ∼ SentenceValidity ∗ GazeCongruency + (1|subject) + (1|item),
f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
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suggests that people were more likely to inspect the linguistically identified object. That
is, the target was inspected more frequently when the statement was true and the com-
petitor was inspected less frequently when the statement was true compared to when
it was false. The interaction of both predictors Sentence Validity and Gaze Congruency
(χ2(2) = 20.289; p < 0.001) suggests that in congruent conditions people continuously
inspected the object fixated and mentioned by the robot whereas in incongruent con-
ditions participants made a visual attention shift from the object fixated by the robot
to the object actually mentioned by the robot (cf. Figure 3.13. Figure 3.13 also shows
that the condition true-neutral elicits similar responses as true-congruent, while false-
neutral is similar to false-incongruent. The reason is probably that in neutral conditions
participants have to rely on the linguistic information only and according to this, the
target is the most likely referent until the sentence-final adjective is mentioned. This is
also suggested by the inspection pattern in IP2, when people inspect the target rather
than the competitor when gaze is neutral. Thus, in case of true statements, the utter-
ance confirms the hypothesis that the target is the actual referent (hence the similarity
to true-congruent) whereas mentioning the competitor (false statement) is inconsistent
with previous hypotheses (hence the similarity to false-incongruent).
Response Times
Trials were excluded from response time analysis when participants gave a wrong
answer (4%) or response time was ±2.5 × SE above or below a subject’s mean (1.69
%). Model reduction on the remaining data suggests that both predictors, Sentence
Validity and Gaze Congruency, contribute to fitting a model to the data (Validity:
χ2(1) = 19.06; p < 0.001, Congruency: χ2(2) = 60.43; p < 0.001). Model simplifi-
cation further suggests that the interaction of the two predictors is marginally signifi-
cant ( χ2(2) = 5.598, p = 0.061) but with more degrees of freedom and a higher BIC
(15,897.6 vs 15,889.3 of the model without interaction) it is questionable which is the
best model. We include a summary of the model containing the interaction in Table
3.6 along with p-Values obtained by MCMC-sampling (a negative coefficient reveals a
shorter response time of the given level compared to the intercept level). Participants
were significantly faster in responding when they had to give a positive answer (true
condition) than when the robot’s utterance was false. Moreover, people were also sig-
nificantly faster in congruent trials, that is when the robot’s gaze and utterance referred
to the same object, compared to when robot gaze was neutral or incongruent. Reorga-
nizing predictor levels within the model reveals that neutral and incongruent gaze do
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Figure 3.14.: Average response times for true and false statements, per gaze congruency condi-
tion.
not differ significantly in the elicited response times, but the numerical tendency for
increased response time in incongruent trials is clearly visible. The reason for the lack
of significance may be related to the difference between true-neutral and false-neutral
conditions. As already suggested for the analysis of IP3-inspections, true-neutral and
true-congruent similarly elicit and confirm the correct hypothesis, while false-neutral
and false-incongruent conditions both initially elicit inspections to the target and then
confront participants with conflicting information by identifying the competitor. It is,
thus, not surprising that the difference in response times between false-neutral and
false-incongruent is relatively small while the difference between true-neutral and true-
incongruent is relatively large. In fact, it is noteworthy that true-congruent is sig-
nificantly faster than true-neutral (according to post-hoc pairwise comparison with
p < 0.01) since linguistic constraints select the target in both cases. It seems that robot
gaze is such a strong, assuring cue that participants have an even stronger hypothesis
about the validity of the sentence and, thus, can respond faster.
The effect of Gaze Congruency on response times suggests that people continuously
follow and use robot gaze for utterance comprehension. Specifically, the facilitation ef-
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Table 3.6.: Summary of model fitted to RT data.
Predictor Coefficient SE t-value
(Intercept) 1546.288 55.607 27.808
Validity - true -166.874 48.744 -3.423
Congr - incongr. 203.771 48.699 4.184
Congr - neutral 155.575 47.504 3.275
true:incongruent 139.539 69.262 2.015
true:neutral -4.033 68.152 -0.059
Coefficient MCMCmean pMCMC Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 1546.288 1546.103 0.0001 <0.001
Validity - true -166.874 -167.243 0.0002 <0.001
Congr - incongr. 203.771 204.294 0.0002 <0.001
Congr - neutral 155.575 155.603 0.0008 <0.005
true:incongruent 139.538 138.640 0.0470 <0.05
true:neutral - 4.033 -4.043 0.9574 0.953
Model : RT ∼ SentenceValidity ∗ GazeCongruency + (1|subject) + (1|item)
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fect of congruent gaze suggests that people used the gaze direction to anticipate poten-
tial referents such that incongruent gaze led to wrong expectations, resulting in slower
response time.
One might argue that people followed and used robot gaze only until they realized
that robot gaze was not so beneficial overall. Thus, the reported effects could have
been very large in the first part of the experiment, but then disappeared in the sec-
ond part when people had learned to ignore gaze because it was not generally helpful.
This argument presupposes that people decide whether or not they interpret robot gaze
movements as shifts in the robot’s visual attention and whether they follow them or
not, depending on the utility for task completion. It is indeed vaguely possible that the
overall effects reported above are carried by behavior occurring in the first part of the
experiment only. To investigate whether participants learned to ignore gaze or whether
the reported effects are persistent for the entire experiment, we conducted a block anal-
ysis. An additional (binary) predictor "Block" captures the fact whether an item, and the
produced response time, occurred in the first or in the second experimental block. Since
items and conditions were sequentially randomized, each condition appeared twice on
average in each block. Even though results from analyses with such sparse data are
only indicative, they describe a trend for either change or continuity in the observed
behavior. Thus, if participants indeed stopped using gaze in the second half of the ex-
periment, we would expect to observe an effect of congruency in the first block, but not
in the second block. Consequently, Sentence Validity may still have affected response
time but the Gaze Congruency effect is then expected to disappear in block 2, inducing
an interaction of the predictor Block with the predictor Gaze Congruency. In contrast,
if participants remain attentive to robot gaze, the additional predictor Block is unlikely
to interact with Sentence Validity or Gaze Congruency.
Interestingly, model reduction reveals a main effect of Block (p < 0.001, see also
the sequential analysis of variance table in 3.7 such that we include it in the model as
an additional predictor. However, we did not observe an interaction with other pre-
dictors. The final model is described in Table 3.8 and MCMC-sampling again confirms
the main effect of Block. The negative coefficient for the second block indicates that
participants are generally faster in the second half of the experiment. This is a fre-
quent effect reflecting that people improve in task completion through practice. More
importantly, the absence of an interaction suggests that participants similarly follow
and use robot gaze throughout the entire experiment. Additional analyses within each
block confirm this result and reveal that in block 1 as well as in block 2, Congruency
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Table 3.7.: Model Reduction with all Predictors (including Block).
Predictor DF SumSq Mean Sq F
Validity 1 3,774,166 3,774,166 18.9
Congruency 2 12,703,156 6,351,578 31.8
Block 1 4,224,974 4,224,974 21.2
Congruency:Block 2 1,148,970 574,485 2.9
Validity:Block 1 129,444 129,444 0.6
Model : RT ∼ SentenceValidity ∗ GazeCongruency ∗ Block
+(1|subject) + (1|item)
Table 3.8.: Final RT model including Block as a factor.
Predictor Coefficient SE t-value
(Intercept) 1605.87 56.96 28.194
Validity - true -166.09 48.28 -3.440
Congr - incongr. 212.92 48.28 4.410
Congr - neutral 159.84 47.06 3.396
Block - second -125.49 28.04 -4.475
true:incongruent 127.93 68.65 1.863
true:neutral 1.58 67.52 0.023
Model : RT ∼ SentenceValidity ∗ GazeCongruency + Block
+(1|subject) + (1|item)
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Figure 3.15.: Response times in block 1 (left graph) and block 2 (right graph).
and Validity have main effects. Notably, the response time for robot utterances with
neutral gaze changes slightly across blocks. Fitting models separately to each block
reveals that, in block 1, the facilitation effect of (congruent) robot gaze is most domi-
nant, with levels neutral (Intercept) and incongruent not differing significantly from each
other (Coe f f . = 75.80; SE = 51.83; t− value = 1.463; p = 0.14). In block 2, the disrup-
tive effect of incongruent gaze seems to have increased, i.e., the neutral condition elicits
response time that is significantly slower than in the congruent condition (Coe f f . =
−96.73; SE = 46.05; t− value = −2.101; p < 0.05) but significantly faster compared to
the incongruent condition (Coe f f . = 153.85; SE = 45.16; t− value = 3.407; p < 0.001).
Combined Analyses
We have analyzed two dependent variables, response time and inspection data, sepa-
rately so far mainly because they have different properties. However, it appears rea-
sonable to investigate the relation of these two dependent variables since they are both
observed in response to the same manipulation of the stimuli. This way, one set of data
can possibly help to examine reasons for the variation of another set of data. In our case,
eye-movement data is observed as an on-line measure during exposure to the stimuli
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while response time is a measure recorded after perceiving the stimulus. Since our main
manipulation concerned the robot’s gaze direction (congruency) which occurred in the
middle of a trial (as opposed to sentence validity which is a manipulation of the final
part of a trial), participants’ eye movements may potentially help to understand and
explain how people’s visual attention during a trial relates to their response time.
Recall that we found that the predictor Gaze Congruency affected response time,
but in precisely what way remained speculation. We further found that participants
followed robot gaze to an object and hypothesized that this visual referent may be con-
sidered to predict the linguistic referent. To shed some light on the relation between
gaze-following and the response time effect, we included people’s inspection behavior
during IP1 (robot gaze towards target/competitor) as a predictor for a model of re-
sponse time data. We predicted that, if the early visual cue to a potential referent led
people to form a hypothesis about upcoming linguistic references, people who actually
follow gaze would be faster in congruent trials. Similarly, following robot gaze to an
object that was eventually not mentioned would mislead people and, thus, slow them
down. In contrast, ignoring robot gaze and not looking at the visual referent is pre-
dicted to flatten this effect and result in a response pattern similar to the neutral gaze
condition.
The data were coded as following robot gaze (’1’) when participants had inspected the
IA that the robot looked at at least once during IP1 and as not following robot gaze (’0’)
otherwise. Since we were interested in the effect of gaze-following, the neutral gaze
condition was dropped in this analysis. The resulting data set includes subject and item
information, the experimental condition (true/false, congruent/incongruent) as well
as whether participants followed the robot gaze to the visual referent or not, and their
response time. Model reduction shows that the predictor GazeFollowed interacts with
Gaze Congruency (χ2(3) = 11.425; p < 0.01). The interaction introduces a larger BIC to
the model but log-likelihood is largest, too, and since we are interested particularly in
this interaction we include it in the final model summarized in Table 3.9.
Figure 3.16 depicts mean response times as a function of (a) whether people followed
robot gaze (represented by lines "follow" versus "NOTfollow"), (b) whether robot gaze
was congruent or not, and (c) whether the sentence was valid or not. Crucially, the
interaction between GazeFollowed and Congruency which is also visible in Figure 3.16
suggests that facilitation as well disruption of robot gaze cueing a visual referent are
larger when participants actually follow that cue and look at the potential referent.
Participants that did not look at the visual referent showed smaller differences in their
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Table 3.9.: Model summary and according p-Values from Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling.
Predictor Coefficient SE t-value
(Intercept) 1572.89 62.49 25.171
Validity - true -156.69 62.62 -2.502
Congr - incongruent 140.24 63.08 2.223
GazeF - followed -84.87 77.78 -1.091
true:incongruent 102.91 90.32 1.139
true:followed -22.76 110.04 -0.207
incongruent:followed 205.48 108.47 1.894
true:incongruent:followed 107.88 155.18 0.695
Coefficient MCMCmean pMCMC Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 1572.89 1570.95 0.0001 <0.001
Validity - true -156.69 -152.06 0.0206 0.013
Congr - incongruent 140.24 144.07 0.0212 0.027
GazeF - followed -84.87 -83.70 0.2882 0.276
true:incongruent 102.91 95.55 0.2966 0.255
true:followed -22.76 -31.23 0.7802 0.836
incongruent:followed 205.48 201.00 0.0742 0.059
true:incongruent:followed 107.88 116.37 0.4652 0.487
Model : RT ∼ SentenceValidity ∗ GazeCongruency ∗ GazeFollowed
+(1|subject) + (1|item)
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Figure 3.16.: Inspection pattern predicting response times. When people had followed robot
gaze to the target/competitor in IP1, gaze congruency had a greater effect on re-
sponse times.
response times. Interestingly, the main effect of congruency – even though smaller
– remains which suggests that people did take notice of the visual referent, possibly
covertly. This result does not establish a causal link but further supports the claim
that robot gaze cues a visual referent which influences people’s hypotheses about the
utterance.
Concluding our results from Experiment 2, we find that the response time results are
in agreement with our eye-movement data and suggest that participants follow both
robot gaze and robot speech. The response time, and in particular its direct relation
to robot-gaze-following, supports the interpretation that congruent gaze benefits and
incongruent gaze disrupts comprehension. We argue that people follow robot gaze to
an object and form hypotheses about what the robot is going to mention next, that is,
robot gaze is interpreted with respect to referential intentions. When people’s expec-
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tations about an upcoming referent are met, as is the case in congruent trials, people
are faster to respond. However, when the visual and spoken references mismatch, the
comprehension process seems to be disrupted and increased response time are elicited.
The participant behavior we observed in response to robot behavior is in many re-
spects similar to what Hanna and Brennan (2007) observed in their studies. We simi-
larly found that: (a) Listeners begin to orient visual attention in the same direction as
the robot/speaker within 1,000ms after "VPoD" (visual point of disambiguation, i.e.,
the first speaker’s look towards the referent before/while beginning to speak which
corresponds to our robot’s gaze onset). (b) Listeners follow the robot/speaker’s gaze
during scene and utterance comprehension. (c) Listeners use this gaze cue to early dis-
ambiguate an utterance with respect to the scene, that is, they look at the target rather
than the competitor well before the LPoD. Note, that in Experiment 1 listeners similarly
kept looked at the visual referent during IP2 suggesting that gaze eliminated referential
ambiguity. We therefore conclude that people use robot gaze in a similar way that they
use human gaze. That is, the observed fixation patterns in response to robot gaze are
also consistent with and extend the idea that gaze elicits reflexive visuospatial orient-
ing (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999). The
persistence of the observed congruency effects in particular seem to suggest that peo-
ple automatically follow robot gaze. The reader is referred to Chapter 6 of this thesis
for further discussion of reflexive attention shifts in response to gaze cues. However,
the observed effects of robot gaze congruency on utterance comprehension in term of
response time further suggest that people use the visual information provided by the
robot’s gaze.
Furthermore, we would like to point out that Hanna and Brennan reported in their
studies that listeners rarely looked at the speakers’ face to detect where the speaker was
gazing at and rather used the speaker’s head orientation peripherally. This is additional
support for the claim that the type of robot gaze used in our studies – that is, as a
combination of head and gaze movement – can in principle be used in much the same
way that human speakers’ gaze is used even though the robot has no anthropomorphic
appearance and no human-like eyes. We suggest that it is sufficient for people to ascribe
the function of ’seeing’ to the camera in order to elicit similar behavior that human gaze
elicits.
Finally, visuo-spatial orientation induced by (robot) gaze seems to constrain the do-
main for utterance interpretation which in turn affects reference resolution. That is,
people seem to prepare to ground an upcoming referring expression with respect to
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one or several objects that have become the focus of visual attention (as a result of robot
gaze). While this in line with Hanna and Brennan’s results, their interpretation relied
exclusively on eye-movement data. Our response time data now provide additional
support for the effect of gaze cues on reference resolution. Thus, the presented evidence
supports the hypothesis that people interpret robot gaze as a visual reference cueing
the linguistic reference. This, however, suggests that people relate visual and linguistic
cues to each other, possibly via the assignment of attentional states to robot gaze. The
results presented in this Chapter therefore support the hypothesis, that people establish
joint attention with the robot and that this can be beneficial for comprehension (response
level 3, as introduced in Section 1.4).
However, the behavioral data from the presented experiments do not reveal in what
way the knowledge about the visual referent (that the participants jointly attend to) af-
fects utterance interpretation. Whether people not only attend to the same object but
also draw inferences about why the robot attended to this object remains speculation.
Two different mechanisms may explain the observed facilitation/disruption effect on
response times: People may use robot gaze in a "top-down" manner, driven by the be-
lief that robot gaze reflects attentional and intentional states, revealing what the robot
intends to mention (we call this the Intentional Account). Thus, people possibly infer ref-
erential intentions from the robot’s gaze so that the expectation of a referent facilitates
(or, if incorrect, disrupts) comprehension. Alternatively, people follow robot gaze (re-
flexively) to the visual referent without inferring any communicative intentions. Robot
gaze rather happens to direct their visual attention to the right (or wrong) referent at
the right (or wrong) time such that further processing is influenced accordingly (Visual
Account). To present a first attempt at distinguishing these two account, this issue was
specifically addressed by Experiment 3.
Summary
In Experiments 1 and 2, we observed that people follow both the robot’s gaze and ut-
terance to referents in the scene. In Experiment 1, the robot ambiguously referred to
two potential referents and we observed that people inspected the object looked at by
the robot significantly more frequently than the other potential referent. In fact, peo-
ple followed robot gaze both when the sentence uniquely or ambiguously identified a
scene referent. Response times were similar for the referentially ambiguous utterance
compared to an unambiguous utterance, suggesting that gaze eliminated referential
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ambiguity. In Experiment 2, we used globally unambiguous utterances and investi-
gated whether robot gaze is indeed beneficial for utterance comprehension such that
people validate an utterance faster than when gaze is neutral. To separate the influence
of robot gaze and speech, we manipulated the congruency of robot gaze and speech such
that gaze sometimes served as a cue to a subsequently mentioned object and sometimes
it did not. Moreover, we manipulated the validity of the statements which were unam-
biguous in general but contained temporarily ambiguous referring expressions. We
again observed gaze-following in all conditions, that is, people inspected the visually
cued object more frequently than the potential competitor. People inspected this object
until the same object or the competitor object was uniquely identified by the robot’s
mention of the color of the respective object. While congruent robot gaze was observed
to speed participants’ response time, a mismatch between visually cued and linguisti-
cally identified object led to slowed response time. These results suggest that people
interpreted the gaze cue to indicate which object was going to be mentioned by the
robot. When people’s expectations with respect to upcoming referents were met, re-
sponse times were faster compared to when people had to revise these expectations
and re-validate the utterance.
These results support the assumption that people apply response level 3 (introduced
in Section 1.4) during interaction with our robot. That is, participants establish joint
attention with the robot and the acquired visual information facilitates comprehension.
However, the presented results do not reveal how the object in visual focus influences
comprehension. Conceivable are two different mechanisms: (a) People infer referential
intentions from robot gaze which facilitates comprehension when these intentions are
congruent with the actual utterance, or else this disrupts comprehension (Intentional
Account), or (b) people (possibly reflexively) attend to the visual referent but do not infer
any communicative intentions and the late attention shift in incongruent trials simply
requires additional effort and time (Visual Account). Thus, whether people indeed form
beliefs on the robot’s communicative intentions, or whether the increased effort related
to an additional visual attention shift simply increases response time is further explored
in Chapter 4.
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The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that robot gaze is a strong cue which guides
visual attention in an automatic fashion and that this further influences utterance com-
prehension. However, there are two categories of explanation for the observed response
time effects. Either people infer referential intentions from the robot’s gaze so that the
expectation of a referent facilitates (or, if incorrect, disrupts) comprehension (called the
Intentional Account). Or, people jointly attend to the visual referent but do not infer any
communicative intentions and robot gaze simply induces a visual attention shift either
to the right object at the right time (facilitation) – or not (disruption). We call this the
Visual Account.
If, indeed, the facilitation/disruption effect of robot gaze on people’s comprehension
is due to the inferred referential intentions, we predicted that robot gaze would not
only affect how fast references are resolved but also which object is believed to be the
intended referent of the utterance. Such behavior would provide strong evidence sup-
porting the Intentional Account, or response level 3 (Section 1.4), and some indication
for response level 4. That is, if robot gaze was shown to affect beliefs about which ref-
erent the robot intended to talk about, this would clearly suggest that people interpret
robot gaze with respect to attentional and intentional states (leading to joint attention,
level 3) and the inference of referential intentions could even indicate that response
level 4 (shared attention) is possible in HRI.
4.1. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 more thoroughly investigated how robot gaze affects reference resolu-
tion when people have to correct the robot utterance. A verbal correction implicitly
requires participants to actively decide which referent they think was intended by the
robot, avoiding the need to explicitly ask people for this decision. The user, thus, is
engaged in a task designed to reveal the relative importance of linguistic and gaze cues
for identifying an intended referent.
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Recall the example scenario described for Experiment 2: Person A wants an ingredi-
ent but cannot reach for it since her hands are covered in cup cake dough. So she asks
person B for help. There is a bowl of macadamia nuts to A’s left and a bowl of hazel-
nuts to her right. But A is in a rush and confuses things, so she says: "B, please pass
me the hazelnuts" while looking at the macadamias. In this case it is not obvious that
the sentence is false but the referential cues are incongruent. Thus, B may decide which
type of nuts A meant to ask for and try to pass those, or she can correct and clarify: "A,
you wanted the hazelnuts, right?" if she thinks that A just looked at the wrong bowl, or
"A, you wanted the macadamias?" if she thinks that A just used the wrong name.
In our experiment, we observed participants mainly in response to false robot utter-
ances which required a verbal correction. These were, as in Experiment 2, accompanied
by either congruent, incongruent or neutral robot gaze. Thus, when the robot men-
tioned one object but gazed at another, participants needed to produce a correction that
involved the object they considered to be the intended referent. The aim of this experi-
ment was to determine whether and to which extent robot gaze modulates participants
beliefs about referential intentions. Additionally this experiment served to see whether
the previously observed visual attention pattern in participants was robust to changes
in the task and could be replicated. A post-experimental questionnaire further sought
to assess the general beliefs and impressions people obtained from the interaction with
the robot.
4.1.1. Method
Participants
Thirty-six native speakers of German, again mainly students enrolled at Saarland Uni-
versity, took part in this study (12 males, 24 females). All reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Materials
For Experiment 3, we used the same set of stimuli that was used for Experiment 2.
That is, 24 items were used which occurred in six conditions each. The conditions re-
sulted from the manipulation of Sentence Validity (true/false) and Gaze Congruency
(congruent, incongruent, neutral; see Table 3.2). Because we wanted to mainly analyze
the correction statements participants produced, false robot utterances were of particu-
lar interest in this experiment. Using the previous example sentence and scene, such a
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Table 4.1.: Linguistic and visual references to objects in three congruency conditions for a false
sentence, e.g. "The cylinder is taller than the pyramid that is brown" where the small
pink pyramid would be considered as target.
Linguistic reference to:
Condition Gaze to: Comparative Color
false - neutral: — Target Competitor
false - congruent: Competitor Target Competitor
false - incongruent: Target Target Competitor
false utterance "The cylinder is taller than the pyramid that is brown" would be accom-
panied either by robot gaze towards the brown pyramid (congruent), the pink pyramid
(incongruent) or neutral gaze. In those utterances, there were two cues identifying the
referent. The first cue was the comparative (taller than or shorter than) and the second
cue was the object color. False statements were false when these two cues did not iden-
tify the same referent, e.g., when the cylinder was not taller than the brown pyramid.
Thus, people could repair such an utterance by changing either the comparative or the
color adjective in their correction sentence.
The neutral condition provided a baseline concerning the bias towards either repair
option in the absence of gaze, that is, wether people generally preferred to adapt the
comparative, for instance. When referential robot gaze was present it emphasized one
of the potential referents: either it supported the mentioned object (identified by color)
or it supported the alternative object (identified by the comparative, not color). Details
on referential variation for the three false conditions are shown in Table 4.1.
Procedure
In this experiment, people were instructed to give an oral correction of the robot’s ut-
terance when they thought that the robot had made a mistake. This formulation was
deliberately kept rather vague so that people were free to interpret "mistake" in a way
they found appropriate. The "cover story" for this experiment remained the same as in
Experiments 1 and 2, i.e., participants were told that the robot system would be evalu-
ated. It still made many mistakes and participants’ feedback was to be used as feedback
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in a machine learning procedure to improve the robot system. They were further told to
start their correction with the same object reference that the robot started with, making
it easier for the system to learn from the corrected sentences. Once more, this explana-
tion served as a cover story making the task appear plausible. People’s utterances were
recorded from trial start to end, that is from video onset until participants pressed a
button indicating that they finished giving their correction. Thus, the experiment was
self-paced and participants could start their utterance at any time during a trial. Par-
ticipants’ sentences were recorded using a mobile microphone connected to an Asio
AudioCard. The eye-tracker adjustment and calibration procedure as well as drift cor-
rection and presentation of the stimuli were otherwise identical to Experiments 1 and
2.
Analysis
For the analysis of the corrections, we annotated the produced sentences with respect to
which object was described (in response to false robot utterances only, i.e. considering
only the conditions shown in Table 4.1). The three categories assigned to responses were
Target (object matching the comparative), Competitor (object matching the color adjec-
tive) and Else (no correction given or described one or more different objects). Each re-
sponse category was thus coded as a binary variable (e.g. the target had been described
in the correction sentence (’1’) or not (’0’)). Since participants almost always either pro-
duced a sentence containing the target or the competitor, both response categories Tar-
get and Competitor were nearly complementary. While we consider only false utterances
and removed Sentence Validity as a factor, the remaining predictor ’Gaze Congruency’
has again three levels: congruent, neutral and incongruent. For the analysis, we used
logistic regression similar to the mixed-effects models used for eye-movement data.
We again recorded people’s eye movements during trials in order to compare par-
ticipant behavior in this study with the behavior observed in previous studies. The
analysis of eye-movement data was identical to Experiment 2.
Predictions
In false utterances, the target object (which is consistent with the comparative of the
sentence) is not the one identified at the LPoD (color adjective). That is, in the false-
congruent condition, the robot looks at the competitor which is also identified at LPoD
but is not consistent with the comparative. In the false-incongruent condition, the robot
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(a) Neutral Gaze.
i) The cylinder is shorter that the pyramid that is brown.
ii) The cylinder is taller that the pyramid that is pink.
(b) Congruent Gaze.
i) The cylinder is shorter that the pyramid that is brown.
ii) The cylinder is taller that the pyramid that is pink.
(c) Incongruent Gaze.
i) The cylinder is shorter that the pyramid that is brown.
ii) The cylinder is taller that the pyramid that is pink.
Figure 4.1.: Predicted corrections of the sentence "The cylinder is taller than the pyramid that is
brown." for neutral, congruent and incongruent robot gaze. In i) the comparative is
adapted to match the competitor object, in ii) the color adjective is adapted to match
with the target object.
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looks at the target, which is not identified at LPoD but is consistent with the compara-
tive. Thus, people may correct the robot’s utterance while mentioning the competitor
(and changing the comparative) or they could produce a correction containing the tar-
get (by changing the LPoD, color adjective). The neutral condition shows whether there
is a bias towards changing one of the two linguistic cues (comparative versus adjective)
and provides a baseline to compare against robot-gaze induced repair preferences. In
Figure 4.1, the possible correction sentences are given as well as a predicted preference
in each gaze condition.
We previously hypothesized that the effect of robot gaze on people’s comprehen-
sion was due to the assumption that robot gaze reflects attentional states such that it,
consequently (and similar to human gaze), elicits predictions about the intended ref-
erent of the speaker. If this Intentional Account holds, we predicted that robot gaze
would not only affect how fast references are resolved (Experiment 2) but also which
object is understood to be the referent. More precisely, we would expect people to
describe the target and adapt the color adjective, for instance, more often in the false-
incongruent condition (when the robot looks at the target, Figure 4.1 c) than in the
false-congruent or false-neutral conditions – even though the (false) utterance always
identifies the competitor at LPoD. Similarly, we predicted that people would tend to
describe the competitor and change the comparative accordingly when the robot also
looked at the competitor (false-congruent, Figure 4.1 b). If robot gaze, however, directs
the listener’s visual attention towards an object without contributing referential mean-
ing (Visual Account), a significant difference in people’s repair patterns across the three
gaze-conditions would be unlikely.
4.1.2. Results and Discussion
Eye movements
Plots in Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show a fixation pattern that is extremely similar to that ob-
served in Experiment 2 (Figures 3.9, 3.10). This suggests that findings on people’s visual
attention during this experiment replicate the findings from our previous experiments.
That is, people robustly followed the robot’s gaze and speech to objects in the scene
irrespective of the type of task they were given.
Inferential analyses of the respective IPs confirmed that people reliably followed
robot gaze. In IP1, people inspected the target more frequently when the robot
looked at the target, i.e., in condition "targetgaze" combining true-congruent and false-
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incongruent, compared to when it looked at the competitor (Coeff.=−2.78, SE = 0.32,
Wald Z =−8.64) or when gaze is neutral (Coeff.=−2.27, SE = 0.27, Wald Z =−8.33). Sim-
ilarly, people were more likely to inspect the competitor when the robot looked at the
competitor than when it looked at the target (Coeff.=−3.27, SE = 0.39, Wald Z = −8.34)
or is neutral (Coeff.=−2.21, SE = 0.27, Wald Z =−8.29). The same pattern is observed
for IP2, suggesting that people continued to inspect the object that had previously been
looked at by the robot, even though the referring expression was ambiguous at that
point. More precisely, in IP2, people were more likely to look at the target when the
robot had fixated the target prior to noun onset, and the competitor was more often
inspected when it was looked at previously by the robot.
Overall, the change from a response time task to a self-paced correction task did not
seem to affect how robot gaze influences people’s visual attention. Instead, people fol-
lowed robot gaze in both settings - both under time pressure (Experiment 2) as well as
in a self-paced correction task (Experiment 3). On one hand, the argument that people
follow robot gaze as part of a strategy in order to better and faster fulfill the task is un-
likely since robot gaze was neither generally helpful for task completion nor was there
a need to respond particularly fast. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that people
follow gaze (and do not look at the robot head) purely for reasons of boredom or cu-
riosity since gaze was frequently misleading and disrupting people in fulfilling the task
of Experiment 2. Thus, the replication of the eye-movement results further support the
view that people attend to (robot) gaze so closely and reliably, possibly because they
reflexively react to robot gaze and further consider it to reflect attentional states.
Sentence Production
Since participants had to start a correction sentence with the same object as was used in
the original sentence (anchor), we mainly found corrections that additionally involved
either the target or the competitor object. To assess whether the robot gaze cue in-
fluenced the choice of the object involved in a correction and whether an object itself
elicited preferences for including it in a description, we initially included two predic-
tors, Described Object and Gaze Congruency, in our analyses. Model reduction sug-
gests that both predictors contribute to fitting a model to the data since their interaction
was significant (χ2(4) = 58.12; p < 0.001). With more degrees of freedom, the log-
likelihood of such a model is also largest (-541.06) and AIC and BIC are smallest (BIC
of 1160.96 versus other models with a BIC of 1176.08, 1190.41 or 1685.68). A summary
of the resulting model containing both predictors and the interaction is given in Table
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Figure 4.2.: Average Fixation proportions in 250ms bins across a whole trial.
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Figure 4.3.: Average Fixation proportions in 250ms bins across a whole trial.
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Figure 4.4.: Proportion of objects described in response to false robot utterances of the form
"The cylinder is taller than the pyramid that is brown".
4.2. Moreover, this table shows models for each response category individually indicat-
ing how well Gaze Congruency predicts when the target (or the competitor) is chosen.
Since only false statements are considered in this analysis, the gaze condition congru-
ent shows competitor gaze while the incongruent condition consequently shows target
gaze.
The response category Else was found in 3.47% of the false-trials and was treated
as missing values in the analysis. The reason for excluding category Else is that it is
conceptually not a third response category. Instead, response category remains a bi-
nary (or dichotomous) dependent variable to which simple logistic regression can be
applied. The alternative would be multinomial logistic regression for a polytomous
dependent variable which is less interpretable and, at this stage, not available (Barr,
2008). We, thus, fitted a logistic regression model to our data including Response Cat-
egory as predictor, specifying which object is part of a given description. This serves
the purpose to find out whether one object was described generally more often than the
other. Otherwise, we fitted simple logistic regression models for each response category
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Table 4.2.: Summary of the resulting model (Model1) and summaries of models for separate
outcome categories (success & failure of target/competitor).
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
(Intercept) 1.8245 0.241 7.572 <0.001
Object-target -3.9763 0.364 -10.924 <0.001
Congr-incongr. -1.4017 0.295 -4.749 <0.001
Congr-neutral -1.1314 0.299 -3.786 <0.001
target:incongr. 3.0129 0.438 6.887 <0.001
target:neutral 2.3959 0.444 5.393 <0.001
success of described object ’target’
(Model2)
(Intercept) -3.1050 0.451 -6.889 <0.001
Congr-incongr. 2.2738 0.395 5.763 <0.001
Congr-neutral 1.7608 0.395 4.454 <0.001
success of described object ’competitor’
(Model3)
(Intercept) 2.6273 0.415 6.332 <0.001
Congr-incongr. -2.0161 0.362 -5.566 <0.001
Congr-neutral -1.6179 0.363 -4.461 <0.001
Model1 : UsedInAnswer ∼ DescribedObject ∗ GazeCongruency
+(1|subject) + (1|item), f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
Model2 : Target ∼ GazeCongruency + (1|subject) + (1|item),
f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
Model3 : Competitor ∼ GazeCongruency + (1|subject) + (1|item),
f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
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(target/competitor) separately accounting for the fact that the response categories are
not independent. While the results from the inferential analyses are provided in Table
4.2, we also computed mean proportions of corrections involving the target/competitor
and plotted them for visualization purposes in Figure 4.4.
In almost 67% of their correction statements in the neutral gaze condition participants
preferably gave this correction sentence: "The cylinder is shorter than the pyramid that
is brown." That is, in the neutral baseline condition we observed a general preference
to build a corrected sentence involving the competitor (which has been linguistically
identified by the mentioned color in false trials), changing the comparative accordingly.
This is depicted in the central condition in Figure 4.4 and confirmed by the fixed effect
of predictor Described Object in Model1, Table 4.2. The overall preference to keep the
more explicitly mentioned object (color match) remained dominant in all three gaze
conditions is likely due to two possible reasons. Firstly, gaze is frequently incongru-
ent in our stimuli (and often considered incorrect) whereas speech is always fluent and
clear. This may have induced a general bias to trust the competence of language rather
than the gaze cue. Consequently, linguistic referential cues were preferred information
for the identification of the intended referent (while gaze cues "only" modulated this
process). Secondly, it has been shown that people prefer to use absolute (shape and
color) to relative features (size, location) for the production of REs (Beun and Cremers,
1998). That is, among the linguistic referential cues, color was simply the most domi-
nant cue to an intended referent.
A positive coefficient of the predictor Gaze Congruency in Model2 and Model3 is in-
terpreted as a larger probability of describing the according object in a given predictor
level. The results in Table 4.2 therefore indicate that people corrected an utterance using
the target (i.e. change the color mentioned in robot statement) significantly less often
when robot gaze was directed towards the competitor (false-congruent) compared to
when the robot actually looked at the target (false-incongruent) or robot gaze was neu-
tral (false-neutral). These results are depicted by the dotted line in Figure 4.4. Similarly,
participants chose to give a scene description involving the competitor (and changing
the comparative) with significantly higher probability when the robot’s gaze was di-
rected towards the competitor compared to when it was target-bound or neutral. This
result is depicted by the continuous line in Figure 4.4. That is, the robot’s gaze increases
the likelihood of correcting the competitor or target in the congruent or incongruent
condition, respectively.
Another observation suggesting that gaze did affect reference resolution becomes
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apparent when analyzing corrections in response to true robot utterances. Although
we did not expect participants to correct true statements, interestingly, we observed
that in 15% of true-incongruent trials (i.e., in 21 trials) people corrected the robot ut-
terance with a sentence describing the competitor which the robot had looked at (true-
congruent was corrected in 4 trials, true-neutral only in 1 trial). This suggests that peo-
ple believed that the robot was indeed talking about the competitor, which it looked
at, even though both the comparative and the mentioned color uniquely identified the
target object. This result is surprising given that a task requiring sentence correction
should induce a clear focus on the utterance. In the mentioned true-incongruent tri-
als, however, participants most likely did not see the target otherwise they would have
realized that the utterance was in fact correct. Instead, they must have focused com-
pletely on the object that the robot had fixated (competitor) leading to the unnecessary
production of a correction sentence involving the competitor.
The results from the correction analysis support our hypothesis that people consider
robot gaze to reflect its attentional state and, further, its intention to talk about an object
that it looks at. These findings also suggest that people in fact establish joint attention
and integrate the visual reference derived from robot gaze with their on-line interpre-
tation of robot speech. Thus, these observations clearly favor the Intentional Account
(response level 3, and possibly 4) for explaining the facilitation/disruption effects of
robot gaze on comprehension reported in Chapter 3.
Questionnaire
In order to examine what general impressions participants obtained from the robot
and, in particular, whether the video-based presentation mode posed a problem for
people, we asked participants to fill out a post-experiment questionnaire. This ques-
tionnaire contained questions and statements concerning people’s general impression
of the robot, whether they thought its utterances were comprehensible at all or what
they thought were the robot’s most common errors. Overall, 20 statements or ques-
tions had to be evaluated and responses were given on a 7-level Likert scale to allow
for graded agreement (1=no/don’t agree and 7=yes/agree). The results of this ques-
tionnaire are shown in Table 4.3. The first batch of statements indicates more generally
what an impression participants obtained during the experiment from the robot. While
the robot was not perceived as very natural or clever, people also did not find it es-
pecially confusing or annoying. Considering the persistent incongruent behavior and
the frequent mistakes of the robot, this makes people appear rather patient. Question 6
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and 8 are particularly important for the justification of our design, as we presupposed
that the robot’s utterances were easily assessable, despite the temporary ambiguity in
the sentences or the video presentation allowing only a certain scene perspective. The
mean agreement values suggest that participants found robot utterances comprehen-
sible and that video presentation did not disrupt task completion. Interesting, and
remarkably accurate, are also participants’ judgements concerning most frequent er-
rors of the robot: size comparisons as well as gaze behavior were considered the most
frequent mistakes (number 14, 17). On the other hand, participants also thought that
the robot typically looked at what it talked about. Participants further seemed to think
that they hardly attended to the robot’s movements (and, thus, did rather not follow
the robot’s gaze) as the mean of 3.3 in statement number 11 suggests. Notably, we
observed clear and robust gaze-following in this and the previous experiments. That
is, this result hints at the automatic or sub-conscious manner of the observed gaze-
following behavior. Additionally, we were interested to see whether participants had
hypotheses concerning the robot’s competences. That is, statements number 19 and 20
sought to reveal whether people assumed speech production or visual processing to
be the source of most errors. The means of 3.1 and 4.7 respectively are significantly
different (t-test(speech,vision):p < 0.001) and indicate that participants rather trusted
the robot’s speech competence (e.g., it produced the correct color word or the correct
comparative) than its ability to grasp the visual scene (it did not correctly recognize the
size difference). On one hand, the frequently inappropriate camera movements – while
speech was always fluent – may have influenced this result. On the other hand, people
may generally think that correct scene comprehension is more difficult for an artificial
system than speech production, possibly because lexical retrieval and sentence produc-
tion appear easy and natural to themselves while recognizing and comparing various
geometric shapes are not always easy for some participants.
Summary
To distinguish the purely visual component of robot gaze from its potentially referen-
tial meaning, we changed the task from a response time task (Experiments 1 and 2) to a
production task in Experiment 3. People had to verbally correct the robot’s statement in
a self-paced manner. False robot utterances contained two conflicting referential cues,
the comparative and the LPoD with the color adjective, which selected either the tar-
get or the competitor, respectively. Additionally, robot gaze provided a referential cue
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Table 4.3.: Statements and Average Agreement - from 1 (no) to 7 (yes))
Nr. Topic Statement Mean Agreement SD
1 Impression The robot’s behavior is confusing. 3.10 1.37
2 The robot’s behavior is natural. 3.23 1.48
3 The robot’s behavior is clever. 4.17 1.49
4 The robot’s behavior is erroneous. 4.47 1.31
5 The robot’s behavior is annoying. 2.07 1.55
6 Clarity Are the robot’s utterances comprehensible? 5.83 1.39
7 Gaze&Head Do you find the head movement appropriate
and natural? 3.53 1.61
8 Presentation Do you think task completion was
more difficult due to video presentation? 1.80 1.37
9 Behavior The robot is an intelligent system which
rarely makes mistakes. 4.30 1.64
10 The robot mostly looks at what it describes. 4.57 1.76
11 I did not pay attention to the robot and
and concentrated on the sentences. 3.30 1.51
12 I can imagine a natural conversation with it. 2.37 1.25
13 I don’t think the robot is intelligent, and its
utterances are rather random. 2.57 1.19
14 Errors The robot mostly made false size comparisons. 4.37 1.50
15 The robot mostly named the wrong shape. 2.77 1.28
16 The robot mostly did not recognize color correctly. 4.40 1.38
17 The robot mostly looked at a wrong object. 4.60 1.52
18 The robot mostly named the wrong locations. 3.33 1.32
19 Error Source Mostly Speech Production: Robot often
chooses incorrect words. 3.13 1.74
20 Mostly Vision Processing: Robot often does not
correctly recognize scene entities. 4.67 1.52
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to either target or competitor. Which referent (target or competitor) participants men-
tioned in their correction sentences was, thus, assumed to reflect which referent they
thought was intended by the robot. Interestingly, the produced correction statements
revealed that robot gaze modulated which referent people mentioned in their correc-
tion sentence, i.e., which object they understood to be the intended referent. Since this
experiment imposed no time pressure on people’s responses, the effort of shifting vi-
sual attention alone cannot account for effects of robot gaze on comprehension and
response production. People had sufficient time to reorient their visual attention and
prepare their utterance. Rather, the referential intention inferred from robot gaze seems
to have influenced what objects people selected as referents for their corrections. In the
light of these results, the Visual Account can probably be rejected as explanation for
facilitation/disruption effects of robot gaze (Experiment 2) and preference modulation
of referent selection for correction statements (Experiment 3).
Thus, in Experiments 1-3, we have provided evidence that listeners not only follow
robot gaze but that they further use this as a visual reference revealing communicative
intentions. In these experiments, we assumed that robot gaze would be only beneficial
for utterance comprehension if it was aligned with speech in a human-like manner such
that gaze cues could be similarly used as referential cues. We argued that human-like
speaker gaze facilitates communication because it fulfills certain functions in commu-
nication but, in fact, it is an open question whether such alignment is indeed required
for people to interpret robot gaze as an attentional and intentional cue that affects how
people comprehend the utterance. The investigation of the relevance of alignment be-
tween gaze and speech for maintaining its utility during utterance comprehension fur-
ther examines whether the Visual or the Intentional Account is most likely to explain
the influence of robot gaze. In the following chapter, we thus consider these issues in
greater detail.
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Experiments 1-3 have examined the influence of robot gaze, when it is aligned with
speech in a human-like manner. Specifically, in Experiments 1 and 2, we have shown
that congruent gaze which is synchronized with speech not only elicits gaze-following
but also facilitates comprehension. In contrast, incongruent gaze has been shown to dis-
rupt comprehension such that listeners needed more time to validate a sentence than
when gaze was neutral. We hypothesized that the facilitating/disruptive effect of con-
gruent/incongruent robot gaze (respectively) was either due to a helpful or a useless
reflexive shift of visual attention (Visual Account), or it was due to people interpreting
robot gaze as a cue to its attentional and intentional states eliciting expectations about
upcoming referents (Intentional Account). That is, participants may have hypothesized
that the robot attended to one object because it intended to mention it. On this account,
congruent referential gaze elicits correct expectations about the utterance whereas in-
congruent gaze entails a revision in expectations upon hearing the actual reference,
thereby slowing people.
In Experiment 3, we found evidence that the visual cue provided by robot gaze not
only elicited a visual attention shift of the listener but indeed influences beliefs about
the robot’s referential intentions. Participants were asked to correct false robot utter-
ances and were free to decide which (target or competitor) object they included in their
correction sentence. Robot gaze modulated which object participants chose as referent
in their correction statement, suggesting that their understanding about what the robot
had originally intended to say was indeed affected by robot gaze. Thus, results from
Experiment 3 supported the Intentional Account.
Importantly, in Experiments 1-3 we assumed that human-like synchronization of
gaze and speech was required for people to be able to use gaze as a cue to the robots
attentional and intentional states. The results from our previous experiments, how-
ever, allow no conclusion with respect to the relevance of temporal synchronization of
gaze and speech for the observed effects. Moreover, we argue that the relevance of this
synchronization could provide additional insights helping to illuminating the nature
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of gaze influence: If its effect on utterance comprehension exists only because speaker
gaze happens to draws attention to the right object at the right time (Visual Account),
changes in the temporal synchronization of gaze and speech should clearly affect the
utility of gaze. In contrast, if people interpret robot gaze with respect to the robot’s
intentional states (Intentional Account), then synchronization is probably not critical.
Understanding someone’s (referential) intentions should persist and influence utter-
ance comprehension as long as they seem relevant. A combination of the two accounts
is also conceivable and, in fact, most probable. That is, which intention is inferred from
the gaze cue depends on when the cue is produced relative to speech. The interpretation
of robot gaze cues may, thus, be a function of temporal synchronization and linear or-
der. Consequently, in Experiments 4 and 5, we manipulated these dimensions of gaze
and speech alignment.
Recent findings from a study on the influence of indirect speaker gaze on utterance
comprehension suggest that there is only limited flexibility in the requirement of tem-
poral synchronization of such a gaze cue with speech, while maintaining its utility for
the listener (Kreysa, 2009). Kreysa (2009) conducted several studies in which partic-
ipants were shown a natural scene (photograph of a room) while listening to verbal
descriptions of this scene previously given by another participant. Further, the speaker
gaze of this participant was projected onto this scene such that listening participants
saw an indirect gaze cue (a cursor which represented the speaker’s original locus of fix-
ation) while listening to the corresponding utterances. Listeners had to identify men-
tioned objects in the scene as soon as possible by clicking on them. To assess the impor-
tance of alignment between speaker gaze and speech, the indirect gaze cue was manip-
ulated to occur one, two or five seconds before or after of the original cue. Kreysa (2009)
found that as long as the shift with respect to the gaze cue’s original occurrence was
small (up to two seconds ahead or one second delayed of natural occurrence), the cue
still facilitated the identification of referents. When the cue was more than two seconds
ahead of its natural occurrence, or more than one second behind, people were slower
to detect and click on the correct object. In fact, cues that were shifted by 5 seconds
were no more beneficial than random cues shown in a baseline condition. Post-hoc
tests between all conditions revealed a significant difference in click latencies between
the natural condition and the baseline (random), but no difference between conditions
with larger shifts and the random cursor. Kreysa concluded that natural timing of gaze
and speech is optimal for listeners, i.e., most beneficial, and that a larger shift reduces
the utility such that click latencies are increased and, in fact, similar to the random pat-
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tern exposure. Notably, the natural speaker gaze pattern she observed in her studies
were typically in accordance with previous results on gaze and speech production, that
is, fixations to an object peaked at approximately 800ms before onset of the object name
(Kreysa, 2009, Chapter 4).
These results suggest that the effect of gaze on utterance comprehension is flexible
only to a limited extent and not independent of the synchronization of gaze and the
produced utterance. However, the gaze cues used in the discussed study are indirect
cues and may not have the same status as direct perception of speaker gaze. Depending
on how people perceive speaker gaze compared to the cursor used in Kreysa’s study,
we outline two different behaviors in response to speaker/robot gaze that is shifted
considerably with respect to its original, ’natural’ occurrence:
(a) Robot gaze is, similar to a gaze cursor, a visual cue that may (reflexively) direct
attention and, thus, is only helpful for processing referring expressions when it
occurs within a short time window around the spoken reference. A substantial shift
of gaze relative to speech would result in longer response times than the original
synchronization (and be no better than neutral gaze).
(b) Speakers’ looks towards an object may be perceived as more intentional than a gaze
cursor and as more robustly assigning relevance to the object in focus (similar to hu-
man gaze). Participants may persistently maintain and use this information when
it seems relevant, leading to equal response time for shifted and synchronized gaze.
Equally, non-congruent gaze cues may thus – even when shifted to precede the ut-
terance – disrupt comprehension and cause slower response times.
Behavior (a) would provide support for the Visual Account (response level 2 in Sec-
tion 1.4) whereas behavior (b) would again favor the Intentional Account (response
level 3 in Section 1.4). Thus, Experiments 4 and 5 sought to investigate the importance
of synchronization between gaze and speech for human-robot interaction, exploring
the effects of shifted gaze cues on gaze-following, joint attention and its benefits for
utterance comprehension.
Specifically, in Experiment 4 we investigated two kinds of synchronization. Firstly,
we manipulated the temporal synchronization of gaze and speech by shifting gaze cues
ahead of speech such that all gaze movements were completed before the robot utter-
ance began (preceding condition). We compared participant behavior in response to
preceding versus synchronized gaze in order to assess the significance of the temporal
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synchronization. Secondly, we manipulated the sequential order of mentioned refer-
ences with respect to the order of gaze cues. That is, gaze cues that occurred in an order
reverse to the order of mention were sequentially miss-aligned, which was compared
to the original order of gaze and speech cues. This manipulation allowed us to explore
people’s ability to make use of a gaze cue which appears misplaced at the time of its
occurrence but which is, nevertheless, relevant since it referred to a mentioned object.
Experiment 5 further investigated the facilitating/disruptive influence of the relative
order of visual and linguistic references on utterance comprehension in greater detail.
Using only synchronized stimuli, both original and reversed orders of referential gaze
and speech cues were contrasted with neutral gaze. This way, we control for poten-
tial effects of the (sentential) order of mention in itself and investigate the actual ben-
efit/disruption of coherent versus reversely synchronized gaze compared to neutral
gaze. Thus, Experiments 4 and 5 together potentially provide additional insights into
the general robustness of robot gaze for people’s beliefs about referential intentions.
5.1. Experiment 4
In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that congruent robot gaze behavior, i.e. gaze to rele-
vant objects one second prior to their mentioning, facilitates utterance comprehension
compared to incongruent or neutral robot gaze. These experiments explored the effect
of referential robot gaze with respect to its match with the uttered reference (referent
identified by gaze cue was either mentioned or not). That this qualitative reference
(mis-)match affected the speed and nature of referential processing shows, on the one
hand, that people attend to an object that the robot seems to attend to and that people
infer referential intentions from the robot gaze. On the other hand, this effect empha-
sizes the importance of which object the robot looks at but it does not allow specific
conclusions with respect to the importance of when the robot looks at the according
object.
In Experiments 1-3, we adopted the previously established timing of referential
(speaker) gaze which precedes the onset of a referring noun by approximately one sec-
ond. As noted above, Kreysa’s results (2009) suggest that such precise timing is not
essential while further showing that large deviations in synchronization reduce gaze
benefits. In the present study, we consequently investigated whether referential robot
gaze needs to be temporally aligned with speech (in the way human gaze is synchro-
nized) in order to be beneficial, or whether robot gaze conveys referential intentions
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that have a long-lasting effect on utterance comprehension. To investigate this issue,
we manipulated alignment in two ways. While robot gaze is always directed to the
mentioned objects, i.e., never refers to irrelevant objects, we manipulated the factor
Order of Mention (sequence of mentioned objects crossed with sequence of gazed at
objects) which led to original (coherent) and reverse order of references. A second factor
Synchronization manipulated the temporal shifts between gaze/visual reference rela-
tive to the corresponding linguistic references.
Recall that participants were shown a scene as given in Figure 5.1 and a correspond-
ing unambiguous sentence such as "The cylinder is taller than the pink pyramid". To
achieve the mentioned manipulations, we varied the sequence of referring expressions
in the sentence: In the experimental condition "original order", the robot first mentioned
the central object and then the peripheral object, while in "reverse order" the robot men-
tioned the peripheral object first, then the central object. Thus, the order of mention
effectively manipulated the location of the referents for noun phrase one and two and
constituted an experimental factor with two levels (original order: central-peripheral,
reverse order: peripheral-central). The reversed order sentences were maintained valid
by also reversing the comparative between two objects (see Table 5.1). Importantly,
robot gaze was always directed first to the central object and subsequently to the pe-
ripheral object. Thus, a conflict arose in the sequence of these multi-modal references
in the reverse condition as the sequence of gaze movements was in reverse order to the
sequence of referring expressions. In the original order condition, both gaze cues and
referring expressions had the same linear order.
The temporal synchronization of robot gaze and speech constituted the second fac-
tor with also two levels (synchronous, preceding). Either robot gaze was synchronized
such that the robot fixated a referent one second prior to noun onset, or all gaze move-
ments preceded the robot utterance completely such that the robot first gazed at the
two referents and then uttered the sentence.
Notably, in all conditions the robot uttered a correct description and always gazed
at the mentioned objects. Thus, the possible conflict in order of mention and order of
gaze cues towards the referents may also be considered to reflect temporal congruency
– not absolute, since the correct and mentioned objects are effectively being looked at.
In terms of the previous manipulation of Congruency, conditions in Experiment 4 can
be compared as follows: Original order of mention in combination with synchronized
gaze equals congruent stimuli from Experiments 2 and 3, while reverse order of mention
combined with synchronized gaze results in a reverse reference sequence (temporally
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Figure 5.1.: Sample scene from Experiments, repeated here for convenience.
incongruent).
Uttered sentences in this experiment were similar to item sentences in Experiments
2 and 3 but were entirely unambiguous. That is, the adjective that previously disam-
biguated target or competitor in a relative clause after the referring noun was now
changed to a prenominal adjective which already uniquely identified the referent. Sen-
tences in this experiment further occurred in combination with identical scenes as in
previous experiments. Figure 5.1 depicts a corresponding sample scene and Table 5.1
provides an example for each experimental condition. The examples are based on the
sentence "The cylinder is taller than the pink pyramid" and show that robot gaze is
always directed first to the cylinder and then to the pink pyramid. That is, the robot
always looked first at the central object, then at the peripherally located object. We
distinguished the location of the referents in this explicit way because it may affect vi-
sual attention as well as processing time. After all, items in the central visual field are
typically more salient than those in the periphery (Mannan et al., 1996) and, thus, are
potentially easier to access when linking the utterance to the scene. This may affect
response time in particular when NP2 refers to the central object (reverse order) such
that NP2 can be resolved faster and the utterance may be validated faster.
104
5.1. Experiment 4
Table 5.1.: Order of Mention of mention, crossed with temporal synchronization of gaze and
speech, results in these four different conditions. Angular brackets (< >) mark a gaze
referent, quotation marks (") specify the linguistic referent. Effectively the sequences
of (ling. and visual) references are provided for each condition.
Original Order:
Robot Gaze "The cylinder is taller than the pink pyramid."
Synchronized <cylinder> "cylinder" . . . <pyramid> "pyramid"
Preceding <cylinder> <pyramid> "cylinder" . . . "pyramid"
Reverse Order:
"The pink pyramid is shorter than the cylinder."
Synchronized <cylinder> "pyramid" . . . <pyramid> "cylinder"
Preceding <cylinder> <pyramid> "pyramid" . . . "cylinder"
5.1.1. Method
Participants
Thirty-two native speakers of German, again mainly students enrolled at Saarland Uni-
versity, took part in this study (6 males, 26 females). All participants reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials
We manipulated two factors: Order of Mention (original, reverse) as well as Synchro-
nization (synchronized, preceding). The four conditions of an item were created using
one video stimulus (showing robot gaze to the central object and then to an object on the
periphery of the table) and two different sentences with two different temporal onsets
each (see Table 5.1). That is, each item appeared in four conditions. The scene and gaze
movements shown in the video stimuli were identical to previous experiments. The
two sentence types were of the form given in Table 5.1 and entirely unambiguous. That
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is, we removed the temporary referential ambiguity and shifted the LPoD to precede
the noun by removing the relative sentence and substituting it by a prenominal adjec-
tive. This way, the relative importance of gaze with respect to unambiguous spoken
references is examined to potentially corroborate the hypothesis that people generally
follow and interpret robot gaze as constraining the domain of interpretation.
While the central object (anchor in previous experiments) was uniquely identified by
naming its shape, objects on the periphery such as the pink pyramid required a dis-
ambiguating adjective in the noun phrase since there were two pyramids in the scene.
The onset of the sentences varied according to the synchronization and was, in aver-
age, delayed by approximately 4300ms in the preceding condition compared to original
occurrence. To counterbalance size, color and location of mentioned objects, we again
created an equal set of four videos per item, each with a reversed comparative such
that each peripheral object was a target referent in one set of stimuli and a potential
competitor in another set (e.g. the brown pyramid in sample scene of Figure 5.1 be-
came target when reversing the comparative). The approximate timing of a trial with
synchronized gaze in reverse order is provided in Figure 5.2.
  
  (English)        “The    cylinder     is taller than the pink    pyramid.”
SPEECH:
    <partner><pyramid>              <cylinder> <partner>GAZE:
TIME:
       (sec)            2 3   4     5       6       7 8
Interest
Periods:
          IP1     IP2              
  (German)       “Der    Zylinder    ist größer als die pinke Pyramide.”
Figure 5.2.: The approximate timing of utterance-driven robot gaze, in a reverse-synchronized
condition.
We constructed 36 filler videos and a total of 24 items resulting in 60 trials per list.
Since all experimental items required a positive answer and participants were given a
decision task, we introduced a bias towards negative answers in the fillers. 24 fillers
contained incorrect statements which resulted in overall distribution of 40% incorrect
trials per list. Otherwise, fillers were equally distributed across experimental condi-
tions and varied only with respect to the comparisons they made and where mentioned
objects were located in the scene.
Eight lists of stimuli were created, resulting from four experimental conditions and
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their counterbalanced versions. Each participant saw only one condition of an item
and, in total, six stimuli in each condition. The order of item trials was randomized for
each participant individually and items were always separated by at least one filler.
Procedure
The task and procedure were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. That is, participants saw
videos of the robot describing the scene and had to decide whether or not the robot’s
statements were correct. Participants’ eye movements were again tracked during trials.
The entire experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Analysis
The Interest Areas (IAs) in this experiment identified the central object, the peripheral
(formerly target or competitor) object and the robot head. The "cylinder" from the ex-
ample sentence above was the reference to the central and the "pink pyramid" was the
reference to the peripheral object. For analyses we were particularly interested in the
object mentioned in the final noun phrase henceforth called the NP2 referent, which
was either the central or the peripheral object depending on the order of mention.
We segmented the speech stream into two Interest Periods (IPs). IP1 was defined as
the 1000ms period ending at the onset of the second noun (in NP2). It contained the
robot’s fixation towards the target object as well as verbal content preceding the target
noun. In this experiment, IP2 did not stretch from noun onset to offset but was defined
as the 700ms period beginning with noun onset in NP2.
For inferential analyses, we considered inspections on the object referenced in NP2
as well as response time, recorded from NP2-noun onset to the moment of the button
press. The analysis is otherwise identical to Experiments 1 and 2.
Predictions
In Experiment 2, it was established that congruent robot gaze facilitates and incongru-
ent gaze disrupts utterance comprehension. If this facilitation effect of gaze is a bottom-
up process, i.e., it arises because the robot gaze cue draws attention to the right object
at the right time (Visual Account), then a temporal shift of gaze cues relative to speech
should diminish the benefit as well as the disruptive effect of gaze. However, the use
of gaze could (simultaneously) be also a top-down process involving interpretation of
gaze as an expression of attentional and intentional states of the robot, as indicated by
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the results from Experiment 3 (Intentional Account). If this is indeed the case, then the
obtained information may be used to construct hypotheses about potential referents
which persist throughout utterance processing until further constraining or contradic-
tory information is obtained. Thus, the benefit of robot gaze is expected to be more
robust and less sensitive to temporal shifts than the Visual Account predicts.
Specifically, we argue that the Intentional Account would not necessarily predict any
reduction of gaze influence for shifted cues. Instead, it is plausible that intentions in-
ferred from preceding gaze still facilitate or disrupt later reference resolution and lead
to similar response times as synchronized gaze.
The Visual Account further predicts that the order of referential cues would affect
their utility such that only original (coherent) order would facilitate comprehension.
Thus, in the context of the Visual Account an interaction of the two factors Synchro-
nization and Order of Mention is likely. That is, cues in original order would facilitate
reference resolution compared to reversed order only when gaze is synchronized while
in the preceding condition reverse and original order would elicit similar (slow) re-
sponses.
The Intentional Account also predicts an effect of Order of Mention. Previous re-
sults have shown that speaker gaze is directed at objects in the order of their mention
(Griffin, 2001) such a listener is likely to also expect gaze and speech cues to occur in
the same linear order. That is, originally ordered cues were predicted to cause shorter
response times than reversed cues since expectations based on inferred referential in-
tentions would be fulfilled in the order of their appearance.
Importantly, the Intentional Account predicts that a temporal shift does not affect
the influence of robot gaze. That is, if reverse order of cues has a disruptive or less
facilitating effect than cues in the same linear order, than this effect is expected to persist
also in the preceding condition such that we predict no interaction between the factors
Synchronization and Order of Mention.
5.1.2. Results and Discussion
Eye movements
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show a plot of the eye-movement data for the whole duration of a
trial. The initial two seconds of a trial were preview time, the robot head started moving
at around 2,000ms after trial start. We started plotting after preview time and ended
plotting just after the end of the robot utterance (9,500ms in the synchronized condition
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and 13,000ms in the preceding condition). We divided this large time window into
250ms-bins and computed fixation proportions for each IA (referent of NP1, referent
of NP2 and robot head) within each bin. Fixations that did not fall within an IA were
counted towards background fixations and are not included in the graph. The onsets of
the nouns in NP1 and NP2 are marked in the graph as well as the occurrences of robot
gaze and its target object. Robot gaze was always directed to the central object first,
and then towards the peripheral object. Depending on the uttered sentence (order of
mention), the fixated object was mentioned in NP1 (marked as "np1 gaze") or in NP2
("np2 gaze"). Final bins in each graph may be disregarded as they span the end of
the average response time, i.e., contain sparse data and are unlikely to reflect general
patterns.
As noted above, that the manipulation of Order of Mention coincided with a differ-
ence in location of the NP2 referent. That is, in original order, the NP2 referent is located
in the periphery of the table (pink pyramid), while in reverse order it is located in the
center of the scene (cylinder), as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Shown in the time graph are fixations on the NP1 and NP2 referents as well as on the
robot head. It is clearly visible that people fixated the robot head more frequently than
the objects on the table until the robot started speaking. Moreover, during robot gaze
movements people followed the gaze to the respective objects (first central, then pe-
ripheral object), notably while fixating the robot head rarely. In the condition original-
synchronized, the object referred to by robot gaze and subsequently by NP1 was iden-
tical and participants smoothly continued to fixate the according IA. Similarly, peo-
ple followed robot gaze to the object which was then mentioned in NP2. In condition
original-preceding, participants similarly followed robot gaze to the NP1 referent and
the NP2 referent before looking back to the NP1 referent (central object) when the robot
starts speaking. The fixation pattern throughout the robot utterance is remarkably sim-
ilar to the pattern observed in the original-synchronized condition.
In the lower graphs depicting reverse-order, people fixated what the robot initially
fixated (which is again the central object, but now mentioned only in NP2, hence ’np2-
gaze’). Then participants redirect visual attention towards the mentioned object (NP1
referent).
Notably, in all conditions participants frequently looked at the NP2 referent prior to
its mention, irrespective of the order of mention, gaze direction and gaze synchroniza-
tion. It is not clear whether participants indeed used even reverse gaze such that they
anticipated the NP2 referent in all conditions or whether this fixation pattern also re-
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Figure 5.3.: Time graph for synchronized robot gaze. Note that, robot gaze is directed first to
central then to peripheral object. Depending on order of mention, central object is
mentioned in NP1 and peripheral object in NP2 or vice versa, hence np1 gaze or
np2 gaze. IP1 ends and IP2 begins with noun onset in NP2.
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Figure 5.4.: Time graph for preceding robot gaze. Note that, robot gaze is directed first to
central then to peripheral object. Depending on order of mention, central object is
mentioned in NP1 and peripheral object in NP2 or vice versa, hence np1 gaze or
np2 gaze. IP1 ends and IP2 begins with noun onset in NP2.
111
5. Synchronization of Gaze and Speech
Figure 5.5.: Mean inspection probabilities per condition for IP1 (left graph) and IP2 (right
graph). IP1 is the 1,000ms time window preceding the noun onset in NP2. IP2
is defined as the 700ms time window starting at noun onset in NP2. Further, bars
are labeled with respect to the location of the NP2 referent in that condition.
flects other processes. Consider an example: <Robot looks at (central) cylinder> "The
pink pyramid is taller than <robot looks at (peripheral) pyramid> the cylinder." When
the robot looks at the pink pyramid, participants have already heard "The pink pyra-
mid is taller than" and hypothesize that the robot is not going to mention the pink pyra-
mid again. Instead they may remember that the robot initially looked at the cylinder
and use this piece of information to predict the NP2 referent. The time graph sug-
gests that this may well be happening in the preceding condition. We consider a second
example (original, preceding): <Robot looks at (central) cylinder> <robot looks at (pe-
ripheral) pyramid> "The cylinder is taller than the pink pyramid." By the time partici-
pants hear "taller than the", they already fixate the (peripherally located) pink pyramid
which suggests that they have inferred some referential intention from the robot’s prior
gaze movements, now predicting the pyramid to be the NP2 referent. While these time
graphs depict averaged eye movements which reflect tendencies for visual attention di-
rection, inferential statistics of both eye movements and response time data will reveal,
for instance, whether people indeed map robot gaze to the utterance quickly enough to
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facilitate comprehension or whether an incongruent sequence of references interrupts
comprehension.
Mean inspection probabilities for the NP2 referent are depicted in Figure 5.5. Results
from inferential statistics on inspection data for IP1 and IP2 are given in Table 5.2. In
IP1, both model reduction (χ2(1) = 4.03; p < 0.05) as well as the predictor’s coeffi-
cient reveal a main effect of Synchronization on inspections on the NP2 referent. As the
negative coefficient suggests, people inspected the NP2 referent with lower probability
when robot gaze preceded the utterance than when it was synchronized. Moreover,
we did not observe a main effect for Order of Mention, i.e., people inspected the NP2
referent equally often irrespective of where this referent was located (centrally, periph-
erally) or whether the robot concurrently fixated this object. This finding indicates that
people may use the visual information provided by robot gaze cues, across conditions,
to at least visually anticipate NP2.
In IP2, we observed a slightly different inspection pattern. In this IP, Order of Men-
tion had a main effect on inspection probability (χ2(1) = 35.67; p < 0.001) such that
participants inspected the mentioned object significantly more often in the reverse con-
dition than in the original, coherent order of reference. That is, when the robot had
previously fixated the peripheral object in IP1 and then mentioned the other, central
object in IP2 (i.e. <gaze to central cylinder>"The pink pyramid is taller than <gaze to
peripheral pyramid> the cylinder.") participants were more likely to inspect the men-
tioned object.
There are two possible explanations these high probabilities of inspecting the NP2
referent in reverse order: Either participants inspected this central object more often
because it was more salient due to its central location, predicting easy and quick refer-
ence resolution. Alternatively, the increased inspections on the NP2 referent in reverse
condition reflect difficulty to resolve the reference as it includes conflicting information
(gaze identified the pyramid while the mentioned noun referred to the cylinder) – in
which case slower response times would be expected. The latter explanation seems
to conflict with the assumption that people indeed predicted NP2 from gaze cues in
all conditions. Upon further consideration, this is not a real conflict, however. Even
though visual attention is directed to the correct object, mapping the gaze cue to resolve
the reference and integrating this piece of information into the utterance comprehen-
sion process may result in a greater cognitive load compared to the coherent sequence
of multi-modal references. The response time results will reveal which of the two ex-
planations is more likely.
113
5. Synchronization of Gaze and Speech
Table 5.2.: Model fitted to inspection data on object mentioned in second noun phrase, in IP1
and IP2.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
IP1 (Intercept) -0.0424 0.1758 -0.241 0.809
Order - reverse 0.1122 0.2165 0.518 0.604
Synchronization - preceding -0.4372 0.2187 -1.999 <0.05
reverse:preceding 0.2462 0.3089 0.797 0.426
IP2 (Intercept) -0.2917 0.1680 -1.737 0.083
Order - reverse 1.1128 0.2314 4.808 <0.001
Synchronization - preceding 0.5056 0.2218 2.280 <0.05
reverse:preceding -0.2773 0.3293 -0.842 0.399
Model : NP2re f erent ∼ OrderO f Mention ∗ Synchronization
+(1|subject) + (1|item), f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
It should be pointed out, however, that the reversal of item sentences produced asym-
metric conditions: NP2 contained a disambiguating adjective in the original order-of-
mention condition while this adjective was not present in the reverse order-of-mention
condition. The reason for this is that a color adjective for the central object would have
been redundant since the noun uniquely identified the object. This imbalance resulted
in a confound of the manipulation of Order of Mention with the presence of an ad-
jective in NP2. Both variations make the same predictions with respect to response
times. Both a coherent sequence of multi-modal references (original order) as well as
an additional adjective in NP2 were predicted to facilitate reference resolution and re-
sult in shorter response time. A closer look at participants’ eye movements may help
to identify which experimental manipulation accounts for potential response time ef-
fects. In order to incorporate the possible influence of the adjective in IP1 – where we
observed gaze-mediated and/or anticipatory eye movements to the object about to be
mentioned in IP2 – we shifted both IPs to 200ms later. That is, IP1-shifted was slightly
shortened and stretched from 500ms prior to noun onset to 200ms after noun onset and
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Table 5.3.: Model fitted to inspection data on object mentioned in second noun phrase, in shifted
IPs.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
IP1-shifted (Intercept) 0.3112 0.1724 1.806 0.071
Order - reverse -0.0912 0.2219 -0.411 0.681
Synchronization - preceding -0.4659 0.2266 -2.056 <0.05
reverse:preceding -0.0412 0.3181 -0.129 0.897
IP2-shifted (Intercept) -0.6989 0.1841 -3.797 <0.001
Order - reverse 1.4774 0.2392 6.176 <0.001
Synchronization - preceding 0.2141 0.2330 0.919 0.358
reverse:preceding 0.0245 0.3356 0.073 0.942
Model f inal : NP2re f erent ∼ OrderO f Mention ∗ Synchronization + (1|subject)
+(1|item), f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
IP2-shifted was defined as the subsequent 700ms period. Thus, IP1-shifted accommo-
dated the time needed to process the adjective such that potentially resulting antici-
patory eye-movement effects are captured in this time window. If the NP2-adjective
indeed helped participants to anticipate the object referenced by NP2 (potentially re-
sulting in short response time), then an effect of Order of Mention would be predicted
in IP1-shifted. That is, already in IP1-shifted, we would expect more inspections on the
NP2 referent in the original order of mention, compared to the reverse order condition.
As shown in Table 5.3, there is no main effect of Order of Mention in IP1-shifted,
suggesting that the adjective in NP2, in reverse order, does not affect anticipation of
the referent significantly. Instead, the Synchronization effect already reported from the
initial IP1 is still present, suggesting that people indeed followed gaze and attended
more closely to the according objects during actual robot gaze movements.
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Figure 5.6.: Average response times for all four conditions.
Response Time
Model reduction shows that Synchronization had no effect on response times. That
is, participants were equally fast to determine the validity of the robot statement in
synchronized and preceding conditions. Since no interaction between the two factors
Synchronization and Order of Mention was observed, we excluded Synchronization as
a predictor from our model. In addition, model reduction reveals a main effect of Order
of Mention (χ2(1) = 45.19; p < 0.001, see also Figure 5.6 for averages).
The result suggests that the temporal shift of robot gaze from synchronized to pre-
ceding the utterance did not affect the utility of the gaze cues, but the order of the cues
did. This, however, contradicts the predictions derived from a purely Visual Account
which suggested that it was critical when robot gaze drew attention to an object. Both
manipulations, however, made robot gaze direct people’s attention to relevant objects
at non-synchronized points in time – and always prior to the last referring expression
(NP2) – such that a difference in how these factors affect utterance processing can only
be explained in terms of an Intentional Account: The precise temporal synchronization
is not crucial for people to interpret and use robot gaze as a cue to the robot’s inten-
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tions. The inferred (referential) intentions, however, are expected to be fulfilled in the
same order as they were indicated by the robot’s gaze. This is not surprising since the
order of gaze cues reflects the speaker’s intentions regarding order of mention (Griffin
and Bock, 2000; Griffin, 2001). Thus, people seem to expect that the inferred referential
intentions be realized in the corresponding order. If this expectation is not met, gaze
cues – even when identifying mentioned objects – disrupt comprehension.
One might be concerned that the response time findings for Order of Mention re-
sulted from the sentence order itself in the event that reverse order of mention is gen-
erally more difficult to process due to, for instance, a certain visual search effort during
reference resolution. However, visual search involved in resolving NP2 is in fact less ex-
tensive in this experimental condition since the central object is mentioned in NP2 and
this centrally located object is arguably most salient and easiest to find. If the peripheral
object location influences the effort needed to resolve the referent, then a potential diffi-
culty should occur at the beginning of the sentence (NP1, peripheral object) and would
have most likely been resolved by the end of the sentence. This suggests that, if any
difference is expected at all, reverse order of mention should result in reduced response
times. Since this is not the case, we suggest that the increased response time reflect the
conflict in order of mention and order of gaze cues. This conflict seems to be caused
by gaze cues that elicit expectations about a certain sequence of referring expressions
which are not met, even in the case when robot gaze precedes the utterance. In contrast,
the close temporal synchronization of gaze and speech seems to be generally less im-
portant, indicating that – regardless of timing – robot gaze evokes expectations about
the robot’s attentional (and possibly intentional) states during interaction.
Summary
In this experiment, we have manipulated the alignment of referential gaze and speech
cues in order to examine the flexibility of this alignment while maintaining the bene-
fit of gaze for utterance comprehension. More precisely, we considered two kinds of
alignment: Firstly, we manipulated the temporal synchronization of gaze and speech:
gaze cue were either preceding (all gaze cues were shifted such that they preceded the
robot utterance) or synchronized (gaze and speech cues were produced concurrently, in
reverse order even in an overlapping manner). Secondly, we manipulated the order
of referring expressions and referential gaze cues. That is, gaze and speech cues were
either in original (and coherent) order or in reverse order to each other.
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We found evidence that the precise temporal synchronization is not critical for the
utility of robot gaze. A substantial temporal shift of roughly 4.3 seconds of the gaze
cues relative to their ’natural’ occurrence (preceding condition) caused the same effects
as synchronized gaze. That is, when gaze was in the same linear order as speech it simi-
larly facilitated comprehension in the synchronized (which has been shown to facilitate
comprehension in Experiment 2) and the preceding condition. When gaze occurred in
a reverse order to speech, this had a similarly slowing effect on response times in both
synchronized and preceding conditions.
This result suggests, that people follow and use robot gaze for utterance comprehen-
sion even after a considerable period of time. Notably, a purely attentional explanation
for comprehension facilitation (Visual Account) suggesting that gaze happens to draw
attention to an object which is then mentioned, would have predicted that the utility
of gaze is affected by a substantial temporal shift (e.g., as shown by Kreysa, 2009). The
Intentional Account, in contrast, is consistent with the notion that people infer inten-
tional states from robot gaze and therefore predicted that people maintain and use the
provided information when it seems appropriate (or until outdated). Thus, the results
on temporal synchronization effects provide more evidence in favor of the Intentional
Account and, thus, also in favor of response level 3 introduced in Section 1.4.
Interestingly, we further observed that the order of referential cues significantly af-
fected the benefit of robot gaze for utterance comprehension. That is, while the precise
temporal synchronization of gaze and speech was not crucial for the utility of robot
gaze, the relative ordering of cues did affect response times. Obviously, the inferred
(referential) intentions were maintained over several seconds but were also expected to
be fulfilled in the same order as they were indicated by the robot’s gaze.
The simultaneous absence of a main effect of Synchronization and presence of a main
effect of Order of Mention is evidence for the importance of when a referential gaze cues
occurs relative to the according referring expression. However, two further questions
arise from this study which need to be addressed in the following experiment. Despite
the inspection analyses suggesting that an imbalanced use of a prenominal adjective
did not affect referent anticipation, we cannot conclude that it had no effect on response
times. Thus, in Experiment 5 we remove this confound and further examine the effect of
Order of Mention. Additionally, the results from this experiment do not reveal whether
cues in reverse order actually disrupt comprehension or whether they are simply not as
beneficial as cues in original (and coherent) order. This issue is examined in Experiment
5 by contrasting original and reversed gaze and speech cues with neutral gaze.
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5.2. Experiment 5
Results from Experiment 4 demonstrated that a close temporal coupling is not essential
for robot gaze to influence utterance comprehension suggesting that gaze is interpreted
as a cue to the robot’s referential intentions rather than providing a purely visual cue. In
contrast to a related study conducted by Kreysa et al. (2009), the robot’s gaze involved
very few saccades over the course of a trial while it seemed to provide a very reliable
cue in the sense that people used it even when it preceded the whole utterance. Since in
Experiment 4 no comparisons between manipulated gaze and neutral gaze conditions
were made, it was left open whether reverse order was actually disrupting or simply
not facilitating comprehension (in contrast to original order). Experiment 5, thus, in-
vestigated the beneficial or disruptive effects of reversed robot gaze (and speech) cues
compared to neutral gaze with the aims of providing insights into whether or not peo-
ple are disrupted by incorrect gaze order or, in contrast, even use it to resolve referring
expressions faster than when only neutral gaze is available. Consequently, results from
this study complement our previous results, especially those from Experiments 2 and
4 which provided evidence for a disruptive effect of incongruent gaze. While incon-
gruent behavior in Experiment 2 was caused by a referential mismatch such that one
modality referred to an irrelevant object, in the current study (as in Experiment 4) both
modal cues referred to relevant (mentioned and correct) objects but in a different order.
To investigate these issues, we again manipulated Order of Mention (original, re-
verse) and Synchronization (synchronized, neutral) by contrasting synchronized gaze
and speech with neutral gaze, rather than preceding gaze. Since the temporal shift from
synchronized to preceding condition in Experiment 4 did not substantially affect peo-
ple’s behavior, we did not include preceding gaze as a condition and instead considered
neutral gaze. Firstly, combining original and reverse order of mention with neutral gaze
allowed us to investigate whether the order of spoken references alone affects utterance
comprehension. And secondly, the comparison between neutral gaze and synchronized
gaze evaluated the facilitating/disruptive effect of originally or reversely synchronized
gaze cues with respect to a neutral baseline.
The use of synchronized gaze crossed with Order of Mention essentially replicated
the level synchronized-original and synchronized-reverse used in Experiment 4. That
is, synchronized gaze and reversed order of spoken references resulted in reverse order
of referential (visual and linguistic) cues, whereas synchronized gaze and original order
of spoken references resulted in a congruent sequence of referential cues.
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Table 5.4.: Order of Mention, crossed with Synchronization of gaze and speech, results in four
different conditions. Angular brackets (< >) mark a gaze referent, quotation marks
(") specify the linguistic referent. Effectively the sequences of (ling. and visual)
references are provided for each condition.
Original Order:
Robot Gaze "The orange cylinder is taller than the pink pyramid."
Synchronized <cylinder> "cylinder" . . . <pyramid> "pyramid"
Neutral <> "cylinder" . . . <> "pyramid"
Reverse Order:
"The pink pyramid is shorter than the orange cylinder."
Synchronized <cylinder> "pyramid" . . . <pyramid> "cylinder"
Neutral <> "pyramid" . . . <> "cylinder"
The experimental conditions used in this experiment are described below using the
sample sentence "The orange cylinder is taller than the pink pyramid." Note that robot
gaze was always directed first to the central object, here the cylinder, and then to the
peripherally located object, the pink pyramid. The sentences were, in contrast to Ex-
periment 4, fully symmetric such that each noun phrase contained an adjective. This
symmetry made sure that the final referring expression (NP2) was similar across all
conditions such that there was no confound of condition and prenominal adjective oc-
currence. Otherwise, sentences and scenes were similar to the material used in the
previous experiments.
5.2.1. Method
Participants and Procedure
Thirty-two native speakers of German, mostly students enrolled at Saarland University,
took part in this study (11 males, 21 females). All reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Task and Procedure were identical to Experiment 4.
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Materials
A set of 20 items was used. The four conditions of one item were created using two dif-
ferent video stimuli and two different sentences. The videos varied according to Gaze
Synchronization, that is, the synchronized condition showed robot gaze to the central
object and then to an object in the periphery of the table, while the neutral condition
showed the robot’s initial glance down at the scene before looking up and beginning to
speak.
The spoken sentences varied according to Order of Mention such that either the cen-
tral object was mentioned followed by the peripheral object (original) or vice versa (re-
verse). A combination of both video stimuli and both sentence versions resulted in
the four conditions depicted in Table 5.4. We further constructed 32 fillers for these
items. Since all experimental items required a positive answer and the task was a de-
cision task, we again introduced a bias towards negative answers in the fillers. Thus,
24 fillers (75%) contained incorrect statements which resulted in an overall distribution
of 46% false trials. Because we had two conditions showing neutral gaze compared to
only one showing original order cues and one showing reversed ordering of referen-
tial cues, fillers were distributed across conditions such that an equal number of trials
had neutral gaze (18, in both original and reverse order), original-synchronized (17)
and reverse-synchronized gaze (17). The two experimental conditions showing neutral
robot gaze provided a means to assess the influence of order of mention as such. If
there was no specific advantage or disadvantage related to Order of Mention, facili-
tation/disruption effects can be assigned to the relative order of referential cues (also
retrospectively for effects found in Experiment 4).
Analysis
The IAs in this experiment were identical to Experiment 4 and contained the central
object, the peripherally located object and the robot head. Since robot gaze was syn-
chronized with speech such that a robot gaze shift towards an object ended on a ref-
erent one second prior to noun onset, IP1 was defined to begin 1,000ms prior to noun
onset in NP2. However, in this experiment IP1 does not stretch to noun onset but al-
ready ends with adjective onset. Thus, IP1 has no fixed duration but an average length
of 600ms. This shortening of IP1 was done to incorporate the fact that the adjective pre-
ceding the noun unambiguously identified the referent. Consequently, IP2 was defined
to stretch from adjective onset to 700ms after noun onset and had a mean duration of
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1,100ms. Defining IP1 and IP2 in this way made it possible to distinguish once again
between gaze-mediated inspections in IP1 and utterance-mediated inspections in IP2.
The approximate timing of a trial with synchronized gaze in reverse order is visualized
in Figure 5.7.
  
 (English) “The orange   cylinder     is taller than the pink    pyramid.”
SPEECH:
    <partner> <pyramid>              <cylinder>  <partner>GAZE:
TIME:
    (sec)              2 3   4     5       6       7 8
Interest
Periods:
        IP1  IP2              
 (German)“Der orange   Zylinder    ist größer als die pinke Pyramide.”
Figure 5.7.: The approximate timing of utterance-driven robot gaze, in a reverse-synchronized
condition.
For inferential analyses, we considered inspections on the object referenced in NP2
as well as response time, recorded from NP2-adjective onset to the moment of the button
press. The analysis was otherwise identical to previous experiments.
Predictions
In the synchronized condition, we expected to replicate the findings from Experiment
4. That is, the order of produced gaze and speech was predicted to be relevant such
that listeners only benefited from gaze if it was aligned to speech in the same linear
order. We expected people to be again slower in validating the robot’s utterance when
the referential order of gaze and speech differed (i.e., was reversed).
The neutral gaze conditions further establish a baseline to determine the facilita-
tion/disruption effects of synchronized gaze. Specifically, the comparison between
neutral and synchronized conditions was predicted to reveal whether reversely coor-
dinated gaze did simply not facilitate comprehension in the same way that an original
order of cues did, or whether this, in fact, disrupted comprehension.
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5.2.2. Results and Discussion
Eye movements
Fixation proportions on the NP1 and NP2 referents as well as on the robot head are
plotted in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. Noun onsets are marked as distinct events in the unfold-
ing speech stream. However, IP1 offset (= IP2 onset) is approximately 400ms prior to
the second noun onset, at adjective onset. The plot clearly shows that, similar to Exper-
iment 4, participants followed robot gaze and speech and inspected the looked at, and
then mentioned, objects.
Neutral Gaze: Interestingly, the two neutral conditions reveal a fundamental differ-
ence of the Order of Mention. Contrary to what we predicted, namely that the order
itself would have no significant influence, we observed considerable differences in par-
ticipants’ eye movements. The plot showing condition original-neutral indicates that
the central object was initially the most salient object and, thus, was fixated before men-
tioning. This was probably due to the fact that objects centrally located in the visual
field were more salient than others and, maybe more importantly the robot produced
an initial glance down at the scene – and back up – before beginning to speak. This gaze
movement was inserted to add some robot movement to neutral trial videos instead of
presenting a more or less still frame, thereby making these conditions appear equally
’live’. However, the central object may have become even more prominent through this
initial glance which may explain why people, in original order, fixated NP1 referent
(the central object) already before noun (and even adjective) onset. Similarly, in reverse
order, the NP2 referent (again the central object) was fixated already before noun onset.
With regard to this preference for the central object, two inspection patterns become
apparent: While original order seemed to be an advantage for processing NP1, NP2
was hardly anticipated and people fixated its referent only after noun onset. Reverse
order of mentioning, on the other hand, seemed to facilitate anticipation and process-
ing of NP2. This is reasonable as the peripherally located object had been mentioned in
NP1 such that people fixated this object during mentioning and then re-directed their
attention to the center of the scene (possibly preparing for further visual search) where
the NP2 referent is located.
Synchronized Gaze: The fixations pattern shown in the plot for condition reverse-
synchronized (incongruent order of referential cues) is similar to that observed for
reverse-neutral. This is somewhat surprising, since people did not seem to follow the
reversed gaze cues. Instead, people seemed to anticipate the NP2 referent (central ob-
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Figure 5.8.: Time graph for synchronized robot gaze. Note that, robot gaze is directed first to
central then to peripheral object. Depending on Order of Mention, central object is
mentioned in NP1 and peripheral object in NP2 or vice versa, hence np1 gaze or
np2 gaze.
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Figure 5.9.: Time graph for neutral robot gaze. The initial glance down onto the scene may
direct people’s visual attention towards the centrally located object. Depending on
Order of Mention, this object is mentioned first or second.
125
5. Synchronization of Gaze and Speech
Figure 5.10.: Mean inspection probabilities per condition for IP1 (left graph) and IP2 (right
graph). IP1 is the 600ms time window preceding the adjective onset in NP2. IP2
stretches from adjective onset in NP2 to noun offset in NP2. Further, bars are
labeled with respect to the location of the NP2 referent in that condition.
ject) in the second gaze period – prior to NP2 – even though robot gaze was directed
towards the peripheral object. However, at this point the peripheral object had already
been mentioned in NP1 which may have caused people not to inspect it any further.
The plot of condition original-synchronized (coherent order of referential cues) sug-
gests that, similar to original-neutral, people visually anticipated the NP1 referent and
continued to fixate it during mention. In contrast to the neutral condition, gaze to-
wards the NP2 referent – preceding its mention – was then available to participants
who followed the robot’s gaze, using it to anticipate NP2. Note, that the stimuli in both
conditions with temporally synchronized gaze (original and reverse order) were similar
to the two conditions that showed synchronized gaze in Experiment 4. Accordingly,
the observed fixation pattern for these conditions is also similar in both experiments.
Inferential statistics mainly confirm the observations from the time graphs. Mean
probabilities for inspecting the NP2 referent are given in Figure 5.10 and results from
inferential analyses are provided for both IPs in Table 5.5. In IP1, both Order of Men-
tion and Synchronization had main effects on inspection behavior (Order: χ2(1) =
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Table 5.5.: Model fitted to inspection data on object mentioned in second noun phrase, in IP1
and IP2.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
IP1 (Intercept) -0.4402 0.1954 -2.252 0.024
Order - reverse 0.2733 0.2493 1.096 0.273
Synchronization - neutral -1.2701 0.2975 -4.269 <0.001
reverse:neutral 1.4276 0.3840 3.717 <0.001
IP2 (Intercept) 0.3460 0.2075 1.668 0.095
Order - reverse 1.1403 0.2753 4.142 <0.001
Synchronization - neutral -0.0510 0.2413 -0.211 0.833
reverse:neutral 0.5857 0.4103 1.428 0.153
Model : NP2re f erent ∼ OrderO f Mention ∗ Synchronization + (1|subject)
+(1|item), f amily = binomial(link = ”logit”)
24.90; p < 0.001 and Synchronization: χ2(1) = 5.83; p < 0.05). Participants generally
inspected the NP2 referent more frequently when gaze was synchronized than when it
was neutral. Moreover, model reduction revealed a significant interaction of the two
predictors Order of Mention and Synchronization (χ2(1) = 14.08; p < 0.001). That is,
the effect of Order of Mention varied depending on the Synchronization: Firstly, the
neutral gaze condition reveals that Order of Mention by itself affected people’s visual
attention. In the reverse-neutral condition, the NP2 referent was inspected significantly
more often than in original-neutral. We argue that this effect is due to the NP2 referent
being central and being additionally highlighted as the robot initially looked down-
wards. Secondly, the graph also reveals that the peripherally located object (NP2 refer-
ent in original order) was inspected more often when gaze was synchronized (original-
synchronized) than when it was neutral (original-neutral), suggesting that a gaze cue
in original (coherent) order helped people to visually anticipate the NP2 referent. In
contrast, gaze cues in reverse order did not affect the inspections on the NP2 referent
(central object) compared to reverse-neutral. Instead, the NP2 referent was rather fre-
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quently inspected in reverse order even when robot gaze was neutral (during the utter-
ance). This indicates that the central object was indeed more salient than the peripheral
object.
In IP2, Order of Mention had a main effect on inspection probabilities (χ2(1) =
51.99; p < 0.001). That is, during mentioning of NP2 noun, people inspected the NP2
referent more frequently in reverse order than in original order which was also the case
in Experiment 4. As before, we suggest that this reflects people visually attending more
closely to the mentioned object when the referring expression required more effort to
be resolved.
Response Time
Model reduction revealed a significant interaction of both predictors, Synchronization
and Order of Mention (χ2(1) = 16.85; p < 0.001). Consequently, we included both in
the model fitted to our response time data. The details of this model are provided
in Table 5.6. Even though Synchronization and Order of Mention had a marginal
main effect on the data, the interaction of both factors was clearly more relevant for
interpretation. Before interpreting the interaction, we provide pairwise comparisons
here which reveal the following significant differences: Between reverse-neutral and
reverse-synchronized (p < 0.001), reverse-synchronized and original-synchronized
(p < 0.05), reverse-neutral and original-neutral (p < 0.001) and a marginally signifi-
cant difference between original-synchronized and original-neutral (p = 0.07).
As already indicated by the inspection data in IP1, order of references in a sentence
affected responsive behavior. This was further reflected in response times in both neu-
tral conditions: People were significantly faster to validate the robot’s utterance in the
reverse-neutral condition than in original-neutral. This result is consistent with the
findings on visual anticipation of the NP2 referent (for neutral gaze), i.e., when order
was reversed people anticipated the NP2 referent, when order was original they hardly
did. This suggests that reverse order of mention sentences were generally easier to pro-
cess than original order of mention. Crucially, however, synchronization of gaze cues
reversed this effect: Participants were significantly slower when gaze was synchronized
and in reverse order (resulting in concurrent but conflicting referential cues) than when
gaze was synchronized and in original order (concurrent and coherent order of cues).
The neutral condition was intended as a baseline for evaluating the effect of gaze
synchronization while accounting for possible variations due to the manipulated Or-
der of Mention. Interestingly, instead of observing similar behavior in each neutral
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Figure 5.11.: Average response times as a result of two manipulations, Order of Mention and
Gaze Sychronization.
condition, we found that reverse sentence order was easier to process. Despite this ad-
vantage of reverse order of mention, the synchronization of (reverse) robot gaze cues
disrupted people, whereas synchronized (coherent) gaze cues in original order of men-
tion significantly enhanced response time of this sentence order. The results for syn-
chronized robot gaze may therefore be interpreted with respect to gaze and speech cue
synchronization only: Synchronizing (reversed) gaze cue with reverse order of mention
increased response times, while synchronizing (coherent) gaze cues with original order
of mention reduced response times, when each is compared to its neutral gaze baseline.
Notably, even though we did not expect this effect of Order of Mention, it also sup-
ports the interpretation of response time results in Experiment 4. Previous results left
open whether the main effect of Order of Mention was elicited by the order of men-
tioned references in the sentence or rather the chronological match of the visual and
linguistic (referential) cues. The findings above suggest that reverse order facilitated
comprehension and was therefore not the cause for increased response time observed
in reverse conditions in Experiment 4. In contrast, the presented findings not only sup-
port the claim that reversed referential cues disrupt comprehension, but suggest that
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Table 5.6.: Model fitted to response time data.
Predictor Coefficient SE t-value
(Intercept) 1475.79 55.19 26.741
Order - reverse 96.24 40.36 2.384
Synchronization - neutral 68.89 39.60 1.740
reverse:neutral -230.67 55.94 -4.124
Coefficient MCMCmean pMCMC Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 1475.79 1474.78 0.0001 <0.001
Order - reverse 96.24 96.99 0.0156 <0.05
Synchronization - neutral 68.89 69.88 0.0752 0.083
reverse:neutral -230.67 -232.09 0.0001 <0.001
Model : RT ∼ OrderO f Mention ∗ Synchronization + (1|subject) + (1|item)
this disruption may indeed be greater in magnitude than our studies reveal.
Surprisingly, people’s response time in condition reverse-synchronized did not di-
rectly reflect what their eye movement behavior suggested. Even though participants
were slowest in this condition and fastest in condition reverse-neutral to validate the
robot utterance, eye movements were extremely similar in these conditions. The eye
movements plotted in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show that people similarly anticipated NP2
in both conditions, reverse-neutral and reverse-synchronized (although gaze prior to
NP2 referred to NP1 referent). Despite this apparent visual anticipation, the resolution
of the sequential conflict seemed to induce a higher cognitive load such that people
looked at the correct object but needed more time to fully grasp the meaning of all
available cues. This result shows that overt visual attention does not necessarily re-
veal which processes caused a visual attention shift, nor whether the fixated object is
actually anticipated as a referent for the next referring expression thereby facilitating
reference resolution.
It may further be possible that user adaptation to the presented stimuli influenced
the observed response time effects. Since videos in this experiment always showed
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Table 5.7.: Mean response times in milliseconds for each experimental block, the development
from block 1 to block 2, and overall.
Order Synchronization Cue Combination Block 1 Block 2 Block1-2 Overall
original synchronized (coherent) 1470 1446 24 1459
original neutral – 1576 1518 58 1544
reverse synchronized (incoherent) 1656 1485 171 1567
reverse neutral – 1479 1349 130 1404
synchronized, reversed or neutral robot gaze, people may have learned that robot gaze
predicts referents even though it is not correctly synchronized with the utterance word
order. Thus, potentially even larger effects may have been covered by participants’
learning performance. To assess the influence of adaptation on response times, we con-
ducted an additional analysis across and within each of two experimental trial blocks.
The response time means for each block as well as the overall means can be found in Ta-
ble 5.7. Model reduction as well as fitting the final model with three predictors (Order
of Mention, Synchronization, Block) revealed a main effect of Block (Coeff. =−79.81,
SE = 28.57 , t-value =−2.79). That is, people were significantly faster to respond in
the second block which suggests that people have generally adapted to the stimuli.
The absence of any interaction between this predictor and the remaining two predic-
tors, however, indicates that the general pattern did not change significantly over the
course of the experiment. Nevertheless, the mean response times reflect an adjustment
of participants to the reverse order trials in particular. While in block 1, for instance,
original-synchronized was significantly faster than reverse-synchronized (p < 0.05),
this difference disappears in block 2.
Both eye movements as well as the response time results suggest that people found it
more difficult to resolve referring expressions – and ultimately comprehend the robot’s
utterance – when the sequential order of gaze cues was inconsistent with the order
of referring expressions. Since the temporal synchronization of gaze with sentences
in original order resulted in coherent (i.e., congruent) gaze and speech behavior, re-
sponse times decreased – similar to the effect of congruent gaze and speech in Exper-
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iment 2. In contrast, synchronizing gaze with sentences in reverse order resulted in a
reversed sequence of referential cues and, thus, response times increased. This sug-
gests that robot gaze, even though relevant and to mentioned objects, disrupts people
when it is reversely synchronized. People seem to neither ignore this kind of gaze
(which would have resulted in equal response times for reverse-neutral and reverse-
synchronized conditions), nor are they able to establish a mapping of the final gaze cue
and the already mentioned/gazed at objects in order to predict the NP2-referent (which
would have resulted in a facilitating effect of reversed gaze).1 The reversely synchro-
nized gaze cues rather elicit expectations about future referents which conflict with the
actual utterance. Even though the referential information provided by these gaze cues
is somewhat relevant, the resolution of these conflicts between expectations and the
utterance is obviously demanding and slows people instead of facilitating utterance
comprehension.
Summary
To summarize the results from Experiments 4 and 5, we found that substantial tem-
poral shifts of robot gaze with respect to its ’natural’ synchronization do not affect the
utility of the gaze cues whereas the linear order of the cues does. This contradicts the
predictions derived from the Visual Account. The Intentional Account, in contrast, pro-
vides a plausible explanation for these results: The precise temporal synchronization is
not critical since people interpret and use robot gaze as a cue to the robot’s intentions
rather than as a purely visual cue. The order of cues, however, affects the the utility
of gaze since the order of inspections reflects the speaker’s intentions regarding order
of mention (Griffin and Bock, 2000; Griffin, 2001). Thus, people seem to expect that the
inferred referential intentions be realized in the corresponding order. If this expectation
is not met, gaze cues even disrupt comprehension, as the comparison with neutral gaze
suggests. Consequently, the presented evidence for the flexible use of robot gaze cues
during utterance comprehension further supports the hypothesis that people assign at-
tentional and intentional states to robot gaze. That is, people seem to indeed establish
joint attention with the robot and apply at least response level 3 as introduced in Section
1.4).
1Even though block analysis provides some evidence that people do learn to use reverse gaze.
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We begin this chapter with a review of our result in Section 6.1 and continue with the
implications and contributions these results offer to the development and improvement
of human-robot interaction in Section 6.2. Subsequently, we discuss implications of the
presented studies more generally for cognitive accounts of gaze processing as well as
joint and shared attention. We continue with an outlook on future work in Section 6.3
before concluding this thesis in Section 6.4.
6.1. Summary of Results
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that participants follow robot gaze when it is available
and that they use it to resolve referring expressions. This behavior was observed even
though the task neither required participants to pay attention to robot gaze, nor did
gaze cues statistically help participants to predict mentioned referents across the course
of an experiment (gaze effectively predicted a referent in only 55.5% of all trials). In
Experiment 1, people were confronted with referentially ambiguous statements that
were accompanied by referential robot gaze. People’s eye movements as well as re-
sponse time results suggested that people followed robot gaze to the scene referents,
even when there was a visual competitor compatible with the referring expression. In
Experiment 2, we manipulated the congruency between the spoken reference and the
referential cues provided by robot gaze. That is, the robot either looked at an object
it was about to mention (congruent), it looked an one object but then mentioned an-
other one (incongruent), or it showed neutral gaze. We found that robot gaze that was
congruent with the uttered sentence helped human interlocutors to faster validate ut-
terances compared to when robot gaze was neutral. On the other hand, when robot
gaze was incongruent with the utterance, i.e., it identified an object other than the men-
tioned one, people were even slower than in the neutral condition.
We hypothesized that this facilitation/disruption effect of referential robot gaze rela-
tive to neutral gaze was due to the assignment of intentional states to the robot (Inten-
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tional Account). That is, we suggested that people inferred referential intentions from
robot gaze, just as has been shown to be the case for human gaze (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1995; Hanna and Brennan, 2007), such that they expected an object fixated by the robot
to be mentioned next. Incongruent gaze, thus, entailed a revision of expectations. An
alternative explanation of the observed effects concerned the fact that gaze cues may
reflexively draw an observer’s visual attention to the cued direction (Visual Account).
Thus, robot gaze towards the subsequently mentioned object may have facilitated ref-
erence resolution simply because listeners’ attention was already on the relevant object.
Incongruent gaze, in contrast, drew people’s attention to one object while the spoken
reference drew attention to another object. The additional shift of visual attention may
have prolonged the time needed to fixate the referent, comprehend the whole utterance
and respond.
In order to help decided between the Visual and the Intentional Account, we changed
the task from a response time task in Experiments 1 and 2 to a production task in Exper-
iment 3. That is, we showed participants the same stimuli as in Experiment 2 and asked
them to verbally correct false robot utterances. Without time pressure on people’s re-
sponses, a shift of visual attention itself to a (ir)relevant object could not explain any
congruency effects such that the Visual Account could most likely be rejected. Instead,
congruency effects could be explained by the Intentional Account, i.e., that robot gaze
influences which referent people thought was ’intended’ by the robot. And indeed, the
correction statements participants produced confirmed that their correction (and which
object they decided to mention) was influenced by robot gaze.
Results from Experiments 1-3, thus, provided evidence in favor of the Intentional
Account. Importantly, in these first three experiments, we presupposed that robot gaze
would only be helpful if it was aligned to the utterance in a human-like manner. How-
ever, our manipulations allowed no claims about the relevance of alignment of gaze
and speech for the observed effects. We hypothesized that the importance of alignment
may essentially depend on whether robot gaze reflects intentional states or not. Specif-
ically, we argued that, under the Visual Account, human-like alignment robot gaze and
speech would be necessary for gaze to be beneficial since this way listeners’ attention
would be drawn to the right object at the right moment. A temporal shift of gaze rel-
ative to speech would therefore reduce the benefit of gaze. In contrast, the Intentional
Account would allow for a more flexible use of gaze since referential intentions are
relevant to the sentence as a whole, and likely more persistent.
In Experiments 4 and 5, we investigated the flexibility with which people interpret
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and use gaze by manipulating the temporal synchronization of gaze and speech as well
as the relative ordering of referential gaze cues and referring expressions. Experiment
4 revealed that the precise temporal synchronization was not critical for the utility of
robot gaze. That is, a substantial temporal shift of the gaze cues such that they com-
pletely preceded the utterance (4.3 earlier than ’natural’ occurrence) did not affect the
general (facilitating or disruptive) influence of gaze. Interestingly, while the precise
temporal synchronization was not crucial, the relative ordering of gaze and speech
cues did affect response times, i.e., a reversed sequence of referential cues led to in-
creased response times. This suggests that the inferred (referential) intentions were
maintained over several seconds but that listeners were sensitive to the order of their
occurrence and their realization. This is not surprising since the order of gaze cues is
known to reflect the speaker’s intentions regarding order of mention (Griffin and Bock,
2000; Griffin, 2001). Thus, people seem to expect that the inferred referential intentions
be realized in the corresponding order during the utterance. If this expectation is not
met, gaze cues – despite identifying intended referents – disrupt comprehension.
Together these results suggest a "utility spectrum" of speaker gaze as depicted in
Figure 6.1: Most useful is congruent gaze that is closely aligned to speech. Gaze cues
that appear in the same order as referring expressions appear similarly useful even
when completely preceding the utterance. However, as evidence for this similarity is
provided through the absence of a response time effect, further investigation is required
to confirm this initial result.
Moreover, it was found that both incongruent gaze as well as gaze cues in reverse
order to the mentioned references disrupt comprehension and slow response times
compared to neutral gaze. While incongruent gaze identified an object that was not
mentioned at all, reversed gaze cues identified objects that were mentioned in the cor-
responding utterance but not in the expected order.
These observations suggest that referential gaze invariably influences utterance com-
prehension where people infer referential intentions from robot gaze and its order of
occurrence which elicit expectations about the robot utterance. That is, people attribute
attentional and intentional states to the robot such that they follow its gaze to estab-
lish joint attention, typically a very useful and natural process which people clearly
do not disengage from, even when gaze often has a disruptive effect. A (mis)match
between the expectations constructed when jointly attending to an object and the ut-
tered referring expressions, thus, determine whether robot gaze facilitates or disrupts
comprehension.
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Figure 6.1.: A utility spectrum for the production of various gaze patterns shows that gaze always
affects utterance comprehension – for the better or worse.
The finding that people assign intentional states to robot gaze supports the hypoth-
esis that robot gaze is indeed processed and interpreted in a similar manner as human
gaze. That is, the presented evidence provides reason to believe that further insights on
how people integrate referential robot gaze during reference resolution contributes to
our more general understanding of the role of gaze for grounding and disambiguating
utterances in face-to-face interaction.
6.2. Results in Context
6.2.1. Robots and Virtual Characters
One might argue that the presented findings have only limited validity since we em-
ployed a remote (tele-present) robot and only allowed for minimal interaction. We
argue, however, that if such behavior is elicited in such an artificial situation, it is even
more likely to occur in more natural and interactive settings. Employing a virtual agent
rather than a robot is one possible alternative but it is worth noting that there are differ-
ences between these two types of agents that could potentially affect the usage of gaze.
While a virtual agent "lives" in its own world and may be assumed to have complete
knowledge of its environment, a robot shares the environment with a human interlocu-
tor and is not expected to have full knowledge of the world. This may lead to different
expectations and impressions of an agent versus a robot. Mistakes and errors are poten-
tially more acceptable and less irritating when communicating with a robot. Moreover,
robots seem to elicit more anthropomorphic interaction and attributions than agents
Kiesler et al. (2008). Kiesler and colleagues investigated, for instance, whether a robot
and a virtual agent in co-present and remote conditions are perceived differently. The
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results of their questionnaire, which participants had to fill out after a 10-15min dis-
cussion with the robot/agent, indicate that the robot was perceived as more life-like,
having more positive personality traits and being liked better. However, whether the
robot/agent was co-present or remote, i.e. recorded and projected onto a screen, did
not seem to substantially affect participants’ impressions.
The reported findings are of considerable importance for the design of systems con-
trolling robot gaze. We have shown that referential robot gaze contributes to more rapid
understanding and, thus, is to be preferred over a robot that does not look at the objects
it is talking about. However, when the location of a referent (or which object to look at)
cannot be determined (incongruent gaze may be the consequence) it is advisable not to
initiate robot gaze movements since these may disrupt the comprehension of the user.
Similarly, the order of references in the utterance should be considered when initiating
gaze movements to referents in the scene in order to avoid disruption by incoherent
robot gaze. Moreover, our results suggest that a precise temporal synchronization is
otherwise not essential for robot gaze to be beneficial. This is especially important since
precise temporal alignment is difficult to achieve as it depends on issues such as know-
ing which nouns could and should be accompanied by referential gaze or considering
both the velocity of head or eye movements and the required duration.
We further suggest that the presented experimental setting is suited to the more gen-
eral investigation of beliefs humans have about robots and their capabilities. The at-
tribution of beliefs, goals and desires to others is a crucial skill in social interaction
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a, 1985). This capability is necessary in order to realize, for in-
stance, what the interaction partner is attending to and why. Attention, intentions and
beliefs are important aspects of human-robot interaction as well. Of course, a robot is
not expected to be as competent as a person, but with increased communicational skills
the expectations towards the robot will also rise.
6.2.2. A Theory of Mind with Robots
With the increased competence and improved appearance of robots and other artifi-
cial agents, it is not surprising that researchers have begun to consider the utility of
theory of mind (ToM) models for human-robot interaction. One approach concerned
the improvement of the robot’s competence to communicate with people. Scassellati
(2000), for instance, attempted to implement two ToM models on a robot system. He
outlined the long-term research goal to equip a robot with a system that enables the
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robot to "engage in natural human social dynamics" by maintaining a ToM for the hu-
man partners it interacts with. Another approach concerned the investigation of what
mental models people have for robots with a focus on the appearance of the robot and
the anthropomorphization of it. Kiesler and Goetz (2002), for instance, examined and
compared the impressions people obtained from a robot that featured a visible hard-
ware component including cables versus a robot whose hardware was hidden. A ques-
tionnaire revealed that the visible hardware caused participants to consider the robot
less "reliable" and more "powerful". In another study, Hegel et al. (2008) investigated
the effect of an agent’s appearance and the associated stereotypical knowledge in an
FMRI-study. Participants were asked to play the prisoner’s dilemma with each of the
following four partners: A person, a humanoid robot, a functional lego robot consist-
ing of mechanic arms operating a keyboard, and a computer. Importantly, each partner
gave completely randomized responses so that the only difference between each inter-
action was the belief of who participants thought they interacted with. The FMRI-data
revealed increased activity during all interaction in those brain regions typically con-
sidered to be participating in common ToM tasks. Results further showed a tendency
towards higher activity in the respective brain region when participants were facing
robotic partners relative to the laptop partner. In a different study, Groom et al. (2009)
also showed that people seem to attribute identity to robots with a humanoid form,
crucially an identity that is separate from that of their own. In contrast, people per-
ceived a robot with a car form potentially as team member or even as an extension of
themselves. Thus, appearance and anthropomorphism clearly affect the expectations
people have of their partners. However, such studies do not capture the expectations
and a potential ToM (and the adaptation thereof) based on the partner’s actual behavior
during an interaction.
We argue that our approach involving behavioral measures in a human-robot inter-
action scenario allows us to investigate in detail whether humans build a ToM for a
robot they interact with and what the nature of this ToM is. People’s behavior can be
linked precisely to the robot’s behavior, thus, potentially providing insights into an in-
cremental construction and enrichment of a ToM based on behavior rather than general
appearance (which was in fact not manipulated at all).
Recall that having a theory of mind means to possess and use knowledge about men-
tal states in general, and about epistemic mental states (believing, knowing, pretending)
in particular, and to use this knowledge in a "theory-like" way to reason about and pre-
dict actions of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p.51ff). That is, a person can draw inferences
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about why another person, or robot in this case, behaves the way she does because
she can imagine what goals and intentions have elicited this behavior. People’s use of
robot gaze as a cue to the robot’s referential intentions reveals their understanding of
the robot as an intentional being with perceptual and volitional states. Further studies
could potentially provide answers to more specific questions such as: What do people
think about the robot’s cognitive capabilities? Which modality do people preferably
trust in and consider more reliable? Knowing what ToM model people construct for a
robot benefits robot development in general and user adaptive behavior in particular.
6.2.3. The Role of Appearance (versus Behavior)
The robot we used in our studies had a very simple appearance with almost no an-
thropomorphic features. A stereo-camera mounted on a pan-tilt unit served as head
and eyes simultaneously. This camera was the only moving part of our robot and only
through this movement the robot appears as actively performing. Yet, we observed
participant behavior that is very similar to what Hanna and Brennan (2007) observed.
In their studies, listeners rarely looked at the speakers’ face to detect where the speaker
was gazing at and rather used the speaker’s head orientation peripherally. We inter-
pret this is as additional support for the claim that robot gaze as a combination of head
orientation and gaze can in principle be used similarly to human speaker’s gaze, even
though the robot has no anthropomorphic eyes. This is not so surprising as Emery
(2000) suggests that the eyes are only the first choice for interpreting an individual’s di-
rection of attention but not the only one. Instead he describes a hierarchy of cues (gaze,
head, body) the use of which depends on their availability.
Related evidence for the importance of the camera movement (rather than the ap-
pearance) is provided by studies that explicitly investigated the role of motion for the
assignment of goals and intentions to moving entities (e.g. Heider and Simmel, 1944).
Using a simple animation which showed moving geometrical figures, Heider and Sim-
mel (1944) found that those movements were often interpreted as one object hitting the
other, as pushing or pulling actions or as leading and chasing events. That is, people in-
terpreted movements of simple geometric shapes as goal-driven events, with one entity
as agent and another as patient, and even hypothesized about motives for these events,
suggesting that they ascribed goal and intentions to the moving objects.
This suggests that people do not only rely on the anthropomorphic appearance of a
face and/or eyes to elicit ’natural’ reactions towards an entity, but that certain move-
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ment patterns, potentially only with appropriate scope and timing, can achieve this as
well. Whether the appearance is closer to a pair of eyes or a complete head may not
play a particularly significant role here. In our case it seems that the camera movement
which is aligned to the robot’s utterance is in fact the reason why people attribute cog-
nitive functions to it. While reflexive attention towards the robot camera may explain
immediate gaze-following (see following section), we propose that it is the attribution
of cognitive functions (based on plausible motion) which ultimately explains why we
observe an effect of robot gaze on reference resolution/intention recognition.
For these reasons, we feel there is considerable reason to believe that our results al-
low conclusions about general mechanisms involved in gaze processing. Moreover, our
experimental setting offers several methodological advantages. Hanna and Brennan’s
studies, for instance, have focused on people’s flexibility in interpreting gaze direction
by forcing listeners to re-map speakers’ gaze to their own (different) object arrange-
ment. While their aim was to investigate whether and how flexible a gaze cue is, our
studies focus on examining the integration process of referential information provided
by gaze and speech, especially in cases of mismatch. By using a robot as interaction
partner, we can create plausible mismatching references by introducing wrong or erro-
neous (i.e., incongruent) robot behavior. In such cases, re-mapping of perceived gaze is
not appropriate and cannot help to combine cues to one consistent reference. Instead,
people have to make sense of the information they perceived by actively weighing one
cue (or one modality, i.e., speech versus gaze/vision) higher than the other and eventu-
ally make a decision based on that. Such a design can therefore provide insights about
the contribution of gaze relative to speech. Thus, benefits of our HRI design are, on
the one hand, that the robot (or agent in general) can be used to produce behavior that
is almost arbitrarily variable while, on the other hand, experiments can be controlled
for various factors such as balancing of stimuli, which errors should occur and when,
as well as cue validity. That is, we can induce errors where necessary and eliminate
undesired behaviors that may mask other effects. For this reason, we believe that the
behavior observed in human-robot interaction may indeed yield insights that are as
valuable to cognitive research as they are to the development of human-machine inter-
faces.
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6.2.4. Endogenous and Exogenous Attention Shifts
Previous research has increasingly involved computerized paradigms to explore the
role of gaze and other cues to control attention. A number of such studies suggest
that schematized gaze cues (schematic face, stylized pair of eyes, photographs of a face
etc.) attract people’s attention to the cued location in an automatic manner (Friesen and
Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; Langton and Bruce, 1999). That is, gaze - and to
some extent also other direction-giving cues such as arrows (Bayliss and Tipper, 2005;
Tipples, 2008; Marotta et al., 2009) - are assumed to trigger a reflexive (exogenous) atten-
tion shift, rather than having people voluntarily orient towards the indicated direction
(endogenous attention shift). Friesen and Kingstone (1998) found, for instance, that
participants were faster to detect, localize and identify (within-subject task variation) a
target stimulus when the eyes of a centrally presented face cued the target’s location.
This cueing effect was found only for a relatively short time window, i.e., when the
target stimulus appeared 105, 300 or 600ms after the cue onset, and seemed to disap-
pear when target stimulus appeared only 1,005ms after the cue onset. Moreover, it was
found that reaction times were equal among the "uncued" and "neutral" conditions, i.e.
when the eyes cued the opposite location and when they were directed straight ahead.
The authors therefore suggest that "gaze direction is producing an attentional benefit (RT
at the cued location < RT at the neutral location) with no attentional cost (RT at the neutral
location = RT at the uncued location)." (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998, p.493f).
The reported results may hold for direction-giving cues that only elicit reflexive at-
tention shifts but this conclusion seems to underestimate the influence of on-line gaze
that reflects attentional or even intentional states. Despite the evidence suggesting that
these gaze cues simultaneously elicit voluntary attention shifts to a limited extent (Tip-
ples, 2008), it is questionable whether this is comparable to the level of volition involved
in joint attention, for instance. On the basis of previous research on joint attention and
our results presented in this thesis, we argue that on-line gaze behavior, in contrast
to static gaze cues, expresses attentional focus and communicative intentions after all
(Intentional Account). That is, robot gaze not only happens to attract people’s visual
attention to a target which is then mentioned, but it also conveys information about
what the robot presumably intends to mention next. We suggest that this is the reason
why both incongruent (similar to Friesen’s "uncued" condition in Friesen and King-
stone, 1998) and reverse robot gaze disrupt utterance comprehension, in contrast to the
static gaze cue used by Friesen and Kingstone (1998).
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The hypothesis that gaze orients attention through endogenous processes, is sup-
ported by evidence reported in a study of patient ’EVR’ who suffers from neural im-
pairments in the frontal lobe (Vecera and Rizzo, 2006). In this study, EVR was presented
with a number of different cues (peripheral, gaze, word) each potentially cueing a target
stimulus. The patient was shown to be able to detect peripheral cues that further fa-
cilitated target detection, suggesting intact exogenous attentional processes. However,
for centrally presented cues such as words ("left","right") or eye gaze (schematic face)
EVR showed no cueing effect which suggests that these cues do not trigger attention
reflexively. Instead, gaze and words seem to share voluntary (endogenous) attentional
processes that are disrupted in EVR.
Thus, previous results suggest that gaze cues do not (only) elicit exogenous atten-
tion shifts but direct visual attention in a voluntary (endogenous) manner. It remains
unclear, however, to what extent voluntary attention shift can be related to the inten-
tions people assign to (robot) speaker gaze such that they construct expectations about
utterance content.
Additional support for voluntary attention shift comes from a number of studies on
intentional gaze processing (Castiello, 2003; Bayliss et al., 2006; Becchio et al., 2008).
Bayliss et al. (2006) have shown, for instance, that a visual referent that was looked at
by another person receives higher likability scores than a not-looked at object. Another
series of studies conducted by Castiello (2003) has shown, for instance, that people even
infer motor intentions from an actor’s gaze. Based mainly on these results, Becchio and
colleagues argue that gaze potentially enriches the representation of a visual referent
and they propose a "mechanism that allows transferring to an object the intentional-
ity of the person who is looking at it" which they call "intentional imposition". Our
data support this view that gaze is indeed processed as an intentional cue, suggested
by Becchio et al. (2008). Moreover, our results suggest that intentional gaze process-
ing is applied not only to human eyes but also when faced with an extremely simple
realization of robot gaze (represented by a moving camera).
6.2.5. Gaze and Situated Language Comprehension
In this section, we briefly outline where we see contributions of our results to existing
theories and findings on how people comprehend language in a certain visual context
and ground utterances in the environment.
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The Coordinated Interplay Account
The Coordinated Interplay Account (CIA) proposed by Knoeferle and Crocker (2006)
was designed to explain human gaze behavior and the influence of attended scene in-
formation during situated comprehension. The CIA builds on findings from the visual
world paradigm and states that incremental interpretation of utterances directs visual
attention towards mentioned and anticipated objects and events in the scene. The ob-
tained visual information, in turn, further influences interpretation of these utterances.
That is, the CIA consists of three informationally and temporally dependent stages: in-
cremental sentence comprehension, utterance-mediated visual attention shifts, and the
integration of attended scene aspects and current sentence interpretation.
Our findings on eye movements are broadly consistent with Knoeferle and Crocker’s
CIA, but require an extension to that model such that it accommodates the multi-
modality of the utterance itself which consists of a spoken message (the sentence) as
well as – even if unintended – a visual component (speaker gaze). As we have shown,
both utterance and speaker gaze direct people’s visual attention in the scene and are
used to ground utterance meaning during comprehension. That is, while speaker gaze
could be considered a part of the spoken message it accompanies, it is also part of the
visual scene and, thus, information which the listener obtains visually during compre-
hension and links to utterance interpretation. Specifically, the gaze component of such
a multi-modal message serves to ground utterance meaning in the visual scene.
Interestingly, just as Knoeferle and Crocker (2006; 2007) show that scene events can
override linguistic expectations, we similarly find evidence that speaker (robot) gaze
can override linguistic cues about intended referents. This highlights the general im-
portance of visual information (both the scene and speaker gaze) during situated lan-
guage processing and enforces the requirement that an appropriate model acknowl-
edges and explains the multi-modality of both the message and also the receiver. The
receiver, or listener, also perceives and processes information obtained through differ-
ent channels which she then needs to integrate into a coherent message.
Interpretation of Speaker Gaze Varies
When comparing Hanna and Brennan’s (2007) results with our findings, two interesting
issues arise that are worth discussing here. Firstly, Hanna and Brennan noted that the
presentation order of blocks (with one experimental condition each) had an effect. That
is, if block with congruent trials was first and incongruent trials came second, people
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were better and using the speaker gaze for early reference resolution. This suggests
that people learned to use speaker gaze. In contrast, if the block with incongruent trials
(speaker gaze was uninformative) came first, people performed worse with respect to
quick reference resolution. The authors suggested that these participants had learned to
ignore or avoid speaker gaze since it was not useful. In our studies, however, we did
not observe avoidance of robot gaze even when it was frequently misleading. Instead of
showing blocks of each condition, we interleaved conditions in stimulus presentation.
This possibly affected how people used gaze since utility of gaze could not be predicted.
It could also be argued that the continuous use of robot gaze is related to people’s
patience towards a robot being larger than towards other people. Since the interaction is
minimal, however, and robot gaze is simply not particularly helpful, this explanation is
only partly convincing. Either way, our results suggest that gaze-following is somewhat
automatic and that gaze cues are always used, otherwise we would not have observed
disruption effects.
Secondly, Hanna and Brennan report gaze-following only to the extent that match-
ers/listeners began looking at the target side of the display 500ms after the direc-
tor/speaker looked at the target (visual point of disambiguation, VPoD). Matchers only
began fixating the target (and competitor) when the prenominal adjective was men-
tioned (over 1,500-2,000ms after speaker gaze to target). In contrast, we observed listen-
ers’ gaze-following that is temporally closely aligned to the speaker gaze: Inspections
on an object gazed at by the robot rose immediately after speaker gaze, visible in the
subsequent time window of 1,000ms. Participants seemed to clearly identify the visual
referent which may be explained by the explicit and obvious orientation of the robot
head/eyes.
Speaker Gaze Influences Language Learning
Recall that speaker gaze is a useful cue the speaker’s referential intentions, her desires
and goals (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995, 1997b) and that children learn to interpret and use
this cue at a very early stage during development (D’Entremont et al., 1997; Flom et al.,
2007). It is therefore reasonable to assume that children (or adult learners) use speaker
gaze to help them resolve, ground and, thus, learn unknown words. That is, gaze cues
may help to acquire the meaning of words or, more generally, what a sentence is about.
In particular, gaze cues could be extremely helpful in a complex language learning
scenario (for both children and adults) when the word for an object, an action or event
is unknown.
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Accordingly, Nappa et al. (2009) conducted a study with children investigating the
effect of gaze cues for unknown verb interpretation. Listeners viewed scenes depicting
an action that require a perspective, i.e. one interpretation of the action selects character
A as agent and character B as patient, while the complementary verb reverses this role
assignment (e.g. chase and flee). Given the general preference for so-called "source-to-
goal" or to-path verbs over from-path verbs, the acquisition of to-path verbs is assumed
to be easy while the overlapping context in which both verbs appear thereby reduces
the probability of correctly learning the from-path verb. To examine whether gaze can
influence perspective selection and, thus, which verb is learned, Nappa and colleagues
manipulated which character was gazed at while the speaker uttered a sentence con-
taining an unknown verb. They found that while biased towards to-path verbs, speaker
gaze indeed modulated the selection of a character as subject for the uttered sentence
and, thus, the choice of the verb perspective. However, this was only the case when
subject and object references where ambiguous (e.g. "He’s blicking him."). In the case
of unambiguous references such that subject and object were uniquely identified, chil-
dren mostly took the to-path perspective to assign meaning to the unknown verb. That
is, speaker gaze did not affect meaning assignment anymore even though listeners fol-
lowed speaker gaze. This result seems to suggest that gaze cues do not override linguis-
tic and conceptually preferred information, suggesting rather that people prioritize and
interpret speech over gaze in case of incongruent speaker behavior.
In contrast, our results suggest that people use gaze also when utterances are unam-
biguous, as shown in Experiments 4 and 5. Moreover, results from Experiment 3 have
shown that people sometimes consider the looked at object exclusively as intended
referent and correct an initially valid robot utterance accordingly (in true-incongruent
trials). The limited influence of gaze in Nappa’s study (2009) could be due to the pre-
sentation mode in which the speaker/gazer is not part of the environment that contains
the described event. That is, the interpretation of gaze as visual reference reflecting at-
tentional and intentional states is less likely. However, we can only speculate about rea-
sons and it could just as well be the case that speaker gaze has simply more importance
for reference resolution (linking referring nouns to objects) than on the comprehension
and grounding of verbs.
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6.3. Future Work
In this section we first address new questions that arose from experiments and their re-
sults and suggest how these might be tackled. Secondly, we outline some more specu-
lative ideas that have evolved during the work on this thesis and highlight connections
between our research and other areas of inquiry.
6.3.1. Next Steps
Firstly, we would like to replicate some of the presented studies with minor changes to
the manipulations. Some factors could not be optimally manipulated since we essen-
tially employed the same set of visual stimuli across the experiments. This constrained
the variation of gaze cues in terms of their direction, for instance, as well as the location
of referents in the scene.
Secondly, possible explanations for inspection and response time patterns found in
conditions reverse-neutral and reverse-synchronized in Experiment 5 are worth explor-
ing in further detail. Interestingly, the inspection patterns in both conditions were ex-
tremely similar while response times suggest a fundamental difference in the effort
needed to resolve the references and validate the sentences. This suggests that the eye
movements reflect different underlying processes involved in the integration of linguis-
tic and visual cues. Thus, looking at an object may not necessarily mean that the lis-
tener anticipates this object, it could also mean that the listener needs more information
and/or more time to resolve a multi-modal reference and link the linguistic content
with the visual reference and the corresponding object. Another issue related to eye
movements and underlying processes concerns the role of covert attention. In Exper-
iment 2, for instance, we have looked at the effect of gaze-following (i.e., overt visual
attention) on response time, showing that the manipulation of robot gaze congruency
had a greater effect on utterance comprehension when people actually followed robot
gaze. However, congruency affected response times equally even when people did not
follow robot gaze overtly. This suggests that gaze cue may be exploited covertly and
integrated during reference resolution such people’s eye movements do not necessarily
reflect the influence of speaker gaze.
A third issue concerns the movement of the robot’s head/eyes which was rather slow
in the presented studies. One might argue that people consider such slow movement
rather as a search action than as a gaze cue and that people track the robot’s head
instead of interpreting it as providing referential cues. However, we observed that
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people rarely looked at the robot head while remarkably accurately identifying and
inspecting visual referents (looked at by the robot). Even though a faster, saccade-
like gaze cue would be interesting to test and probably easier to experiment with as
timing would be more precise, we have reason to believe that the gaze cues used in the
presented experiments have in fact been interpreted as cues to the robot’s attentional
states.
Finally, we propose a follow-up study to Experiment 3 which further explores the
predictions made by the Visual Account. Specifically, we envisage trials with neutral
robot gaze in which a very subtle visual cue such as a flicker (as in the "Flickering Cake
Paradigm" proposed by Christoph Scheepers) draws people’s visual attention towards
the same object at the same time at which previously robot gaze drew attention to that
object. Such a manipulation would provide a means to compare between a purely
visual cue, that happens to direct people’s attention to an object before it is mentioned,
with a cue which is suggested to reflect referential intentions. A difference in how these
cues affect people’s correction statements – and therefore which object was believed to
be intended – would provide strong evidence in favor of the Intentional Account.
6.3.2. Ideas for Future Work
One of our future goals is to compare the nature of an interaction with a robot in con-
trast to the interaction with a virtual character (VC). We intend to replicate previous
studies in an interaction setting with a virtual character investigating whether the same
principles hold in both HCI and HRI. Moreover, it would be interesting to systemati-
cally explore to which extent participants feel that they share an environment with such
a character and consider objects in the visual world versus objects in the "real world"
to be common ground, for instance. Such studies could be used to examine people’s
beliefs about the partner’s attentional and epistemic states and would provide concrete
insights into the theory of mind of the person interacting with a VC. A related research
question concerns the issues of what precisely referential gaze may communicate. That
is, are affordances (Gibson, 1977) activated based on a gaze cue (Becchio et al., 2008)
and, if so, does their activation (possibly spuriously) influence event representations?
Studying gaze cues and their relation to event representation is generally conceivable
in both HRI and HCI scenarios but may again reveal differences in what people hy-
pothesize about the gazer (ToM) and what meaning they assign to the gaze cue.
Replication of our previous experiments with a VC naturally also raises questions
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about the role of velocity and alignment of the VC’s eye movements. Since a VC can ex-
ecute eye movements fast and frequently, essentially without any physical constraints,
it becomes critical to decide how fast and how often the character should look at enti-
ties in order to appear as natural and remain as informative as possible. Similarly, we
would expect differences in people’s inspection behavior due to differences in the vis-
ibility of gaze direction: Robot gaze was so explicit and visible that people picked up
this cue without having to look at the robot head. However, the gaze direction of a VC
(depending also on the use of head movements) could be more difficult to pick up such
that people might need to look at the character’s head/eyes more frequently.
Importantly, the increased velocity of gaze in VCs opens up the possibility to include
and combine several functions of gaze beyond visual references. That is, various gaze
cues could be implemented and used simultaneously to fulfill additional tasks such
as turn-coordination. Taking turns, however, presupposes another essential aspect of
future experiments, namely greater interaction.
There are indeed cases where gaze-following and joint attention occur and are useful
even in minimal interaction (of the sort created in our HRI studies), for instance, when
children learn from their mother. A classical situation contains an adult that utters a
description or explanation of some sort while looking at mentioned objects. Once the
child has learned that eye gaze reflects visual attention and referential intentions, she
can use this cue to comprehend what the adult says – even when she did not know one
or more words in the utterance (Flom et al., 2007). Moreover, Nappa et al. (2009) have
shown that gaze cues in such a minimal interaction scenario can help people to assign
meaning to, that is, to learn an unknown word.
However, the application of several gaze behaviors and observing their effects on
participant behavior is only possible in a scenario allowing real interaction, when
speech and gaze are produced and comprehended simultaneously. In such an inter-
action scenario, gaze could adopt several functions: While coordinating turns, it could
also, as mentioned above, be used as an additional referential cue helping language
learners to ground new words, or to express "mental" states such as uncertainty or
confusion about something. Crucially, in such an interaction the agent could simi-
larly make use of the person’s gaze, constraining and simplifying its own domain of
interpretation when processing an utterance of the person (see e.g. Kaur, Manpreet
and Tremaine, Marilyn and Huang, Ning and Wilder, Joseph and Gacovski, Zoran and
Flippo, Frans and Mantravadi, Chandra Sekhar, 2003; Prasov and Chai, 2008, for some
ideas on how to do this). This way, insights on people’s use of visual and linguistic
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information to efficiently resolve references could be used to similarly facilitate robot
utterance comprehension.
6.4. Conclusion
Summarizing the results presented in this thesis, we have provided evidence suggest-
ing that detailed insights from situated human-human interaction (HHI) can be applied
to human-robot-interaction (HRI) and that such cognitively motivated robot-gaze be-
havior is beneficial for HRI.
In Experiment 1, we have shown that people follow robot gaze and that referentially
ambiguous utterances that are accompanied by referential robot gaze are understood
equally fast as unambiguous statements. Results from Experiment 2 further suggest
that people used robot gaze to anticipate an upcoming referent such that congruent
robot gaze facilitated comprehension while incongruent gaze disrupted comprehen-
sion relative to neutral gaze. We hypothesized that this utility of gaze would be caused
by the attentional and intentional states that people ascribe to the robot. That is, we
argued that people may indeed establish joint attention with the robot, interpreting its
gaze to indicate what the robot attends to and what it intends to mention. Findings
from Experiment 3 confirm this hypothesis and show that robot gaze modulates which
object – in the case of wrong utterances – is considered as intended referent. In Ex-
periments 4 and 5, we have examined the relevance of alignment between gaze and
speech for such an intentional interpretation of robot gaze. The results again suggest
that people infer referential intentions from robot gaze such that gaze similarly affects
utterance comprehension when it is correctly synchronized as when it is shifted to pre-
cede the utterance. Moreover, the order of referential cues has been found to affect
comprehension, indicating that people interpret gaze cues in their occurring order and
expect the retrieved referential intentions to be realized accordingly. Thus, our findings
converge to the result that people establish joint attention with a robot and infer atten-
tional and intentional states from its gaze, as suggested in the description of response
level 3 from Section 1.4.
The video-based one-way interaction in our experiments can hardly be considered
to allow shared attention (response level 4 in Section 1.4) such that participants and
the robot are mutually aware of their attentional states and use this information to co-
operate or just to share an experience. However, our results clearly suggest that people
interpret robot gaze in a similar way they interpret human gaze which is evidence for
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the utility of our experimental paradigm for investigating not only the role of robot
gaze but also aspects of gaze processing in general.
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A. Item Sentences
In Experiment 1, sentences marked with a) and b) appear with scenes of the corre-
sponding item (shown in Appendix B) that are also marked as a) and b) respectively.
In Experiments 2-4, all sentences of an item appear with the same scene provided for
this item. For Experiment 5, we provide an explicit mapping of sentence items with the
scenes provided in Appendix B, since some items form Experiments 2-4 were discarded
for this experiment.
A.1. Experiment 1
1. a) Neben der Kugel steht eine Pyramide.
b) Neben der Kugel steht ein Würfel.
2. a) Der Keil steht neben einem Stern.
b) Der Keil steht neben einem Ring.
3. a) Neben dem Zylinder ist eine Halbkugel.
b) Neben dem Zylinder ist ein Herz.
4. a) Das Ei ist neben einem Kegel.
b) Das Ei ist neben einem Quader.
5. a) Bei dem Stern steht ein Zylinder.
b) Bei dem Stern steht ein Keil.
6. a) Der Würfel steht bei einem Ring.
b) Der Würfel steht bei einem Kegel.
7. a) Bei der Pyramide ist ein Ei.
b) Bei der Pyramide ist ein Herz.
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8. a) Die Halbkugel liegt bei einem Quader.
b) Die Halbkugel liegt bei einer Kugel.
9. a) Der Quader steht neben einem Keil.
b) Der Quader steht neben einem Ei.
10. a) Neben dem Kegel ist ein Herz.
b) Neben dem Kegel ist eine Pyramide.
11. a) Die Pyramide ist neben einer Kugel.
b) Die Pyramide ist neben ein Stern.
12. a) Neben der Halbkugel steht ein Würfel.
b) Neben der Halbkugel steht ein Zylinder.
13. a) Das Herz steht bei einer Kugel.
b) Das Herz steht bei einem Würfel.
14. a) Bei dem Zylinder liegt eine Halbkugel.
b) Bei dem Zylinder liegt ein Quader.
15. a) Das Ei liegt bei einem Stern.
b) Das Ei liegt bei einem Ring.
16. a) Neben der Kugel ist eine Pyramide.
b) Neben der Kugel ist ein Keil.
A.2. Experiments 2 and 3
1. a) Die Kugel ist größer als die Halbkugel, die hellgrün ist.
b) Die Kugel ist größer als die Halbkugel, die gelb ist.
c) Die Kugel ist kleiner als die Halbkugel, die hellgrün ist.
d) Die Kugel ist kleiner als die Halbkugel, die gelb ist.
2. a) Der Zylinder ist höher als die Pyramide, die pink ist.
b) Der Zylinder ist höher als die Pyramide, die braun ist.
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c) Der Zylinder ist niedriger als die Pyramide, die pink ist.
d) Der Zylinder ist niedriger als die Pyramide, die braun ist.
3. a) Der Würfel ist breiter als die Kugel, die orange ist.
b) Der Würfel ist breiter als die Kugel, die lila ist.
c) Der Würfel ist schmaler als die Kugel, die orange ist.
d) Der Würfel ist schmaler als die Kugel, die lila ist.
4. a) Die Kugel ist breiter als der Zylinder, der rosa ist.
b) Die Kugel ist breiter als der Zylinder, der grau ist.
c) Die Kugel ist schmaler als der Zylinder, der rosa ist.
d) Die Kugel ist schmaler als der Zylinder, der grau ist.
5. a) Die Halbkugel ist größer als der Würfel, der rot ist.
b) Die Halbkugel ist größer als der Würfel, der blau ist.
c) Die Halbkugel ist kleiner als der Würfel, der rot ist.
d) Die Halbkugel ist kleiner als der Würfel, der blau ist.
6. a) Der Quader ist breiter als das Ei, das gelb ist.
b) Der Quader ist breiter als das Ei, das rot ist.
c) Der Quader ist schmaler als das Ei, das gelb ist.
d) Der Quader ist schmaler als das Ei, das rot ist.
7. a) Der Stern ist größer als der Kegel, der grün ist.
b) Der Stern ist größer als der Kegel, der hellblau ist.
c) Der Stern ist kleiner als der Kegel, der grün ist.
d) Der Stern ist kleiner als der Kegel, der hellblau ist.
8. a) Der Kegel ist höher als das Herz, das silber ist.
b) Der Kegel ist höher als das Herz, das hellgrün ist.
c) Der Kegel ist niedriger als das Herz, das silber ist.
d) Der Kegel ist niedriger als das Herz, das hellgrün ist.
9. a) Der Keil ist breiter als der Ring, der hellblau ist.
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b) Der Keil ist breiter als der Ring, der pink ist.
c) Der Keil ist schmaler als der Ring, der hellblau ist.
d) Der Keil ist schmaler als der Ring, der pink ist.
10. a) Der Stern ist höher als der Keil, der braun ist.
b) Der Stern ist höher als der Keil, der orange ist.
c) Der Stern ist niedriger als der Keil, der braun ist.
d) Der Stern ist niedriger als der Keil, der orange ist.
11. a) Das Ei ist größer als der Quader, der schwarz ist.
b) Das Ei ist größer als der Quader, der grün ist.
c) Das Ei ist kleiner als der Quader, der schwarz ist.
d) Das Ei ist kleiner als der Quader, der grün ist.
12. a) Der Kegel ist höher als der Stern, der blau ist.
b) Der Kegel ist höher als der Stern, der schwarz ist.
c) Der Kegel ist niedriger als der Stern, der blau ist.
d) Der Kegel ist niedriger als der Stern, der schwarz ist.
13. a) Der Quader ist breiter als die Halbkugel, die hellgrün ist.
b) Der Quader ist breiter als die Halbkugel, die gelb ist.
c) Der Quader ist schmaler als die Halbkugel, die hellgrün ist.
d) Der Quader ist schmaler als die Halbkugel, die gelb ist.
14. a) Die Kugel ist gößer als die Pyramide, die pink ist.
b) Die Kugel ist gößer als die Pyramide, die braun ist.
c) Die Kugel ist kleiner als die Pyramide, die pink ist.
d) Die Kugel ist kleiner als die Pyramide, die braun ist.
15. a) Der Ring ist höher als die Kugel, die orange ist.
b) Der Ring ist höher als die Kugel, die lila ist.
c) Der Ring ist niedriger als die Kugel, die orange ist.
d) Der Ring ist niedriger als die Kugel, die lila ist.
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16. a) Der Würfel ist höher als der Zylinder, der rosa ist.
b) Der Würfel ist höher als der Zylinder, der grau ist.
c) Der Würfel ist niedriger als der Zylinder, der rosa ist.
d) Der Würfel ist niedriger als der Zylinder, der grau ist.
17. a) Die Pyramide ist breiter als der Würfel, der rot ist.
b) Die Pyramide ist breiter als der Würfel, der blau ist.
c) Die Pyramide ist schmaler als der Würfel, der rot ist.
d) Die Pyramide ist schmaler als der Würfel, der blau ist.
18. a) Die Halbkugel ist größer als das Ei, das gelb ist.
b) Die Halbkugel ist größer als das Ei, das rot ist.
c) Die Halbkugel ist kleiner als das Ei, das gelb ist.
d) Die Halbkugel ist kleiner als das Ei, das rot ist.
19. a) Das Herz ist höher als der Kegel, der grün ist.
b) Das Herz ist höher als der Kegel, der hellblau ist.
c) Das Herz ist niedriger als der Kegel, der grün ist.
d) Das Herz ist niedriger als der Kegel, der hellblau ist.
20. a) Der Zylinder ist größer als das Herz, das silber ist.
b) Der Zylinder ist größer als das Herz, das hellgrün ist.
c) Der Zylinder ist kleiner als das Herz, das silber ist.
d) Der Zylinder ist kleiner als das Herz, das hellgrün ist.
21. a) Die Pyramide ist höher als der Ring, der hellblau ist.
b) Die Pyramide ist höher als der Ring, der pink ist.
c) Die Pyramide ist niedriger als der Ring, der hellblau ist.
d) Die Pyramide ist niedriger als der Ring, der pink ist.
22. a) Der Würfel ist breiter als der Keil, der braun ist.
b) Der Würfel ist breiter als der Keil, der orange ist.
c) Der Würfel ist schmaler als der Keil, der braun ist.
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d) Der Würfel ist schmaler als der Keil, der orange ist.
23. a) Der Ring ist breiter als der Quader, der schwarz ist.
b) Der Ring ist breiter als der Quader, der grün ist.
c) Der Ring ist schmaler als der Quader, der schwarz ist.
d) Der Ring ist schmaler als der Quader, der grün ist.
24. a) Das Herz ist größer als der Stern, der blau ist.
b) Das Herz ist größer als der Stern, der schwarz ist.
c) Das Herz ist kleiner als der Stern, der blau ist.
d) Das Herz ist kleiner als der Stern, der schwarz ist.
A.3. Experiment 4
1. a) Die Kugel ist größer als die grüne Halbkugel.
b) Die grüne Halbkugel ist kleiner als die Kugel.
c) Die Kugel ist kleiner als die gelbe Halbkugel.
d) Die gelbe Halbkugel ist größer als die Kugel.
2. a) Der Zylinder ist höher als die pinke Pyramide.
b) Die pinke Pyramide ist niedriger als der Zylinder.
c) Der Zylinder is niedriger als die braune Pyramide.
d) Die braune Pyramide ist höher als der Zylinder.
3. a) Der Würfel ist breiter als die orange Kugel.
b) Die orange Kugel ist schmaler als der Würfel.
c) Der Würfel ist schmaler als die lila Kugel.
d) Die lila Kugel ist breiter als der Würfel.
4. a) Die Kugel ist breiter als der rosa Zylinder.
b) Der rosa Zylinder ist schmaler als die Kugel.
c) Die Kugel ist schmaler als der graue Zylinder.
d) Der graue Zylinder ist breiter als die Kugel.
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5. a) Die Halbkugel ist größer als der rote Würfel.
b) Der rote Würfel ist kleiner als die Halbkugel.
c) Die Halbkugel ist kleiner als der blaue Würfel.
d) Der blaue Würfel ist größer als die Halbkugel.
6. a) Der Quader ist breiter als das gelbe Ei.
b) Das gelbe Ei ist schmaler als der Quader.
c) Der Quader ist schmaler als das rote Ei.
d) Das rote Ei ist breiter als der Quader.
7. a) Der Stern ist größer als der grüne Kegel.
b) Der grüne Kegel ist kleiner als der Stern.
c) Der Stern ist kleiner als der blaue Kegel.
d) Der blaue Kegel ist größer als der Stern.
8. a) Der Kegel ist höher als das silberne Herz.
b) Das silberne Herz ist niedriger als der Kegel.
c) Der Kegel ist niedriger als das grüne Herz.
d) Das grüne Herz ist höher als der Kegel.
9. a) Der Keil ist breiter als der blaue Ring.
b) Der blaue Ring ist schmaler als der Keil.
c) Der Keil ist schmaler als der pinke Ring.
d) Der pinke Ring ist breiter als der Keil.
10. a) Der Stern ist höher als der braune Keil.
b) Der braune Keil ist niedriger als der Stern.
c) Der Stern ist niedriger als der orange Keil.
d) Der orange Keil ist höher als der Stern.
11. a) Das Ei ist größer als der schwarze Quader.
b) Der schwarze Quader ist kleiner als das Ei.
c) Das Ei ist kleiner als der grüne Quader.
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d) Der grüne Quader ist größer als das Ei.
12. a) Der Kegel ist höher als der blaue Stern.
b) Der blaue Stern ist niedriger als der Kegel.
c) Der Kegel ist niedriger als der schwarze Stern.
d) Der schwarze Stern ist höher als der Kegel.
13. a) Der Quader ist breiter als die grüne Halbkugel,.
b) Die grüne Halbkugel ist schmaler als der Quader.
c) Der Quader ist schmaler als die gelbe Halbkugel.
d) Die gelbe Halbkugel ist breiter als der Quader.
14. a) Die Kugel ist gößer als die pinke Pyramide.
b) Die pinke Pyramide ist kleiner als die Kugel.
c) Die Kugel ist kleiner als die braune Pyramide.
d) Die braune Pyramider ist größer als die Kugel.
15. a) Der Ring ist höher als die orange Kugel.
b) Die orange Kugel ist niedriger als der Ring.
c) Der Ring ist niedriger als die lila Kugel.
d) Die lila Kugel ist höher als der Ring.
16. a) Der Würfel ist höher als der rosa Zylinder.
b) Der rosa Zylinder ist niedriger als der Würfel.
c) Der Würfel ist niedriger als der graue Zylinder.
d) Der graue Zylinder ist höher als der Würfel.
17. a) Die Pyramide ist breiter als der rote Würfel.
b) Der rote Würfel ist schmaler als die Pyramide.
c) Die Pyramide ist schmaler als der blaue Würfel.
d) Der blaue Würfel ist breiter als die Pyramide.
18. a) Die Halbkugel ist größer als das gelbe Ei.
b) Das gelber Ei ist kleiner als die Halbkugel.
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c) Die Halbkugel ist kleiner als das rote Ei.
d) Das rote Ei ist größer als die Halbkugel.
19. a) Das Herz ist höher als der grüne Kegel.
b) Der grüne Kegel ist niedriger als das Herz.
c) Das Herz ist niedriger als der blaue Kegel.
d) Der blaue Kegel ist höher als das Herz.
20. a) Der Zylinder ist größer als das silberne Herz.
b) Das silberne Herz ist kleiner als der Zylinder.
c) Der Zylinder ist kleiner als das grüne Herz.
d) Das grüne Herz ist größer als der Zylinder.
21. a) Die Pyramide ist höher als der blaue Ring.
b) Der blaue Ring ist niedriger als die Pyramide.
c) Die Pyramide ist niedriger als der pinke Ring.
d) Der pinke Ring ist höher als die Pyramide.
22. a) Der Würfel ist breiter als der braune Keil.
b) Der braune Keil ist schmaler als der Würfel.
c) Der Würfel ist schmaler als der orange Keil.
d) Der orange Keil ist breiter als der Würfel.
23. a) Der Ring ist breiter als der schwarze Quader.
b) Der schwarze Quader ist schmaler als der Ring.
c) Der Ring ist schmaler als der grüne Quader.
d) Der grüne Quader ist breiter als der Ring.
24. a) Das Herz ist größer als der blaue Stern.
b) Der blaue Stern ist kleiner als das Herz.
c) Das Herz ist kleiner als der schwarze Stern.
d) Der schwarze Stern ist größer als das Herz.
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A.4. Experiment 5
1. (Scene 1)
a) Die rote Kugel ist größer als die grüne Halbkugel.
b) Die grüne Halbkugel ist kleiner als die rote Kugel.
c) Die rote Kugel ist kleiner als die gelbe Halbkugel.
d) Die gelbe Halbkugel ist größer als die rote Kugel.
2. (Scene 2)
a) Der orange Zylinder ist höher als die pinke Pyramide.
b) Die pinke Pyramide ist niedriger als der orange Zylinder.
c) Der orange Zylinder is niedriger als die braune Pyramide.
d) Die braune Pyramide ist höher als der orange Zylinder.
3. (Scene 6)
a) Der blaue Quader ist breiter als das gelbe Ei.
b) Das gelbe Ei ist schmaler als der blaue Quader.
c) Der blaue Quader ist schmaler als das rote Ei.
d) Das rote Ei ist breiter als der blaue Quader.
4. (Scene 7)
a) Der schwarze Stern ist größer als der grüne Kegel.
b) Der grüne Kegel ist kleiner als der schwarze Stern.
c) Der schwarze Stern ist kleiner als der blaue Kegel.
d) Der blaue Kegel ist größer als der schwarze Stern.
5. (Scene 8)
a) Der gelbe Kegel ist höher als das silberne Herz.
b) Das silberne Herz ist niedriger als der gelbe Kegel.
c) Der gelbe Kegel ist niedriger als das grüne Herz.
d) Das grüne Herz ist höher als der gelbe Kegel.
6. (Scene 9)
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a) Der graue Keil ist breiter als der blaue Ring.
b) Der blaue Ring ist schmaler als der graue Keil.
c) Der graue Keil ist schmaler als der pinke Ring.
d) Der pinke Ring ist breiter als der graue Keil.
7. (Scene 10)
a) Der blaue Stern ist höher als der braune Keil.
b) Der braune Keil ist niedriger als der blaue Stern.
c) Der blaue Stern ist niedriger als der orange Keil.
d) Der orange Keil ist höher als der blaue Stern.
8. (Scene 11)
a) Das pinke Ei ist größer als der schwarze Quader.
b) Der schwarze Quader ist kleiner als das pinke Ei.
c) Das pinke Ei ist kleiner als der grüne Quader.
d) Der grüne Quader ist größer als das pinke Ei.
9. (Scene 13)
a) Der blaue Quader ist breiter als die grüne Halbkugel,.
b) Die grüne Halbkugel ist schmaler als der blaue Quader.
c) Der blaue Quader ist schmaler als die gelbe Halbkugel.
d) Die gelbe Halbkugel ist breiter als der blaue Quader.
10. (Scene 14)
a) Die rote Kugel ist gößer als die pinke Pyramide.
b) Die pinke Pyramide ist kleiner als die rote Kugel.
c) Die rote Kugel ist kleiner als die braune Pyramide.
d) Die braune Pyramider ist größer als die rote Kugel.
11. (Scene 15)
a) Der braune Ring ist höher als die orange Kugel.
b) Die orange Kugel ist niedriger als der braune Ring.
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c) Der braune Ring ist niedriger als die lila Kugel.
d) Die lila Kugel ist höher als der braune Ring.
12. (Scene 16)
a) Der grüne Würfel ist höher als der rosa Zylinder.
b) Der rosa Zylinder ist niedriger als der grüne Würfel.
c) Der grüne Würfel ist niedriger als der graue Zylinder.
d) Der graue Zylinder ist höher als der grüne Würfel.
13. (Scene 17)
a) Die grüne Pyramide ist breiter als der rote Würfel.
b) Der rote Würfel ist schmaler als die grüne Pyramide.
c) Die grüne Pyramide ist schmaler als der blaue Würfel.
d) Der blaue Würfel ist breiter als die grüne Pyramide.
14. (Scene 18)
a) Die blaue Halbkugel ist größer als das gelbe Ei.
b) Das gelber Ei ist kleiner als die blaue Halbkugel.
c) Die blaue Halbkugel ist kleiner als das rote Ei.
d) Das rote Ei ist größer als die blaue Halbkugel.
15. (Scene 19)
a) Das lila Herz ist höher als der grüne Kegel.
b) Der grüne Kegel ist niedriger als das lila Herz.
c) Das lila Herz ist niedriger als der blaue Kegel.
d) Der blaue Kegel ist höher als das lila Herz.
16. (Scene 20)
a) Der orange Zylinder ist größer als das silberne Herz.
b) Das silberne Herz ist kleiner als der orange Zylinder.
c) Der orange Zylinder ist kleiner als das grüne Herz.
d) Das grüne Herz ist größer als der orange Zylinder.
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17. (Scene 22)
a) Der grüne Würfel ist breiter als der braune Keil.
b) Der braune Keil ist schmaler als der grüne Würfel.
c) Der grüne Würfel ist schmaler als der orange Keil.
d) Der orange Keil ist breiter als der grüne Würfel.
18. (Scene 23)
a) Der braune Ring ist breiter als der schwarze Quader.
b) Der schwarze Quader ist schmaler als der braune Ring.
c) Der braune Ring ist schmaler als der grüne Quader.
d) Der grüne Quader ist breiter als der braune Ring.
19. (Scene 24)
a) Das lila Herz ist größer als der blaue Stern.
b) Der blaue Stern ist kleiner als das lila Herz.
c) Das lila Herz ist kleiner als der schwarze Stern.
d) Der schwarze Stern ist größer als das lila Herz.
20. (Scene 4)
a) Die rote Kugel ist breiter als der rosa Zylinder.
b) Der rosa Zylinder ist schmaler als die rote Kugel.
c) Die rote Kugel ist schmaler als der graue Zylinder.
d) Der graue Zylinder ist breiter als die rote Kugel.
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B.1. Experiment 1
Item 1
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 2
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
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Item 3
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 4
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 5
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 6
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
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Item 7
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 8
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 9
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 10
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
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Item 11
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 12
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 13
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 14
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
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Item 15
(a) ambiguous (b) unambiguous
Item 16
(c) ambiguous (d) unambiguous
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B.2. Experiments 2 - 5
Item 1
Item 2
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Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
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Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
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Item 9
Item 10
Item 11
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Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
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Item 15
Item 16
Item 17
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Item 18
Item 19
Item 20
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Item 21
Item 22
Item 23
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Item 24
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